There are alot of stunned players in game 3 in particular regarding the German team's airforce in particular.

Gone from the skies are the Me109 and even Fw190. How can this be?

Well, at one time there were several players on the team. This split into 3 factions. The existing leadership, one group that wanted to overthrow the Nazi Party in favour of simple military dictatorship ruled by Prussian Military tradition, the other for a return to civilian Weimar gov't under a Kaiser. Neither succeeded, partially because both coups countered eachother. However, it did reveal some unknown rules and characteristics about my game. The Political leader playing Hitler and others were given reports of possible consequences and were surprised. One coup group were 'shot' and off the team. The others stayed and decided that they would pursue a Weimar route and get rid of Hitler and the Nazi Party. There were many reasons for this, but one revelation was the following.

Hitler, and his Nazi Party Leadership, were quite unreasonably prejudicial and foolishly discriminatory when it came to things such as accepted production designs.

He 112B-0 and B-1

Origin: Ernst Heinkel AG
Type: Single-seat fighter and light ground attack
Engine: One 680hp Junkers Jumo 210Ea inverted-vee-12 liquid-cooled.
Dimensions: (He112) span 9.1m; length 9.3m; height 3.85m
Weights: Empty 1620kg; loaded 2250
Performance: Maximum speed 510km/h; inicital climb 700m/min; service ceiling 8500m; range 1100km.
Armament: Two 20mm Oerlikon MG FF cannon in outer wings and two 97.92mm Rheinmetall MG 17 machine guns in sides of fuselage; underwing racks for six 10kg fragmentation bombs.
History: First flight (He 112V-1) September 1935; (B-series production prototype) May 1937; final delivery (Romania) September 1939.
Development: One of the first requirements issued by the rapidly expandied RLM under the Nazis was a specification for a completely new monoplane fighter to replace the Ar 68 and He51. Heinkel's team under the Gunthers used He 70 experience to create the shapely He 112, which was much smaller and of wholly light-alloy stressed skin construction. Powered by a British Kestrel, it was matched at Travemunde against the similarly powered Bf109 prototype, as well as the "Aslo rans", the Ar80 and Fw159. Though Heinkel's fighter was marginally slower, it had better field performance, much better pilot view (especially on the ground), a wide-track landing gear and considerably better manoeuverablility. Many, especially Heinkel, were amazed when the Messershmitt design was chosen for the Luftwaffe, thought the He112 was continued as an insurance. Nothing Heinkel could do with improved versions could shake the RLM's rejetion, despite the delight of the RLM test pilots in flying them. Thirty He 112B-0 fighters were supplied to th eLuftwaffe for evaluation, but 17 were pormplty shipped to Spain (not as part of the Legion Kondor but flown by volunteer civilians). There they were judged superior to the Bf 109C, and 15 countinued in Spanish service until after World War II. All but one of the other Luftwaffe machines were sold to the Japanese Navy, which disliked them intensely because of their high wing loading. Romania bout 13 B-0 and 11 B-1 fighters in 1939 and used them in the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.

Worse...

Heinkel He 100

Origin: Ernst Heinkel AG
Type: Single-seat fighter.
Engine: 1,175hp Damiler-Benz DB 601 Aa inverted-vee-12 liquid-cooled.
Dimensions: Span 9.41m; length 8.195m; height 3.60m
Weights: (D-1) Empty 1810kg; max loaded 2500kg
Performance: (D-1) max speed 670km/h; service ceiling 11,000, range 900km
Development: all these are quotes... "Undaunted by loss of the Luftwaffe's figher orders to BFW with the 109, Heinkel proposed a much faster fighter, with structure completely different from the rather ynimpressive He 112 to make it more efficient and much quicker an cheaper to build. The resulting Projekt 1035 was completed on 25 May 1937 and at the end of that year the now-informed RLM sanctioned a prototype and ten pre-production machines. Heinkel managed to secure the number "100" though this had been previously alotted to Fieseler. The first prototype flew on 22 Hanuary 1938, and was clearly outstandingly fast, being small and having a surface-evaporation cooling system instead of a draggy radiatro. Though there were many problems, and Luftwaffe test pilots disliked the high wing loading, Udet himself flew the V2 to a new world 100km circuit record at 634.73km/h(394.6mph). On 30 March 1939 Hans Dieterle, flying the clipped -wing V3, took the world speed record at 746.6km/h(463.92mph). But the RLM saw no reason for mass production, and six prototypes were sold to the Soviet Union and three He 100D-) to Japan, with armament of two MG 17 and a 20mm MG/FF. The remaining 12 He 100D-1 fighters formed a Heinkel-Rostock defence unit, but in 1940 were publicised by Goebbell's propaganda machine in such a way as to convince Britain there was a fighter in large-scale service called the "He 113".

