|
© J. Glenn Friesen 2003, 2004. |
Linked
Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless
indicated.See concordance
for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance
is in pdf format.)
Dooyeweerd denies the traditional metaphysical
teaching is of an immortal soul
(which is conceived as a complex of temporal
functions) (I, 56). Our center is
not the soul, conceived of as part of our temporal functions, but our
supratemporal heart,
the center of all of our temporal functions.
He says that the Bible does not teach anywhere that man
saves a divine part of his temporal existence. The soul or spirit is not
an abstraction from temporal existence but the full, spiritual-religious
root unity of man.(Vernieuwing en Bezinning, 35). It is only
in this dynamic sense that we can speak of 'soul,' as the religious
center of our existence:
The Biblical meaning of the word 'soul,' where it is
used in its pregnant sense of religious centre of human existence, has
nothing to do with a theoretically abstracted complex of modal functions.
Neither has it anything to do with the metaphysical Greek conception
of the psyche. This must be clear to any one who has discovered that
the background of all such views is the immanence standpoint in philosophy.
The Bible does not theorize at all about the human soul (let alone theorizing
from the philosophical immanence standpoint (NC II, 111).
Dooyeweerd says that the body that is put off at death
is the whole earthly existence of man in all
temporal spheres of life, as this existence is interwoven in individuality
structures. Bodily death is in fact the unbinding of all earthly bonds.
It is not just a material body that is given up, a body that is conceived
as being closed up in the physical-chemical aspects of temporal reality.
And the soul, which Scriptures assure us continues after death, must not
be understood as any part of this temporal earthly existence, nor as the
theoretical abstraction of a substance
that has only psychical and normative
functions. The soul is rather the full human selfhood,
one's heart, in the sense of the center
of one's whole existence, of which the body is only the temporal organ.
(March 19/1938 response to Curators; cited Verburg 226-227).
The theologian Valentin Hepp criticized Dooyeweerd's
idea of the supratemporal heart as contrary to the traditional Reformed
theological distinction between body and soul. Dooyeweerd argued that
the body/soul distinction was a dualism that
played off one set of temporal functions against another set. And yet
it is interesting that in his response to the investigation that was set
off by Hepp's critique, Dooyeweerd does not deny the distinction between
body and soul. The Curators asked Dooyeweerd in a letter dated July 8,
1939:
“Bij curatoren der Vrije Unversiteit is aanhangig
de vraag of de Gereformeerde beginselen in het algemeen en de Drie Formulieren
van Eenigheid der Nederlandsche Gereformeerde Kerken in het byzonder
de dichotomie leeren…”
[The question remains for the Curators of the Free
University whether a dichotomy is taught by Reformed principles in general,
or the Three Confessions of Unity of the Dutch Gereformeerde Churches…]
Dooyeweerd’s response was [a few words are difficult
to make out]:
Wat het eerste punt aangaat, er bestaat geen verschil
van meening over de dichotomie van ziel en lichaam als confessioneel
leerstuk, doch uitsluitend over de vraag, hoe deze dichotomie dient
te worden verstaan, hetzijn in den religieuze zin van inwendiges en
uitwendiges mensch (Hart en “tydelijke levensuitgangen”)
dar wel in den metaphysisch-wijsgeerigen zin van “stoffelijk soma”
en “geestelijke psychè” (anima rationalis).
Het vraagpunt kan dus m.i. alleen zijn, of de Gereformeerde beginselen
enz [?] “dwingen tot de aanvaarding van een tweedeling binnen
het tydelijk leven van den mensch, dan wel of de dichotomie van ziel
en lichaam op een dieper plan moet worden gezocht en wel in de onderscheiding
van reliigieus levenscentrum (als eenheid en zelf en ___ [?]) en heel
het complex der tijdelijke levens functies.
[Concerning the first point, there is no difference
of opinion about the dichotomy of soul and body as a confessional dogma.
The only difference concerns the question how this dicohotomy should
be understood, , but only concerning the question how we interpret it.
We can interpret it in the religious sense of inner and outer man (the
heart and the "temporal issues of life"). Or we can interpret
it in a metaphysical-philosophic sense of "material body"
and "spiritual psyche" (anima rationalis).
In my opinion, the problem can therefore only be whether the
Reformed principles etc. [?] "force the acceptance of a dichotomy
within the temporla life of a man, or whether the dichotomy of soul
and body must be sought on a deeper level, and then in the distinciton
of a religious center of life (as unity and self and __[?] as distinguished
from the whole complex of temporal functions of life.
Revised Dec 27/04 |