Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Herman Dooyeweerd: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee

 

© J. Glenn Friesen 2003-2006

Notes regarding WdW p. 5

1. Corresponds to NC I, 3-4.

2. Already in the headings for the Introduction, there are some differences between the WdW and the NC translation. The WdW gives the title for Book I as “De Wetsidee als Grondlegging der Wijsbegeerte” [The Law-Idea as Foundation of Philosophy]. The NC entitles Volume I “The Necessary Presupposition of Philosophy.” Note the singular of ‘presupposition’ as opposed to the WdW, which uses the word in the heading for the Prolegomena and speaks of “necessary presuppositions.” The WdW heading also refers to the Archimedean point.

3. The use of the term ‘presupposition’ must not be understood as a proposition that is accepted. That propositional view of Christian philosophy is not Dooyeweerdean, but rather in the line of Van Til's thought, as well as of those philosophers who refer to their work as “Reformed epistemology.” For Dooyeweerd, the presupposition is rather the foundation (grondlegging), the ontical apriori conditions that make possible our thinking in the first place. We approach (approximate) these apriori conditions by way of Ideas. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between these two senses of presuppositions (ontical and propositional) in his work Encyclopedia of the Science of Law. Dooyeweerd makes a distinction between subjective presuppositions [vooronderstellingen] and “that which is presupposed” [de vooronderstelde]. The Ideas, as “subjective presuppositions,” point towards “what is presupposed.” Subjective presuppositions are our Ideas as hypotheses, pointing towards the supratemporal a priori conditions that make our Ideas possible. These a priori conditions are “what is presupposed,” but they are not themselves Ideas or even propositions. The present translation of the Encyclopedia does not always adequately distinguish between these two meanings of presuppositions. For example, the word for conditions [voorwaarden] is translated as ‘presuppositions.’ See my critique of the present translation of the Encyclopedia.

4. The heading of the NC refers to “The First Way of a Transcendental Critique.” I do not accept the contention of Van Til and others that the NC marks a change to a transcendental from a transcendent approach. The transcendental critique is already very evident in the WdW, although Dooyeweerd speaks of a "sharpening" of his method in the NC (NC I, 34). In fact, the same transcendental arguments against Kant appear in Baader a hundred years earlier. WdW I, 52 clearly distinguishes between transcendent and transcendental critique. The transcendental argument is based on the religious-cosmological apriori of which the thinker must give account.

5. Although the transcendental way is already in the WdW, there is a difference in emphasis between the WdW and the NC. Dooyeweerd speaks of a “sharpening” of the transcendental method. I believe that this is due to Dooyeweerd’s increasing ecumenism. In the NC, Dooyeweerd distances himself from those who refer to his philosophy as ‘Calvinistic.’ He says that the line of antithesis runs through the heart of each of us [and not between Calvinists and other groups] (NC I, 524). In emphasizing the transcendental method, he is moving away from a narrower dogmatic, transcendent approach. But to classify the WdW as totally transcendent would miss the fact that it also uses a transcendental argument.

6. The very first line of the Prolegomena refers to our experience. This is often overlooked. Dooyeweerd distinguishes our pre-theoretical experience from our theoretical experience. But he also distinguishes both our pre-theoretical and our theoretical experience from the experience of our central selfhood, which he later refers to as a “cosmic self-consciousness.” Too often Dooyeweerd has been interpreted in terms of theoretical (and specifically theological) presuppositions, following Van Til’s approach. But Dooyeweerd’s presuppositions are experiential, relating to our being, and to our supratemporal self. And they are ontological. This is the ontical, religious-cosmological a priori. In this first passage of the Prolegomena, Dooyeweerd starts with both our pre-theoretical and our theoretical experience. He later speaks of our supratemporal experience. His emphasis on experience is an answer to the charge of “fideism” that is sometimes leveled against Dooyeweerd (although it may be correct to assert this charge against some Reformational philosophy that emphasizes conceptual presuppositions). Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on experience will (and has) troubled some Reformed theologians, who see it as a return to “natural theology.” But Dooyeweerd (like Baader) rejects as dualistic the very distinction between natural and supernatural.