Bf/Me 109...560km/h, ceiling 10500m, range 700-800km.(at the time).

Let's look at another obscene example...

Blohm und Voss BV 155 Me 155a and B, Bv 155 V1 to V3

Origin: Messerschmitt AG, later Blohm und Voss, Abt. Flugzeugbau
Type: High-altitude interceptor.
Engine: (155B) DB 603A with TKL 15 turbocharger giving 1,450hp at 15000
Dimensions: Span (B) 20.5m; length 12m; height 2.98m
Weights: (B) empty 4870kg; loaded (max armament) 6016kg
Performance: (B) maximum speed 690km/h at 16,000m; range at high altitude 1440km.
Development: Messerschmitt began the Me 155 as a derivative of the Bf 109 to operate from the resumed carrier Graf Zeppelin, but when this unhappy ship again fell from favour the 155 reappeared as a pinpoint bomber with 10000kg bomb and finally in 1943 as a long-span

So, why were the He 112, He 100 and He 155s passed over again and again?

Successive new models of the He112 would have kept it right up there with the Spitfire in future years. Its wide landing gear and durability would permit it to stay closer to the front in poor conditions than either the Spitfire or Bf 109. Pilot visibility was a delight, years ahead of the Spitfire and Mustang bubble canopies. It even presented a smaller target, yet just as durable. Assuming one abandoned the ground support role just like the British did the P51 eventually, one might use the wing potential for greater fire-power and/or fuel capacity increasing range. Even if it never had the range of the P51(which Heinkel did think he could manage however), it would in all probability be able to out-dogfight it. It's major failings at the time, however, were speed and ceiling. It was still believed, especially in Europe, that the time of the 'derstroyers' was at hand. Fast high-speed, higher altitude twin-engine bombers. Here, the He 112 appeared inferior to the Bf 109. Had they known that the time of the 'destroyers' was in fact coming to a close rather than its own, and that dog-fighting would once again be the key to air-superiority, they probably would've given Heinkel the benefit of the doubt.

The He100 was inexplicable though. It completely solved the issue. For its production run it had no rival for sheer speed anywhere in the world making the probability of future versions maintaining this advantage all but guaranteed. The larger Mustang and even Spitfires would eventually match these speeds but at least 3 if not 5 years later. This is a life-time in respects to air-superiority. Passing over the He 112 might be defendable giving the reasoning of the time. Passing over the He 100 is indefensible by any practical means. It was clearly the choice that should have been made.

The Bv 155 was another victim against reason. Although this one couldn't claim the agility or dogfighting superiority of the aforementioned rebuffed Heinkels, it was clearly a brilliant design. A little longer than the P51 with massive wingspan(ingeniously foldable for carriers though), it again could out-run both the P51 and Spitfires of the periods. As a carrier plane it would've been ideally cost-effective as both figher and attack. Imagine an aircraft carrier that only had to worry about spare parts et al for one type of plane. Where you could literally decide in one battle to have all of them as fighters, or in another all as attack or modify any ratio as you see fit due to losses and circumstances presented with at sea. It gives you a durability no other navy say possibly the British with their Seafire before having to withdraw to make up losses. It can't be overstated how important this would be. Carriers couldn't simply transfer fighters and attack units to others to balance out losses as easily as one might think and this is an important factor where a still active carrier might have too high a fighter-attack ratio to be an offensive threat for the remainding of the battle while its mate might have the reverse problem.

The 1943 version would be more than adequate as a carrier interceptor because of its superior speed and armour, however wouldn't match up against the Allies' fighters when escorting their own raids. The designers had an arguement for this however. The Bv 155 had unmatched ceiling, where Allied carrier fighters especially couldn't even go let alone would give up their performance advantage. The Bv 155 would approach untouchably high, dive to whichever altitude it was armed for at speeds that no Allied carrier fighter could intercept until 1945(the heavy reinforced structure of the 155 here would make this possible), slow to attack speed required, then once the payload was exhausted, and the 155 was again 'light' it could again use its 690km/h speed to try out-run the Corsairs, Hellcats, Spitfires, Bearcats or whatever. Goering had already made up his mind though. The original BV 155 lacked the range of the American or Japanese carrier planes, it didn't matter how effective it would be within that range.

