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What We Learn When We Learn Economics

Is a little economics a dangerous thing?

By Christopher Hayes

November 27,=20 2006

There's a case to be made that the single most intellectually = and=20 politically influential neighborhood in the United States is = Chicago's=20 Hyde Park. Integrated, affluent and quiet, the 1.6 square-mile = enclave on=20 the city's south side is like a tiny company town, where the = company=20 happens to be the august, gothic, eminently serious University of = Chicago.=20 Students at the U. of C. sell T-shirts that read "Where Fun Goes = To Die,"=20 and the same could be said of the neighborhood, which until very = recently=20 had a bookstore-to-bar ratio of 5:2.

But the university is probably best known for the school of = economic=20 thought it has produced. When the Chicago School first emerged in = the=20 '50s, its zealous support of free markets and critique of = government=20 intervention were considered reactionary and extreme. Among elites = in=20 economics and politics the consensus was, as John Maynard Keynes = had=20 argued, that capitalism could only function with regular and = robust=20 government management. Indeed, so total was this consensus that in = 1971=20 Richard Nixon announced a plan to impose wage and price caps in = order to=20 curb inflation, declaring, "We are all Keynesians now." Just 25 = years=20 later, however, Bill Clinton, the first Democratic president to be = re-elected since FDR, announced that the "era of big government is = over."=20 He might as well have said, "We are all Chicagoans now."

Neoclassical economics, as the Chicago School of thought is now = called,=20 has become an international elite consensus, one that provides the = foundation for the entire global political economy. In the United = States,=20 young members of the middle and upper-middle class first learn its = precepts in the academy. Polls routinely show that economists and = the=20 general public have widely divergent views on the economy, but = among the=20 well-educated that gap is far narrower. A 2001 study published in = the U.=20 of C.'s Journal of Law and Economics showed that those with = college=20 degrees are more likely to subscribe to the views of neoclassical=20 economists than the general public. This isn't surprising. At = elite=20 colleges, economics is consistently one of the most popular majors = (nearly=20 a quarter of undergrads at the U. of C.), and across all schools,=20 introductory economics, often a required course, has been one of = the 10=20 most popular classes for the last 30 years. Graduate schools--from = business to public policy to political science to, most notably, = law--are=20 now suffused with economic paradigms for understanding not only = financial=20 interactions but all human behavior.

Conservatives have long critiqued academia for the ways = professors use=20 their position to indoctrinate students with left-wing ideology, = but the=20 left has largely ignored the political impact of the way people = learn=20 economics, though its influence is likely far more profound. So in = order=20 to find out just what students learn when they learn economics, I = headed=20 down to Hyde Park, where the University generously let me enroll = in=20 "Principles of Macroeconomics" for a quarter.

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Allen Sanderson, 62, has been teaching the intro macro and = micro=20 courses at the university for the last 18 years and though he = initially=20 appears somewhat grave and understated, it is quickly apparent = that he is=20 a master of technique. His lectures skip along, propelled by a = series of=20 wry, contrarian quips, each punctuated with a visual rimshot: a = slight=20 pause and a thrust jaw. "When you hear, 'The economics department = at U. of=20 C.,' one's free association is 'pro-business, greedy bastards,'" = says=20 Sanderson (pause, jaw thrust) in the first lecture. "I tend to = think=20 that's not the case. Greedy bastards we may be, but we're not=20 pro-business. Republicans tend to be very pro-business. It's a = genetic=20 defect of Republicans. Democrats tend to be anti-business, another = genetic=20 defect. We are not anti-business; we are not pro-business. We are=20 pro-choice in the ultimate sense of pro-market. Based on empirical = work,=20 macro and micro solutions are probably better worked out by = private=20 markets than government intervention."

His second lecture begins with a thought experiment. Noting = that there=20 are only 26 spots left in the class for the 52 students who would = still=20 like to enroll, he asks, "How should we figure out who gets to go = into the=20 class?" The students--eager, studious and serious--shoot their = hands up=20 and offer a variety of ideas: Seniority? First-come, first-serve? = Ask=20 prospective students to write an essay? It takes about a minute = for a=20 confident young man to give the answer Sanderson's looking for: = "auction=20 by price."