7. Dooyeweerd refers to our experience as it is “given.” This is important in the dialogue with postmodernism today. We do not construct our reality. It is given. As Baader says that our knowledge is a ‘finden’ (finding), and not an ‘erfinden’ (invention). The knowledge that we find derives from a source that ‘dominates’ and founds this knowledge. (Weltalter 261).

8. The word translated in the NC as ‘experience’ is ‘instelling.’ To merely refer to it as ‘experience’ misses the contrast between ‘instelling’ and ‘uiteen-stelling.’ Dooyeweerd is here playing with words, to show the contrast between pre-theoretical and theoretical experience. I believe that by ‘instelling’ he means the centripetal, inward-directed, enstatic experience of the self, relating temporal reality towards the center and the supratemporal. In naïve experience, we are set or fitted within [‘ingesteld’] full temporal reality, in its concrete coherence of all its meaning-sides (WdW I, 48). Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘enstasis’ to describe our naive, pre-theoretical experience of being fitted into temporal reality in its coherence. So enstasis is the relation of equilibrium between our supratemporal selfhood as center, and temporal reality.

9. The temporal coherence of the modal aspects, as it gives itself to our experience of individuality structures of temporal reality, is a systasis. In his last article, Dooyeweerd says,

…we also find in [D.F.M.] Strauss a continual confusion between the “ontical” and the epistemological states of affairs. In the Prolegomena of the transcendental critique of the theoretical attitude of thought and experience, I have remarked that in the subject-object relations of naïve attitude of thought and experience, empirical reality is understood as it gives itself, that is to say in the continuous systatic coherence and relatedness of its modal aspects within cosmic time. But in the Gegenstand-relation, these modal aspects are epistemologically (not “ontically”) split apart and set over against each other, with the intention of bringing them into view in their general modality, and thereby making them available for theoretical concepts. (p. 91)

10. But the relation of enstasis is more than the temporal enstasis. Our selfhood cannot be found in this systasis, because our selfhood is supratemporal, and the systasis is a temporal coherence (II, 400; NC II, 467). In our experience of enstasis, we relate this temporal systasis to our selfhood. Temporal relaity becomes “our own.”

11. In contrast to the coherence of our naive, pre-theoretical experience, our theoretical or scientific thought appears to split up reality, by distinguishing the various modal aspects. Note that Dooyeweerd italicizes the word ‘uiteen-stelling’ here. Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd speaks of this theoretical splitting apart of reality as the attitude of dis-stasis. The temporal systasis is split apart into a dis-stasis (although this splitting apart is not ontical, but merely intentional and epistemological. The splitting up is not ontical, but only apparent). The NC translates the word ‘uiteen-stelling’ as ‘analysis.’ But that misses the point of the splitting apart of the coherence of reality. We tend to think of analysis in terms of the idea of abstraction, but that also leads to a misunderstanding of Dooyeweerd's thought, for his view of abstraction is an abstraction from the continuity of time, and not of any abstraction of properties from things, as reformational philosophy has tended to believe. If Dooyeweerd had wanted to use the word ‘analysis,’ he could have used the Dutch words ‘analyse’ or ‘ontleden.’ The fact that he uses ‘uiteen-stelling’ and that he italicizes the word must be given proper emphasis. He is using it in the sense of splitting apart, or dis-stasis, and not in the sense of abstraction of properties.

