Dr. J. Glenn Friesen

Studies relating to
Herman Dooyeweerd

Linked Glossary of Terms

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Dooyeweerd
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De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Volume I
Foreword
Introduction
Ground-Idea
Foundation
Law-Idea
Prism of Cosmic Time
Law and Subject
Philosophy/Worldview

De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee Volume II
The Gegenstand
Dis-stasis/ Synthesis
Intuition and Time
Conceptual Limits
Horizon and Levels
God, Self and Cosmos

© J. Glenn Friesen 2003-2006

Linked Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless indicated.See concordance for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance is in pdf format.)

immanence

I, 37-38

II, 402, 468 (Satz der Immanenz)

immanence philosophy

I, vi, vii, x, xi, 16-17 (used in the broadest sense), 26 (leads to -isms), 27-30, 32-33, 37, 39, 50-51, 55, 59, 62, 64-65 (logos-speculatie), 68-70, 73, 75-76, 79, 81-86, 88-89, 92, 93fn1, 100 (Archimedisch punt), 102, 117 (waarheidsbegrippen), 118 (geen waarheidsnorm boven haar wetsidee), 124 (relativistisch), 137 (grondantinomie), 139-140, 141fn1, 144 (speculatieven), 147 (Grieksche), 150, 173, 255, 263-264, 291, 352, 383, 466 (grens van alle immanentiephilosophie), 471, 474-478, 481-484, 488fn1, 489, 492-495, 498, 501-504, 506-507, 509,

II, 3, 9, 10, 39, 46, 131 (cannot see full distinction between concept and idea), 132 (results in -isms), 141 (wrong ideas of history), 177 (re coherence), 222, 240, 255, 260, 263 (wrong idea of universality in own sphere), 264, 297 (antinomies), 302 (subject-object), 305, 313, 347 (form-matter), 349, 358-64, 391 (form-matter), 397-399, 408 (no idea of cosmic time), 410-412, 422, 426, 442, 468, 470 (its law-idea), 473, 474 (meaning of a priori), 476 (understanding of empirical), 478, 482, 490-493, 496-498, 503, 508, 511-512, 514-515, 519, 527 (kosmos-idee)

III, vi (seeks supratemporal resting point within the temporal), viii, 1 (misunderstands naive experience), 2, 4, 13 (dualistische), 14, 27, 33 (no research re structure of a thing), 48, 50, 98, 110, 139, 147, 149, 173, 183 (Weber, Troeltsch), 203, 266, 354, 379, 382, 453, 554, 628-629,

NC I, vi
NC II, 565

“Het dilemma voor het christelijk wijsgeerig denken,” Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936) 1-16 [‘Dilemma’] at 4: immanence philosophy does not give an adequate account of the conditions that make philosophic thought possible. It does not distinguish between the selfhood and its theoretical thought (p.8).

immanence standpoint

I, vi, 15-16 (rejects any true Archimedean point) , 18, 21-22, 24, 28 (compared to Midas), 29, 30-31, 52, 68 (can't be reconciled with sovereignty in own sphere),69, 72 (eliminates cosmic law-order), 73, 85-87, 93fn1(Rickert, Heidegger, Jaspers), 127 (Kant), 128 (algemeen geldigheid), 131 (Kant), 139, 149, 155, 164 (metaphysica), 181, 392, 465, 467, 467 (Archimedisch punt), 487, 500, 504, 507, 510-511,

II, 6, 10, 15, 21-24, 25 (selfhood as religious root is invisible to the immanence standpoint), 28-30, 34fn1 (Rickert), 35, 37,45, 48-50, 59, 82 (immanence standpoint reflected in wrong view of soul), 97 (wrong idea of coherence), 240 (only partial truths), 256, 305, 319 (intentionality), 348, 386, 424, 457, 458 (Heidegger bound to immanence standpoint because he seeks the self in time), 467, 469, 482-83, 489, 497, 499, 501, 506, 508, 525, 532 (subjectivism)

III, viii, 12, 26, 29, 34, 110, 172, 174, 181, (individualisme), 198-199, 203, 349 (staatstheorieën), 350, 353, 355-356, 365, 391, 418, 475-476, 552, 628 (immanent ideas of body and soul are wrong), 629 (no immanent act center), 630 (cannot answer, "What is man?)