"As a reasonable indication of how much you want something, how = much=20 you're willing to pay is a pretty good means of measuring," = Sanderson=20 says. "A lot of things in economics will turn in one way or = another on=20 price. Price has a lot going for it as a generalized expression of = commitment. The thing we don't like about, say, first-come, = first-serve,=20 is that if someone really wants to get in, they could start lining = up now.=20 But the problem is that I don't really benefit from your = expression of=20 interest, whereas if you pay me, we both are benefiting."

This makes sense, but I'm uneasy. Wouldn't giving a place in = class to=20 the highest bidder result in the rich students getting in and the=20 financial-aid kids being left out? And since people don't have = equal=20 amounts of money to spend, how good a measure of desire is price = in this=20 situation?

"Random and first-come have the benefit of being fair," = Sanderson says,=20 anticipating the objection. "There's an interesting dichotomy of = fair vs.=20 efficient." But, Sanderson asks, what, really, is fair? If we = think some=20 kind of random lottery drawing was a fair way of getting into the = class,=20 would that be a fair way of awarding grades? "Obviously not!," I = think.=20 Why? Sanderson lets us mull that over, but the answer floats up=20 immediately: because I work hard for my grades and I deserve them. = In=20 other words, those who work hard and get good grades are like = those who=20 work hard and have a lot of money to win spots that are auctioned = by=20 price.

"We're trying to balance these things out," Sanderson = continues.=20 "What's efficient? What's fair? Often they are in tension."

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Efficiency is the Chicago School's defining value. The free = market=20 economists who came before--most notably Austrian Friedrich = Hayek--offered=20 a philosophical critique of the political consequences of state = regulation=20 and control of the economy. But Milton Friedman, his colleague = George=20 Stigler and the entire Chicago School focused on the actual = economic=20 problems of state control, namely, inefficiency. They rejected = Keynes'=20 contention that markets function best with routine government = intervention=20 and instead harkened back to Adam Smith's classical conceptions of = equilibrium. Chicago School theories gained popularity when global = capitalism hit a major funk in the '70s--a period of slow growth = and high=20 inflation. Friedman argued, plausibly, that it was too much = government=20 that had caused the problems.

What may seem a subtle rhetorical shift had major consequences. = It=20 transformed what had been conservatism's moral argument about = capitalism=20 bestowing the most benefits on those who worked the hardest--and = the=20 inherent injustice of a coercive state forcibly redistributing=20 capital--into a technical argument about the inefficiencies = associated=20 with non-free-market solutions and the perverse incentives that = made any=20 social programs destined to fail. Thus, arguments about the way = the world=20 should be were converted into assertions about how the world = actually was.=20 Or, to put in terms that economists favor, normative arguments = became=20 positive ones.

In the textbook Sanderson uses, author Michael Parkin defines = the=20 difference this way: positive statements are about "what is" and = they=20 "might be right or wrong." Normative statements are about "what = ought to=20 be" and because they depend on values, they can't be tested. "Be = on the=20 lookout," Parkin warns, "for normative propositions dressed up as = positive=20 propositions."

Parkin's warning, however, turns out to be surprisingly = difficult to=20 heed. Neoclassical economics smuggles a great many normative wares = underneath its positive trenchcoat, both in its assumptions about = how=20 humans operate--as individuals rationally maximizing their = utility--and=20 its implied preference for "markets in everything." Because = neoclassical=20 economics always presents itself as a value-neutral description of = the=20 world, its ideological commitments can be adopted by those who = learn it=20 without any recognition that they are ideological. This is the = source of=20 some very spirited debate within the field itself. A growing = global=20 movement of "heterodox" economists has criticized the ideological = confines=20 and blindspots of the neoclassical approach. As Nobel Laureate = Joseph=20 Stiglitz put it, the dominance of the neoclassical model is a = "triumph of=20 ideology over science."

In the popular press, however, such dissent is almost entirely = absent.=20 When protesters disrupted the 1999 World Trade Organization = meeting in=20 Seattle, WTO officials, mainstream economists and the New York=20 Times' Thomas Friedman ignored the fact that in much of the = world=20 neoclassical reforms had failed to produce the promised growth. = Friedman=20 went so far as to dismiss the protesters as "flat-earthers." For = Thomas=20 Friedman (and, indeed, Allen Sanderson), people can't "disagree" = with=20 neo-classical economics. They can only fail to understand it.