12. In theory, there is a ‘tegenoverstellende’ pattern of thought [this is another play on words]. This is the ‘Gegen-stand’ [standing over against] relation. In scientific, theoretic thought, there is an opposition [‘tegenstelling’] to the ‘instellende’ pattern of thought in naïve experience (WdW, 49). This “standing over against” is not to be seen as a logical opposition. The Gegenstand-relation is not a logical opposition, but an opposition of our selfhood against all the aspects, including the logical. I believe that most interpreters of Dooyeweerd have missed this point, because they have denied Dooyeweerd's key idea of the supratemporal selfhood. In the 1946 edition of the Encyclopedia of Legal Science, Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Gegenstand-relation results from the entry of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal. It is only because of our supratemporal selfhood that we can enter into the Gegenstand-relation:

The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions. This supratemporal selfhood of our human existence is the religious root of our personality, which in its individuality participates in the religious root of the human race. (1946 edition, 12, italics Dooyeweerd’s).

This entry of our supratemporal selfhood into the temporal results in the attitude of splitting apart of the coherence of our experience, and results in the ‘uiteen-stelling,’ the dis-stasis of theoretical thought.

13. The very first line of this page speaks of ‘giving an account.’ To give an account is to use theory to explain that which transcends theory. We do this by the transcendental Ideas, which as theoretical presuppositions, point to their ontical presupposita. Dooyeweerd says elsewhere that this use of theory to point beyond its subjective presuppositions to its ontical presupposita is possible only because of the Gegenstand-relation, which in turn is possible only by means of our supratemporal selfhood (See the point discussed directly above). In the Encyclopedia of the Science of Law, Dooyeweerd says that it is only by means of the Gegenstand-relation that our theoretical Ideas can relate to these ontical conditions (“that which is presupposed”) while remaining within the bounds of theoretical thought. But this important insight into the importance of the Gegenstand-relation is obscured by the present translation at pages 80-81 of the Encyclopedia, which even breaks up this discussion into two paragraphs, thus losing the connection. See my critique of the present translation. It should read,

Therefore by maintaining the Gegenstand-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of the theoretical way of thought, first makes possible theoretical thought itself; the transcendental is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition.

14. In the uiteen-stelling, there is a splitting up of the coherent reality into what “appears” to diverge into separate aspects. It is important to emphasize the word ‘appears’ [schijnt]. Dooyeweerd stresses that the Gegenstand of our theoretical thought does not have a real (ontical) existence. It is only intentional, and does not correspond to the structure of empirical reality (NC I, 39, 40).

15. In the enumeration of the modalities, the NC adds a reference to the aspect of physical energy. Dooyeweerd added this after publication of the WdW; there are thus fifteen different modal aspects. There is a long development in this regard. In fact, the WdW does not even use the word ‘aspect.’ It generally uses the term ‘meaning-side.’ Verburg wonders whether the new physical aspect includes earlier understandings of the modality of "reality.” See aspects. The NC also adds a reference to “logical anticipation.”

16. The NC adds a footnote about modalities–they do not refer to concrete “what” of things or events but are only the different modes of the universal "how" which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality. I have discussed this in the note of aspects. But this note that modes refer to the "how" should not be taken to mean that there is in fact a “whatness” of things and events, at least not as usually understood in empiricism. See things. This has been misunderstood by those reformational philosophers (van Riessen, Strauss, Clouser), who begin with things and try to “abstract” universals and properties from them. But Dooyeweerd specifically says that philosophy does not begin with things! (I, 47) the idea of modalities as "hows" of experience is much more radical than has been generally understood.

17. The WdW says that nothing in the world coherence exists in itself. The NC says “no single aspect stands by itself.” This may be a proper clarification in this context. The passage is here talking about coherence in the sense of sphere universality (although that term is only used later). But we should not forget that it is not only aspects that do not exist by themselves. Nothing in temporal reality exists by itself. Temporal reality has existence only in our selfhood as the temporal root, and in Christ, the redeemed root. And our selfhood has no existence in itself, but has meaning only in God the Origin. These discussions about ex-sistere come later. (NC I, 58, 59).

18. The interrelation between the aspects is one of being “bound to” (‘verbondenheid’). This is perhaps even stronger than the word 'interrelation.' ‘Verbondenheid’ is perhaps even stronger in showing the relation between aspects.