Oddly enough, one Japanese naval observer did make the following report for his own nation's perusal although it was apparently not even opened by Goering despite the urgings of some Kreigsmarine converts to carrier potential. Basically it said that the Bv 155's dual role potential was the key. Say you had 50 of them on a carrier. Technically, you could keep all 50 of them going as figher cap during the battle. The enemy carriers had to either stay on station or attempt the often-risky rendezvous at another point. Either way, this gave the German carrier the opportunity to close on the enemy carrier with more fighter cap than there should be considering capacity. German carriers designs like the Graf Zeppelin might only carry 50 or so planes until the larger conversions or even Europa would come out, however, what they gave up in carrying capacity went to maintain high speed with signficantly more armour and armament. Worse for the Allies was the oddly superior German elevator and especially catapult system that could launch and retrieve planes more than twice as fast as the best Allied design. This also cannot be under-valued. Remember Midway.

So, increase your fighter ratio, fend off the superior-ranged attacks(at least of the Americans) and close to withing striking distance of the enemy. Reverse your ratio from fighters to attack armed. Go in at high altitude, strike fast and get out fast. Then go from there. Although the Japanese at the time were staunchly range-minded(hit him first), they were looking at this theory by the end of the war themselves with even the short-ranged Kikka jet fighter/attack plane especially on planned fast light carriers.

Another point often overlooked though, is that the Germans weren't looking at 'Pacific type carrier battles'. They were looking to blockade England into submission or at least keeping her off of her D-Day plans. Raiders are pecularily different than battlegroups. A single fast raider like the Tirpitz caused entire heavily escorted convoys to scatter and be picked off by uboats and Luftwaffe units, with the Tirpitz for example not sinking a singly merchantman herself, yet causing the destruction of an entire convoy headed for Murmansk. Keep in mind that the British committed 12 times as many ships, planes and resources to the destruction of the Bismark(which almost got away anyways). Surface raiders did no where near the damage that uboats or even the German and Italian airforces did to Allied shipping, however, just their threat of engaging a convoy on the surface amplified the submarine and airforce effectiveness many times over.

Now add an aircraft carrier to the mix. This becomes untenable. The Bismark or even uboats with air support becomes a far greater issue and the economics become bleak. If it takes 10 ships to catch and sink one raider, then the blockade becomes all the more effective even with 100% losses.

Now remember, the Germans weren't planning for a Pacific Theatre campaign. The Italians were, and they were successfully working on American type carriers with longer ranged planes. But the Germans weren't. The North Atlantic is NOT carrier-friendly. Most of the year only the most durable planes can even operate from carriers. Even the Essex class carriers found themselves unable to launch fighters anywhere near winter and were relegated to recon and possible ASW missions at best.

Recon and detection is the key here. The greatest threat to the uboats was early detection and attack from the air. A German carrier with the all-weather Bv 155 would turn the tables. Well beyond the range of Luftwaffe land-based recons, the Graf Zeppelin for example, would be able to detect Allied convoys and easily evade if not shrug off Allied air response permitted in the North Atlantic. Worse, even if it could not attack by air itself(something that devastated Japanese convoys by the end of the war), it could lend air support to the incoming uboats who feared air detection and attack above all. Literally the German carrier could be a floating mobile Uboat HQ capable of even re-fueling and re-arming them at sea. This was something planned by Yamamoto himself before he died.

Things go awfully wrong for the Allies at this point. Historically in the Atlantic we almost lost, even after the Americans joined the war full bore. The Allied Atlantic fleets were optimized in size, type and formation to combat uboats and the odd fast surface raider. It would take immensely more resources and manpower to add to that defense the role of countering a carrier surface raider threat, not to mention if the German surface fleet sortied out in support with it even in a small battlegroup.

Again, don't think in terms of Pacific Carrier Battles here. Think blockade. If the Allies had to commit 10 ships per enemy surface raider, (remember how effective the Tirpitz was in increasing uboat and Luftwaffe kills without killing anything herself), think of the number and types of units the Allies would have to commit to try to counter each carrier in support of this.

• Anytime you can sacrifice one dollar to cost your enemy 10 or even 2 dollars, it is cost effective.
• A single engine figher going down with a four-engine bomber, is cost effective.
• A submarine being sunk after sinking 10 times its tonnage, is cost effective.
• Even without a loss, forcing the enemy to commit 5 times as many ships, 5 times as much fuel to even keep your aircraft carrier at bay (even if not sinking it), is cost effective.

So, the Bv 155 was probably the worst passed-up offensive threat(oddly enough) of all three negligently denied aircraft designs mentioned here for the Germans.