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As a standard part of his first lecture in both his macro and=20 microeconomics class, Sanderson reads a David Barry quote: = "Democrats seem=20 to be basically nicer people, but they have demonstrated the = management=20 skills of celery. Republicans would know how to fix your tire, but = they=20 wouldn't stop."

In the wake of Katrina and Iraq, this might seem quaint, but = what=20 Sanderson is doing makes sense. Temperamentally, it reflects his = own,=20 libertarian-inflected, "pox-on-both-their-houses" centrism, but = his=20 insistence on political equanimity is also crucial to his = pedagogical=20 success. Students are most likely to have been exposed to = macroeconomic=20 issues within the context of political debates about free trade, = the size=20 of the budget deficit, tax rates, etc. In order to assure students = that=20 they aren't just learning a set of political talking points, he = must go=20 out of his way to hammer home the fact that what he's offering is = unbiased=20 and nonpartisan: positive not normative, facts not opinion. "I = don't have=20 a dog in this fight," Sanderson tells the students. So every joke = about=20 George Bush is followed by a joke about Hillary Clinton, every = shot at a=20 Democrat quickly balanced by a shot at Republicans.

The effect, intentional or not, is that Sanderson appears to = represent=20 the exact center of the political spectrum, and that can leave = students=20 with a strange perception of just where the center lies. During a=20 discussion of flat, progressive and regressive tax structures, a = student=20 asked about the argument against the flat tax. "What's wrong with = the flat=20 rate tax?" Sanderson replies. "Well, the bad thing was that Steve = Forbes=20 was the spokesman. It's not obvious that there's that much wrong = with it.=20 There's sort of a movement out there for a flat rate tax. Because = it=20 strikes some people: What could be fairer than that? It also = doesn't=20 distort incentives. It has a lot going for it."

It's true that there's "sort of a movement" for a flat tax, but = those=20 in favor of what would be the single most regressive = redistribution of=20 wealth in American history are not located in the political = center.=20 Far-right Republicans like former House Majority Leader Dick Armey = have=20 long pushed the idea, as have conservative think tanks like = American=20 Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. But politically, = it's a=20 non-starter. The basic notion of fairness that those who get more = out of=20 our economy should pay a greater percentage of their income in = taxes is=20 deeply embedded in American political culture, even during years = of=20 Republican domination. The students sitting around me, I start to = fear,=20 are going to walk out of the lecture thinking that the flat tax is = a=20 sensible, centrist idea. And as thousands of students pass through = classes=20 like Sanderson's every year, I worry that it will become a = sensible,=20 centrist idea.

Sanderson's politics aren't one-dimensional, and he certainly = isn't a=20 propagandist. But the fact remains that he has the predispositions = of=20 someone who "learned economics from Milton Friedman." First, = there's a=20 tendency to see trade-offs between equity and efficiency even = where they=20 might not exist. Dean Baker, an economist at the Center for = Economic and=20 Policy Research and author of the book The Conservative Nanny=20 State, points out that policies can be both fairer and more = efficient.=20 For instance, Baker told me, "it is not clear that a flat tax is = more=20 efficient than a progressive income tax. This is entirely an = empirical=20 question. It is entirely possible that taxing middle-income = workers and=20 Bill Gates at a 25 percent rate will create more distortions than = taxing=20 middle-income workers at a 15 percent rate and Bill Gates at a 40 = percent=20 rate. ... They want liberals to say that we care about fairness = and they=20 care about efficiency. This is crap. They find ways to justify=20 redistributing income upward and proclaim it to be efficient. The = reality=20 is it is not fair and generally not efficient either."

But when equity and efficiency trade-offs do arise, economists = like=20 Sanderson are systematically biased in favor of efficiency because = that's what they are experts on. Efficiency they can = measure and=20 analyze. Fairness? That's the turf of philosophers and = politicians. This=20 tendency is most pronounced in discussions of economic growth, and = how the=20 benefits of that growth should be distributed. Sanderson = paraphrases his=20 Nobel Laureate colleague Bob Lucas, who says that "once you start = to think=20 about the benefits of high growth, it's hard to think about = anything=20 else." In other words, first worry about how best to grow the pie, = then=20 how to slice it up. Let efficiency trump equity, create wealth, = and then=20 you can use the extra wealth you've created to alleviate = inequality.

