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© J. Glenn Friesen 2003-2006 |
Linked
Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless
indicated.See concordance
for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance
is in pdf format.)
| immanence |
I, 37-38
II, 402, 468 (Satz der Immanenz) |
| immanence philosophy |
I, vi, vii, x, xi, 16-17 (used in the broadest sense), 26 (leads
to -isms), 27-30, 32-33, 37, 39, 50-51, 55, 59, 62, 64-65 (logos-speculatie),
68-70, 73, 75-76, 79, 81-86, 88-89, 92, 93fn1, 100 (Archimedisch
punt), 102, 117 (waarheidsbegrippen), 118 (geen waarheidsnorm boven
haar wetsidee), 124 (relativistisch), 137 (grondantinomie), 139-140,
141fn1, 144 (speculatieven), 147 (Grieksche), 150, 173, 255, 263-264,
291, 352, 383, 466 (grens van alle immanentiephilosophie), 471,
474-478, 481-484, 488fn1, 489, 492-495, 498, 501-504, 506-507, 509,
II, 3, 9, 10, 39, 46, 131 (cannot see full distinction between
concept and idea), 132 (results in -isms), 141 (wrong ideas of history),
177 (re coherence), 222, 240, 255, 260, 263 (wrong idea of universality
in own sphere), 264, 297 (antinomies), 302 (subject-object), 305,
313, 347 (form-matter), 349, 358-64, 391 (form-matter), 397-399,
408 (no idea of cosmic time), 410-412, 422, 426, 442, 468, 470 (its
law-idea), 473, 474 (meaning of a priori), 476 (understanding of
empirical), 478, 482, 490-493, 496-498, 503, 508, 511-512, 514-515,
519, 527 (kosmos-idee)
III, vi (seeks supratemporal resting point within the temporal),
viii, 1 (misunderstands naive experience), 2, 4, 13 (dualistische),
14, 27, 33 (no research re structure of a thing), 48, 50, 98, 110,
139, 147, 149, 173, 183 (Weber, Troeltsch), 203, 266, 354, 379,
382, 453, 554, 628-629,
NC I, vi
NC II, 565
“Het dilemma voor het christelijk wijsgeerig
denken,” Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936)
1-16 [‘Dilemma’] at 4: immanence philosophy does not
give an adequate account of the conditions that make philosophic
thought possible. It does not distinguish between the selfhood and
its theoretical thought (p.8). |
| immanence standpoint |
I, vi, 15-16 (rejects any true Archimedean point) , 18, 21-22,
24, 28 (compared to Midas), 29, 30-31, 52, 68 (can't be reconciled
with sovereignty in own sphere),69, 72 (eliminates cosmic law-order),
73, 85-87, 93fn1(Rickert, Heidegger, Jaspers), 127 (Kant), 128 (algemeen
geldigheid), 131 (Kant), 139, 149, 155, 164 (metaphysica), 181,
392, 465, 467, 467 (Archimedisch punt), 487, 500, 504, 507, 510-511,
II, 6, 10, 15, 21-24, 25 (selfhood as religious root is invisible
to the immanence standpoint), 28-30, 34fn1 (Rickert), 35, 37,45,
48-50, 59, 82 (immanence standpoint reflected in wrong view of soul),
97 (wrong idea of coherence), 240 (only partial truths), 256, 305,
319 (intentionality), 348, 386, 424, 457, 458 (Heidegger bound to
immanence standpoint because he seeks the self in time), 467, 469,
482-83, 489, 497, 499, 501, 506, 508, 525, 532 (subjectivism)
III, viii, 12, 26, 29, 34, 110, 172, 174, 181, (individualisme),
198-199, 203, 349 (staatstheorieën), 350, 353, 355-356, 365,
391, 418, 475-476, 552, 628 (immanent ideas of body and soul are
wrong), 629 (no immanent act center), 630 (cannot answer, "What
is man?)
