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© J. Glenn Friesen 2003, 2004 |
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Glossary of Terms
Dooyeweerd says that the foundation [grondlegging] for philosophy is its hypothesis. (I, 51). Its hypothesis is the ground-Idea (I, 45). Or as he says in Volume II, the law-Idea is "hypothesis"(II, 485). Only when our selfhood, while thinking philosophically, chooses its Archimedean point in the true totality of meaning does our philosophic thought obtain in its Ground-Idea to the hypothesis which preserves this selfhood from the fall from the totality of meaning and therefore also from the fall of the selfhood. (I, 45) It seems that by 'hypothesis' he means the same thing as 'Idea,' except that it is the foundational Idea. It is the limiting concept par excellence (I, 52). He says at I, 53 that he shares Kant's view of Idea as hypothesis. His view differs from Kant because Kant absolutizes the Idea in setting forth the Idea of the homo noumenon. But although the Idea is hypothesis, this does not mean that it is subject to relativism. It is relative, but not relativism, because it is subjected to an 'objective judge.' I believe that he means that there are apriori conditions of validity that make our thought possible, even though our Ideas of these conditions may be relative. In 1928, Dooyeweerd says that only the law-Idea gives an account of the coherence of law-spheres and subject functions:
The law-Idea is both the hypothesis and the "anhypotheton"–the unpostulated principle–of all synthetic concepts. In 1932, Dooyeweerd says that without the hypothesis of meaning of the anticipated spheres, the anticipated functions cannot be understood. ( “De Theorie van de Bronnen van het Stellig Recht in het licht der Wetsidee” , “Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, XIX (1932). Revised Dec. 27/04
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