Bv 155 as a ground attack. Granted, it didn't have the range one would like, but it was ridiculously fast and durable even when fully loaded with its very large wing-load capacity. Hitler wanted the Me262 used as a short-ranged but fast ground attack plane. He should have chosen the Bv 155. Attack planes need to slow down anyways to increase their accuracy, so although the Bv 155 was slower than the Me 262, it could carry a larger payload, was a superior weaponry platform(nuts to rockets) and could still use its superior speed to decrease the effectiveness of enemy response, interception and flak(let alone its superior durability).

Bv 155 as high altitude interceptor. Again, no excuse here. At medium and low altitudes it lacked agility to dogfight with the best Allied fighters. However, at high and highest altitudes it would actually be the superior fighter. With the increasingly effective German radar and flak towards the end of the war, the Allies were starting to abandon their reliance on their fighter escort supremacy for higher altitude where their fighter's performance waned exponentially.

The German answer to this was to be the jets and rockets as well as the impressive but too late FW 152 tank. However, they already had the answer to this in the passed-up Bv 155. Using the same slash and gash attacks planned by the Me262, the 155 could maintain such high speed at altitude higher than our highest ceiling bombers that it could literally ignore even our post-war escorts for years to come. The 155 was also much more durable than the Me262 or even Fw152 tank so could resist heavy bomber defensive guns better. The 155 could hold more heavy weaponry from 30mm cannons to rockets and still outrun the best Allied fighters at those altitudes. Moreover, it made economic sense. The 155 could continue to use the same engine production lines as the rest of the Messershmitt aircraft. It was less costly to produce, more durable and easier to repair than the jet and rocket options(although the Fw engines were cheaper than the DBs as well, they didn't operate as well at high altitudes for obvious radial reasons).

Even if the Allies dropped back down to just high altitude to give their fighters back some of their bite, the Bv 155 would still be a slash attack threat. If you released the Me109s and especially Fw190s from attacking the bombers to engage the P51s instead, then the Allies are still in for a mess of trouble at the best of high altitudes.

So, in summary, if the Bv 155 was put into production in 1940 or even 1941 let alone by 1943 at latest, it could have made significant changes to the face of the war. On the sea, with the Graf Zeppelin at least, it would have greatly affected Allied resource allocation and decreased the chance of Allied naval victory, delayed or at all. On the ground, it would have devasted Russian armour columns worse than the Sturmovik did to the Germans. It might've been the straw to break Stalin's back in the East, especially in 1941 and 1942 when Germany ruled the skies on the Eastern Front. Possibly even in 1943. Hell, even Kursk might've looked different.

Against the bombers, the Allies in all probability would have called off the daylight strategic bombing raids over Europe as they so nearly did in 1943 without sufficient fighter escort support. Even if they didn't then, this single engine strike plane would've realized the dream of the 'derstroyer' theory and caused many more losses to Allied bomber fleets and decreasing Allied bombing effectiveness on Axis production.

• The He 112, in hindsight, should have been chosen over the Bf 109 as a dogfighter.
• The He 100, in all sight, should have been chosen as the mainstay German fighter period.
• The He 155, in all sight, was an inexcusable error passing up probably the best multi-role strike plane design the Germans had.

So, this all begs one to ask, ...why?

Simply put, after all this, .... 'greed, ego and politics'. For the same reason the Horta brothers were continually denied...(they invented the single-wing radar resistant fighter/bomber that the modern American super-planes are inspired from).

The War Ministry and RLM under the Nazis, were bound by Nazi leadership, political concerns if not individual egos. If the owners of a company weren't Nazis, their products were discriminated against. Even if they were, those companies that offered the best lobbies, political contributions and so on, were usually given preference again. If Hitler or some other high-ranking Nazi like Goering or even Hitler's secretary Borhman didn't like someone, again that nixed common sense. German test pilots and Galland himself were constantly outraged at the 'politics and business' of the war effort and claim that Germany could have won the war with even just a few exceptions to this rule. It should be pointed out, however, that this kind of thing happened in every country even the USSR. Goering himself nixed the German aircraft carrier matters because of his own ego. This would've happened even without Hitler's own concerns of the sea and Kriegsmarine Admiralty biases. It sounds silly, sad and treasonous. These 3 planes themselves probably would've greatly changed the face of the war. However, it wasn't limited just to the Germans. The Germans were the worst, but Italy and Japan were pretty bad in this failing as well. The Allies and even the Soviets weren't immune to these failings either.

Leigh Miller
President Miller Systems