This makes a certain amount of sense. But when this rhetoric = comes to=20 dominate our politics, the problem of inequality is never = addressed.=20 Now is always the time for growing, later is always = the time=20 to address concerns about equity. The result is predictable: In = countries=20 that have adopted the neoclassical policy prescriptions (including = the=20 United States), there has been an ever-widening gap between rich = and=20 poor.

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As taught by Sanderson, economics is a satisfyingly neat = machine:=20 complicated enough to warrant curiosity and discovery, but not so=20 complicated as to bewilder. Like a bicycle, input matches output = (wind the=20 crank and the wheel moves), and once you've got the basics of the = model=20 down, everything seems to make sense. As the weeks go by, and I = trek down=20 to Hyde Park, fight for a parking space and slip in between the=20 hundred-plus students into the lecture hall, I come to love the = class. The=20 more reading I do, the more sense the op-eds in the Wall Street = Journal make. The NPR program "Marketplace" becomes = interesting. I=20 even know what exactly the Fed rate is. A part of the world = that=20 was blurry and obscure begins to come into focus. My classmates = seem to=20 feel the same way. "I never thought I'd be interested in = economics," one=20 sophomore told me. "Sanderson convinced me I was."

The simple models have an explanatory power that is thrilling. = Once=20 you've grasped the aggregate supply/aggregate demand model, you = understand=20 why stimulating demand may lead, in the short run, to = growth, but=20 will also produce inflation. But the content of that understanding = turns=20 out to be a bit thin. Inflation happens because, well, that's = where the=20 lines intersect. "A little economics can be a dangerous thing," a = friend=20 working on her Ph.D in public policy at the U. of C. told me. "An = intro=20 econ course is necessarily going to be superficial. You deal with = highly=20 stylized models that are robbed of context, that take place in a = world=20 unmediated by norms and institutions. Much of the most interesting = work in=20 economics right now calls into question the Econ 101 assumptions = of=20 rationality, individualism, maximizing behavior, etc. But, of = course, if=20 you don't go any further than Econ 101, you won't know that the = textbook=20 models are not the way the world really works, and that there are = tons of=20 empirical studies out there that demonstrate this."

Take, for instance, the minimum wage. In Sanderson's intro = micro class,=20 he uses a simple supply and demand model of a labor market to show = why a=20 minimum wage will cause unemployment, and therefore be = self-defeating.=20 "Most economists, myself included, are opposed to living wage = ordinances=20 and minimum wage laws period," he says. But a series of empirical = studies=20 has established that the most recent increase of minimum wage in = 1997 had=20 essentially no impact on unemployment. In fact, in October, 650=20 economists, including five Nobel Laureates, signed a letter = advocating an=20 increase in the U.S. minimum wage to $8 an hour.

Of course, some elision and simplification is unavoidable. = Sanderson's=20 not trying to create future economists, but rather give students = "some=20 sort of cultural literacy" about how the economy works. He often = starts=20 class by leading us through a kind of Socratic deconstruction of a = newspaper article that commits some egregious economic sin. About = midway=20 through the semester, during the unit we spend learning about how = the=20 gross domestic product is computed, he reads to the class from an = article=20 in the Chicago Tribune with the headline, "Corporate Giants = Dwarf=20 Many Nations." The piece compares the annual sales of large = corporations=20 like Wal-Mart with that of small countries, like Israel, showing = that many=20 of the world's 200 largest corporations are as large as entire = national=20 economies, and therefore have a great deal of political and = economic=20 clout. After quoting at length, Sanderson points out how = implausible it is=20 that 200 companies, with one third of one percent of the world's=20 workforce, could produce 28 percent of the world's economic = activity.=20 "There's a word for it," Sanderson says. "Two words, actually. The = first=20 is 'Horse.' "

The problem, Sanderson notes, is that "sales" is a terrible = measurement=20 for the economic output of a company like Wal-Mart, because it = only=20 produces a very small percentage of the value of any product is = sells.=20 When you buy pistachios at Wal-Mart, it's not like those nuts were = grown=20 on a Wal-Mart farm. Wal-Mart bought them from someone and then = resold them=20 for a profit. "If we were counting GDP, we just want to count = what's the=20 net contribution, what's the value added?" he explains. "Last = year,=20 worldwide Wal-Mart sold $285 billion worth of goods and services, = but paid=20 manufacturers $220." Sanderson's point is pretty obvious, if you = think=20 about it. And yet the article gets it wrong over and over, which = nearly=20 sends Sanderson around the bend. "This happens to be the political = rhetoric: 'These 200 corporations dominate the world.' They don't. = They're=20 a very small percentage of GDP," Sanderson says. "Those who are=20 criticizing very large multinational corporations are doing a = disservice=20 if they don't get the math right."

