Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Herman Dooyeweerd: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee

© J. Glenn Friesen 2003.

Notes regarding WdW I, 20

1. Corresponds to NC II, 16. The NC is quite different in many places.

2. NC has “transcendental unity of apperception” and “transcendental logical ego.”

3. This is one of many references where Dooyeweerd refers to the "function of thought." The NC adds "logical aspect." But it seems that initially, Dooyeweerd regarded thought as a function and not as an act. Even in the Gegenstand relation, it is the logical aspect that has this ability to oppose itself against the other aspects.

4. Why does Dooyeweerd refer to "states of affairs" instead of to facts? It seems that states of affairs are what we learn in theoretical thought. Since theoretical thought involves a dis-stasis, its Gegenstand does not correspond to ontical reality. Therefore we cannot refer to what we discover as concrete facts. The concrete is reserved for non-theoretical naive experience. Even there, Dooyeweerd has a very different view of 'things' than is normally supposed. This is quite a different approach than Briiths empiricism, which begins with things and facts.

5. Dooyeweerd says in place of the cogito [I think], say "I believe."

Baader is also opposed to Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum." In place of it, Baader says, "Cogitor, ergo cogito et sum" (Werke 16, 31; Sauer 29) or "Cogitor, ergo cogitans sum" (Werke 12, 235). I am known by God, therefore I know and am. for Baader, our knowing is also dependent on a belief in God. He expresses it in that we are known by God first. The Carteisan cogito in contrast is a "Selbstsetzung" or autonomy–setting the law for oneself.