NC I, 12 |
| immanent critique |
I, 55, 107, 166, 530
II, 46, 423 |
| immanent |
I, 8 (grenzen; vermeende reductie tot immanent subjecftieve denk-pool),
11 (oorsprong), 13 (wetmatigheid), 15 fn1 (apriorische structuur),
16, 18 (grenzen), 19 (samenhang), 20-21, 22 (immanent-logischen
zin), 25 (ideas of meaning-coherence), 30, 33 (immanent-wijsgeerige),
36, 40, 47, 51 (immanente apriosiche structuur), 82, 83 (immanenten
historischen zin), 94 (immanente, bewuste, gegeven werkelijkheid),
96, 100 (antinomie), 115, 117, 146 (doel-beginsel), 151 (gerichte),
157 (godsidee), 197, 358 (bewustzijnsfunctie), 363 (principe), 417
(doelmatig organisme), 441 (transcendentale analyse), 459 (continuiteitspostulaat),
466 (normatieve zin-zijden), 482 (zedeleer), 508 (grenzen),
II, 38, 141,145, 149, 159, 163 (immanent-historische), 174, 197
(immanente cultuur-synthese), 199 (profane), 231, 245 (in de gesloten
naturrkrachten),252 (opoenbaring), 348, 399-400, 403, 454, 468,
472 (immanent aan de mogelijke ervaring), 489 (in de dingen), 495
(kosmische immanenten zin), 502 (transcendentale subject), 505,
522,
III, viii (antinomieën), 19, 29 (Satz der Immanenz), 30 (immanentes
Sein), 52 (immanent tijdelijk karakter der ding-eenheid), 140 (wezensvorm),
152 (doel), 156 (wereld-logos), 159 (substantieele wezensvorm),
192fn1 (universalisme), 451 fn1 (tidjelijke openbareing), 524 (Vernunft),
553 (totality of meaning not sought in temporal coherence), 560
(relatie van het geheel en zijn deelen),
NC II, 489 |
Immanent reality is temporal reality, the
reality that is within cosmic time.
It is the opposite of the 'transcendent,'
that which is supratemporal.
Immanence philosophy seeks
its standpoint or Archimedean point within
time. Christian philosophy has a transcendent standpoint. Immanence philosophy
cannot understand any of the horizons of
our experience: the religious dimension of the selfhood, the dimension
of cosmic time, the dimension of the modal aspects and the dimension of
individuality structures (II, 489).
Immanence philosophy, in seeking its standpoint in time,
also denies the supratemporal selfood:
Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke
opvatting der persoonlijkheid, kan evenmin het 'individueele ik' in
den tijd worden gezocht en daarmede nemen wij principieel tegen de 'geesteswetenschappelijke
sociologie' positie, die zulks met de geheele immanentie philosophie
juist wel doet. De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus,
boventijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan nòch aan
den individueelen mensch, nòch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid
toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke
beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving. (De Crisis der Humanistische
Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), p. 113.
[But according to our view, the Christian
understanding of a person, the 'individual I' can no more be sought
within time. And we thereby stand in principle against the position
of sociology in the humanities, which seeks to do just this in its immanence
philosophy. The individual selfhood is through and through religious,
supratemporal. In the cosmic temporal order, selfhood or I-ness
cannot be reached by [sociological conceptions of] either individual
man, or of societal structures. This is the principal point of departure
for any truly Christian view of temporal society.]
In his first
response to the curators of the Vrije Universiteit (April 27, 1937),
in response to Valentin Hepp's complaints, Dooyeweerd wrote that the WdW
makes a radical break with immanence philosophy in its idea that it understands
that our whole temporal human existence proceeds from out of the religious
root, the heart.
Immanent critique is the criticism of another philosophy
based on its own standpoint. Thus, it tries to critique immanence philosophy
from its own standpoint within time, showing that it leads to insoluble
contradictions and antinomies. Transcendent
critique confronts another philosophy by arguments based on one's own
standpoint.
Dooyeweerd's first mention of immanent critique is in
1922. On April 8, 1922, Dooyeweerd spoke to a gathering from the Vereeiniging
voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts in the Hague. Dooyeweerd said that he was
giving "immanent critique" on what had been said by others.
Dooyeweerd also distinguished sharply between ethics and legal rights:
"Plaats ik mij op ethisch standpunt, dan kan ik
mij niet te gelijk op rechtsstandpunt plaatsen. Beide stelsels zijn
ieder in zich souverein, en kunnen dit nooit te gelijker tijd zijn."
[If I place myself in the ethical standpoint, then
I cannot at the same time place myself in the juridical standpoint.
Both systems are sovereign in themselves, and cannot be so at the same
time].
He makes no reference to Kuyper in this discussion.
(Verburg, 31).
Verburg says that six days later in April 1922, Dooyeweerd
sent a manuscript entitled 'Een methodologische inleiding in de geschiedenis
der rechtsphilosophie in het begin der XXe eeuw." He says that if
criticism is to be fruitful, one must take the standpoint of the theory
being judged:
"Vruchtbaar is een kritiek eerst dan, wanneer
zij begint zich in den gedachtegang van den schrijver in te leven, met
volkomen eerlijkheid van uit diens kentheoretische premissen de noodzakelijke
conclusies trekt, wijst op het onbevredigended in die conclusies en
van daaruit op het onhoudbare van het uitgangspunt. Eerst dan is de
weg geëffend voor transcendente kritiek vanuit eigen standpunt…"
[Critique first becomes fruitful when it begins to
live within the thought process of the writer, with complete honesty
draws the necessary conclusions from out of his epistemological premisses,
and shows the unsatisfactory nature of these conclusions and from this
the untenability of its point of departure. Only then is the way opened
to a transcendent critique from out of one's own standpoint…].
The critic tries to show that his or her standpoint leads
to better conclusions.
Revised Nov 29/08 |