This contrarian approach is central to Sanderson's worldview: = It's the=20 counterintuitive, "everyone-says-x-but-really-what-matters-is-y"=20 formulation that has become the staple of magazines like the New = Republic=20 and Slate. (A headline from Slate's October 14 "Underground = Economist"=20 column: "Charity is Selfish.") But as with any counterintuitive = rhetoric,=20 what matters is how you define the conventional "intuition" that = you're=20 skewering. And with Sanderson, the target is almost always = statist,=20 regulatory and liberal: The idea that you can, indeed, get a free = lunch,=20 by, for instance, mandating better incomes for workers by raising = the=20 minimum wage. Thinking of economic policy as a series of = trade-offs and=20 opportunity costs and, most importantly, unintended consequences = is a=20 hallmark of the Chicago School, and it was a constant theme = throughout the=20 course: Whenever you try to alter the market, the market extracts = its=20 revenge.

In Sanderson's zeal to play 'gotcha' with the press, he too can = slant=20 the pure data. That evening, I went online and found that = Wal-Mart's $65=20 billion of net revenue was still larger than the GDP of 132 = countries,=20 including Bangladesh, which has a population of 144 million = people. I=20 wrote an e-mail to Sanderson, who promptly wrote back, saying the = bigger=20 point was to drive home the problem with inappropriate comparisons = and=20 double counting. "I tried to point out that these apples v. = oranges=20 comparisons are all over the place," he wrote, and added that the=20 double-counting error could be found everywhere from the Wall = Street=20 Journal to some introductory textbooks. "Thanks," he wrote, = "for=20 continuing the out-of-class dialogue."

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Sanderson is so likeable and masterful that the entire quarter = goes by=20 with the class eating out of his hand: They take careful notes, = class=20 attendance is almost perfect every day and each pre-exam study = session is=20 packed. But the final unit of the class is devoted to free trade, = and=20 suddenly things change.

Sanderson begins the class by telling us that "in trade, = there's an=20 enormous amount of agreement between economists about what = constitutes the=20 truth. The disagreements are between economists and everybody = else." His=20 central contention is that allowing any two given countries to = trade their=20 goods freely will necessarily make both countries better off. It's = the=20 same logic, he says, that we use everyday. When you decide to have = someone=20 do your dry cleaning or fix your car, you're deciding to = specialize in=20 what you do best, and trade for the other things you need. = Specialize and=20 trade: That was Adam Smith's central insight into the nature of = the=20 "wealth of nations," and, Sanderson says, it remains as true today = as it=20 was then.

But when lecturing on trade, Sanderson's tone is noticeably = different.=20 His agenda and ideology are more up front, such that the classes = felt for=20 the first time almost--almost--like propaganda. And during these = lectures,=20 something incredible happens. The class rebels. Whereas for the = duration=20 of the quarter Sanderson had made the students feel as if he was = their=20 guide in seeing through the Matrix, suddenly Sanderson morphs from = being=20 Laurence Fishburne to the FBI agent in a suit. The class prods and = pushes=20 back as if they are being fed spin. As Sanderson talks about the=20 importance of nations specializing in whatever they have a = comparative=20 advantage in, a student raises his hand: "Isn't there a problem if = you put=20 all your eggs into one basket, and then if there's a problem with = that=20 sector you're in trouble?"

That ends that day's class, but it continues in the next. = Sanderson=20 argues that liberalized trade creates more jobs than it destroys. = "Free=20 trade creates winners and it also creates losers. It turns out = that=20 winners are quantitatively larger than the losers." A student = asks, flat=20 out, "Why are we to believe that?" Sanderson restates his point, = but the=20 student holds his ground, saying he's read that there simply = doesn't exist=20 an accurate measure to figure out how many jobs are being created = and=20 destroyed. Sanderson concedes that this is true, but insists it = "must" be=20 a net positive.