NC I, 12

immanent critique

I, 55, 107, 166, 530

II, 46, 423

immanent

I, 8 (grenzen; vermeende reductie tot immanent subjecftieve denk-pool), 11 (oorsprong), 13 (wetmatigheid), 15 fn1 (apriorische structuur), 16, 18 (grenzen), 19 (samenhang), 20-21, 22 (immanent-logischen zin), 25 (ideas of meaning-coherence), 30, 33 (immanent-wijsgeerige), 36, 40, 47, 51 (immanente apriosiche structuur), 82, 83 (immanenten historischen zin), 94 (immanente, bewuste, gegeven werkelijkheid), 96, 100 (antinomie), 115, 117, 146 (doel-beginsel), 151 (gerichte), 157 (godsidee), 197, 358 (bewustzijnsfunctie), 363 (principe), 417 (doelmatig organisme), 441 (transcendentale analyse), 459 (continuiteitspostulaat), 466 (normatieve zin-zijden), 482 (zedeleer), 508 (grenzen),

II, 38, 141,145, 149, 159, 163 (immanent-historische), 174, 197 (immanente cultuur-synthese), 199 (profane), 231, 245 (in de gesloten naturrkrachten),252 (opoenbaring), 348, 399-400, 403, 454, 468, 472 (immanent aan de mogelijke ervaring), 489 (in de dingen), 495 (kosmische immanenten zin), 502 (transcendentale subject), 505, 522,

III, viii (antinomieën), 19, 29 (Satz der Immanenz), 30 (immanentes Sein), 52 (immanent tijdelijk karakter der ding-eenheid), 140 (wezensvorm), 152 (doel), 156 (wereld-logos), 159 (substantieele wezensvorm), 192fn1 (universalisme), 451 fn1 (tidjelijke openbareing), 524 (Vernunft), 553 (totality of meaning not sought in temporal coherence), 560 (relatie van het geheel en zijn deelen),

NC II, 489

Immanent reality is temporal reality, the reality that is within cosmic time.

It is the opposite of the 'transcendent,' that which is supratemporal.

Immanence philosophy seeks its standpoint or Archimedean point within time. Christian philosophy has a transcendent standpoint. Immanence philosophy cannot understand any of the horizons of our experience: the religious dimension of the selfhood, the dimension of cosmic time, the dimension of the modal aspects and the dimension of individuality structures (II, 489).

Immanence philosophy, in seeking its standpoint in time, also denies the supratemporal selfood:

Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke opvatting der persoonlijkheid, kan evenmin het 'individueele ik' in den tijd worden gezocht en daarmede nemen wij principieel tegen de 'geesteswetenschappelijke sociologie' positie, die zulks met de geheele immanentie philosophie juist wel doet. De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan nòch aan den individueelen mensch, nòch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving. (De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), p. 113.

[But according to our view, the Christian understanding of a person, the 'individual I' can no more be sought within time. And we thereby stand in principle against the position of sociology in the humanities, which seeks to do just this in its immanence philosophy. The individual selfhood is through and through religious, supratemporal. In the cosmic temporal order, selfhood or I-ness cannot be reached by [sociological conceptions of] either individual man, or of societal structures. This is the principal point of departure for any truly Christian view of temporal society.]

In his first response to the curators of the Vrije Universiteit (April 27, 1937), in response to Valentin Hepp's complaints, Dooyeweerd wrote that the WdW makes a radical break with immanence philosophy in its idea that it understands that our whole temporal human existence proceeds from out of the religious root, the heart.

Immanent critique is the criticism of another philosophy based on its own standpoint. Thus, it tries to critique immanence philosophy from its own standpoint within time, showing that it leads to insoluble contradictions and antinomies. Transcendent critique confronts another philosophy by arguments based on one's own standpoint.

Dooyeweerd's first mention of immanent critique is in 1922. On April 8, 1922, Dooyeweerd spoke to a gathering from the Vereeiniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts in the Hague. Dooyeweerd said that he was giving "immanent critique" on what had been said by others. Dooyeweerd also distinguished sharply between ethics and legal rights:

"Plaats ik mij op ethisch standpunt, dan kan ik mij niet te gelijk op rechtsstandpunt plaatsen. Beide stelsels zijn ieder in zich souverein, en kunnen dit nooit te gelijker tijd zijn."

[If I place myself in the ethical standpoint, then I cannot at the same time place myself in the juridical standpoint. Both systems are sovereign in themselves, and cannot be so at the same time].

He makes no reference to Kuyper in this discussion. (Verburg, 31).

Verburg says that six days later in April 1922, Dooyeweerd sent a manuscript entitled 'Een methodologische inleiding in de geschiedenis der rechtsphilosophie in het begin der XXe eeuw." He says that if criticism is to be fruitful, one must take the standpoint of the theory being judged:

"Vruchtbaar is een kritiek eerst dan, wanneer zij begint zich in den gedachtegang van den schrijver in te leven, met volkomen eerlijkheid van uit diens kentheoretische premissen de noodzakelijke conclusies trekt, wijst op het onbevredigended in die conclusies en van daaruit op het onhoudbare van het uitgangspunt. Eerst dan is de weg geëffend voor transcendente kritiek vanuit eigen standpunt…"

[Critique first becomes fruitful when it begins to live within the thought process of the writer, with complete honesty draws the necessary conclusions from out of his epistemological premisses, and shows the unsatisfactory nature of these conclusions and from this the untenability of its point of departure. Only then is the way opened to a transcendent critique from out of one's own standpoint…].

The critic tries to show that his or her standpoint leads to better conclusions.

Revised Nov 29/08