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© J. Glenn Friesen 2003. |
Notes regarding WdW I, 76-78 1. Corresponds to NC I, 110-11 2. The NC has an extensive discussion of irrationalist existentialism, and ancient Greek thought. It does not include the section on Aquinas. 3. This section discusses rationalism and irrationalism. 4. The idea of the lex aeterna subjects God to the law. The binding force of the law is brought back to God's will. But Dooyeweerd himself refers to the law which limits and determines as being dependent on the creative and sovereign will of God (II, 492). How is this any different? Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin's dictum that God is not subject to the law, but not arbitrary. What does "not arbitrary" mean if not some standard for God's actions? 5. Similar questions must be asked about Dooyeweerd's criticism of natural law. He says that it contains particularized law in itself as entelechia. How is this different from Dooyeweerd's view that law is potential and must be actualized or positivized? Is it because his view allows for a changing of the law to fit different subjective historical circumstances? These questions are beyond the scope of the present commentary and study. 6. I, 78 [NC I, 101]: The important point is made here that the 'actuality' spoken of by phenomenology is actually the kernel of each subject-function. What does this mean? First of all, acts occur in the supratemporal. The kernel of each subject-function is therefore in the supratemporal. Elsewhere he says that we know the kernel only in its analogies. We have to form an idea of the kernel. But this goes even further. It is the kernel of the subject function that is the actual. Temporal reality has both a law and a subject-side. The kernel of both the law-side and the subject-side is therefore in the supratemporal realm, at least insofar as human subjects are concerned. This whole discussion requires further research. what is clear is that any view that sees the aspects as "properties" of things of which we can form concepts is not in line with Dooyeweerd's own philosophy. 7. I, 78 [NC I, 101]: Another important point here is made here that Heidegger's view of "Vorhandenes" assumes a static givenness in the subject-side of reality. As I understand Dooyeweerd here, if temporal reality is not static, but dynamic, then Heidegger's criticism misses the mark. The dynamism consists in the temporal coherence [with other aspects and other things], and in the restless nature of being. This restlessness is towards God as Origin, but also towards the heart of humanity, as the religious supratemporal root of temporal reality. |
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