19. The phrase‘drukt zich uit’ needs to be emphasized. It means ‘expressed.’ The WdW uses it in the active voice. The coherence expresses itself. The English translation unfortunately uses the passive, “finds its expression.” The idea of the supratemporal totality expressing itself in the temporal coherence, and the coherence expressing itself in the aspects, is thereby lost. Furthermore, our supratemporal selfhood expresses itself in our temporal functions. This is emphasized in the following sentence: the human I-ness expresses itself in the coherence of all its cosmic functions. Elsewhere he says, the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of our existence, which, to be sure, expresses itself in al modal aspects of time, but never can be exhausted by these (NC I, 58). Humans function in all aspects, but their supratemporal center goes beyond all aspects (NC I, 51; NC III, 88). We are not a dualistic composite of body and soul, but an integral unity–a supratemporal Selfhood that expresses itself and acts in the temporal.

20. The NC makes the mistake of translating this supratemporal I-ness as 'ego.' Dooyeweerd distinguishes between supraindividual selfhood and individual ego.

21. Dooyeweerd also says that individuality is rooted in the religious centre of our temporal world: all temporal individuality can only be an expression of the fullness of individuality inherent in this centre (NC II, 418).

22. Our creation in “the image of God” is an expression of God's image. Just as the temporal world is an expression of our supratemporal selfhood, so our selfhood is an expression of God. Later, he says that our existence is an ex-sistere in God. And as we are God's image, the temporal world has its existence only in us. Humans are the religious root of temporal reality and only humans have existence in the sense of ex-sistere:

It is only man who can have cosmic and cosmological self consciousness because only man's cosmic temporal structure is founded in an individual religious root transcending time, viz. his selfhood." (NC II, 480).

23. Dooyeweerd says that because we are the temporal root of creation, creation fell along with humanity in the Fall. It had no root of its own. Since the Fall, the image of God is only revealed in its true sense in Jesus Christ (NC III 69).

24. The Idea of expression is therefore a relating of and a supratemporal center to a temporal periphery. The expression is in the sense of the refraction of the unity of the center into a refracted temporal diversity. It is a matter of differentiation. In Twilight of Western Thought 123 he makes this same type of comparison--this time to the central law:

Just as in the human ego all the aspects of our temporal experience and existence find their central reference point, so the commandment of love is the central unity of all God's different ordinances for the temporal world.

25. The idea of image of God is mentioned repeatedly by Baader. Baader identifies Man as the mirror of Totality (Schumacher 57). We are the expression of God. Everything from God is directed eternally towards Him, and nothing perishes of what he has expressed, and He is all in all (1 Cor. 15:28) (Werke 11, 42). The same ideas of selfhood as temporal root, and the substitution of Christ as the new religious root had been previously developed by Baader. Baader also speaks of our Existenz, and the fact that we have no being in ourselves. We are God’s final creation (Schlussgeschöpf) (Werke I, 299, 432; IV, 33). The idea of religious root is related to the fact that we are the image of God (Weltalter 184). St. Paul says that Heaven and earth ‘live and move and have their being’ in God [Acts 17:28]. Because our central, supratemporal selfhood is the image of God, humans are truly the center of the material world (Werke V, 31; XI, 78; Begründung 48).

As you can see, even this first short excerpt from the WdW is very densely written, and there is a lot of “unpacking” to do. Dooyeweerd recognizes this. He says in I, 6 that his introductory propositions contain in themselves the whole problematic of the possibility of truly philosophical thought.

Translation notes:

Changes Oct 21/06. 'grondgedachte' changed to 'basic idea.' 'zgn.' not translated as 'so-called' but simply as indicating the name given to the side of reality. In English, the phrase 'so-called has a negative connotation. In Dutch, 'zgn.' is usually used just to indicate the word used for the idea. And Dooyeweerd did use the terms 'natural' and 'spiritual' sides.

Revised Oct 21/06