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© J. Glenn Friesen 2003-2007 |
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Glossary of Terms
It will surprise many followers of Dooyeweerd that he regards the central, supratemporal selfhood as supra-individual. Individuality is something that is given in time. Dooyeweerd says that the central and radical unity of our existence is at the same time individual and supra-individual; that is to say, in the individual I-ness it points beyond the individual ego toward that which makes the whole of mankind spiritually one in root in creation, fall and redemption:
By this Dooyeweerd means that individuality is the temporal expression of the supratemporal undifferentiated and supra-individual root. There is a "radical individual concentration of temporal reality in the human I-ness" (NC II, 417). The supratemporal selfhood experiences his individual existence within time:
This seems similar to Jung's Idea of individuation. Dooyeweerd also says that modal meaning must be individualized if it is ever to express itself in the fullness of temporal reality (NC II, 423). Baader says that temporal beings fulfill potentiality as they move further from the central Unity; but temporal life (alone) leads to death (Zeit 28). But such individuation is not individualism. Dooyeweerd condemns an individualistic view of the Self as due to an irrationalistic personalism. He criticizes the Renaissance idea of personality, which he says was a secularization of the Christian idea of regeneration:
We ourselves in our temporal individuality are also determined by the modal dimension,which is part of temporal reality (II, 483). Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the supratemporal root is supra-individual. He avoids both individualism and universalism (he rejects the idea of a world soul). He speaks of "the fullness of individuality" that has been saved in Christ. All temporal individuality is only an expression of this fullness of individuality inherent in the religious centre of our temporal world (NC II, 418). We experience our individual existence within the temporal horizon exclusively (NC II, 594). Temporal individual subjectivity cannot exist unless bound to a supra-individual order (NC II, 493). The "earthly" world does not exist in itself, but only in relation to the religious root (NC II, 549). Dooyeweerd refers to the time when we will not live in this "earthly" dispensation, and when we will no longer have what Dooyeweerd calls the mantle of temporal functions [functiemantel]. Dooyeweerd does not begin with the concept of the 'individual'; he begins with the religious Root, its creation, fall and redemption. This Christian Ground-Motive must be interpreted in accordance with this Idea of the the supratemporal religious root (Twilight of Western Thought, 125). He says that we need a supra-individual point of departure (NC I, 60). Dooyeweerd says that the individual does not exist as such. Even to focus on an individual linden tree is an abstraction. An individual 'thing' is only a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions (NC III, 65). Temporal individual subjectivity cannot really exist unless it is bound to a supra-individual order (NC I, 493). It is worth pointing out here that one of Dooyeweerd's disagreements with Vollenhoven concerned the nature of individuality. We should also note that Dooyeweerd does not want to refer to a trans-personalism. He says that transpersonalism rests on an irrationalistic hypostatization of temporal communal relationships (NC III, 246). It is interesting that the English translation sometimes substitutes the word 'universal' for 'supra-individual' (NC I, 7). That is wrong. One reason that Dooyeweerd's Idea of the supratemporal heart has been rejected is because people cannot understand that it is supra-individual. For example, Dengerink says that on Dooyeweerd’s view, there would have to be as many supratemporal hearts as there are individuals. But this reflects a misunderstanding of Dooyeweerd's critique of individualism. I believe that Dooyeweerd would call this a nominalistic religious individualism. This view of the root of humanity as supra-individual is also found in Kuyper. Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper's view that individuals do not exist in themselves; there only exist membra corporis generis humani. Christ is the head of reborn humanity (NC II, 248). Baader sometimes refers to this issue. We should not refer to the afterlife in personalistic terms:
Elsewhere Baader speaks in terms of a fulfilled individuality. He says that the completely fullfilled individuality or personality is even what the divine in God consists of (Philosophische Schriften II, 22). The supratemporal reality is not nothing.
Revised Sept 25/07 .
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