You can hear papers rustling and side conversations breaking = out. Hands=20 begin to shoot up and Sanderson began to sweat noticeably as the = mutiny=20 spreads. One student asks about attaching labor or environmental=20 protections to trade deals. Sanderson replies that such = stipulations (like=20 requiring workers be paid $14 an hour) simply operate like = tariffs,=20 raising the price of goods and "saving jobs in the U.S., union = jobs that=20 are relatively high paid, and taking people in developing = countries who=20 are not well off and making them poorer. I tend to be against laws = that=20 make poor people poorer."

"OK," responds the student, who with a beard and long hair = looks a bit=20 like the student radical who's been missing all quarter. "Let's = say the=20 standards are not ridiculous. The workers have a right to = organize, or we=20 can't pollute the only source of the village's water supply."

"How do we define what's ridiculous?," Sanderson shoots back. = "Once you=20 start, it's very difficult to draw the line, in terms of what = workers=20 have. Should other countries not trade with the U.S. because we = have=20 capital punishment? Should we not trade with countries that don't = allow=20 abortion? My problem with sweatshops is, quite frankly, the only = potential=20 definition is people who work long hours for low wages, and that's = what=20 the U.S. was 120 years ago. A lot of what economics is about is = how to=20 increase the world's income, and not for Bill Gates and Oprah, but = for the=20 world's poor. Unions don't like trade agreements. They've never = seen one=20 they like, and they want to find a reason in environmental = standards or=20 things like that."

"We do draw the line every day," the student responds, not = bothering to=20 raise his hand this time. There are hands up all over and the = class has=20 now devolved into a free-for-all. "We don't trade with Burma. We = didn't=20 trade with Iraq. We do trade with Saudi Arabia. It's not = impossible to=20 re-imagine how to draw the line." Sanderson is not winning this = argument.=20 "These are tough issues," he says, and the class ends.

It occurs to me that Sanderson's problem is that he's been too = honest=20 about his biases. It's far more effective to communicate a = worldview=20 through subtext than to argue for it explicitly. For eight weeks,=20 Sanderson had been the model of equanimity, the centrist arbiter = of=20 competing factions, and because of this students seemed to accept = his word=20 without question. But on the very first day of class he'd tipped = his hand=20 that he was an "ardent free-trader," and his clear desire to have = students=20 come away believing, as he does, in the benefits of free trade, = was=20 backfiring.

By the next class, Sanderson has regrouped, and calmly and = methodically=20 leads the class through a Socratic dialogue. Tobacco farmers have = lost=20 their jobs because we smoke less: Does that mean we should have = the=20 government do something about it? People lose their jobs all the = time=20 because the work they do--whether opening envelopes for magazine=20 subscriptions or wrapping Hershey's Kisses--becomes automated. = Trade works=20 the same way as technological progress: While it might put some = people out=20 of work, in the end, it makes everyone better off. The class is = nodding,=20 attentive and silent.

Furthermore, free trade is a moral imperative because it makes = poorer=20 countries better off. "I don't want to sound like Miss America," = Sanderson=20 says as he wraps up the final class of the quarter. "I think world = poverty=20 is where it's at in terms of where you try to place resources. My = sense is=20 that significant redistribution of wealth is probably not the = answer. Part=20 of it is that there is not enough wealth to redistribute. There's = not a=20 lot of rich people and too many poor people. And the gap between = rich and=20 poor is too vast. It comes down to economic growth, how fast we = can make=20 economies grow. Economic growth does tend to raise all boats."

As the class files out, I see a student I'd talked with a few = times=20 over the course of the quarter, an unassuming kid with a long mop = of brown=20 hair. I remember a conversation we'd had at the beginning of the = semester:=20 "I hope it doesn't all end up to be wrong," he'd said, referring = to the=20 Chicago School theories he was about to learn. "Like in Latin = America.=20 That worries me a bit."

Six months after the class ended, I e-mailed him to ask whether = he was=20 still worried. "I got this e-mail right after my Econ 201 class, = the=20 intermediate sequence for the major requirement," he wrote back. = "So it=20 looks like I'm no longer worried that what I'm learning is = 'wrong.'=20 Actually, the conversation we had doesn't really make sense to me = anymore.=20 I now understand that any one school of economics can't explain = and=20 predict all the intricacies of human economies."

What he'd come to realize, he wrote, was that "it isn't a = question of=20 correct theory or incorrect theory, but whether or not the results = of the=20 implementation of that theory are right or wrong in a moral = sense."

In other words, it's a question that economics alone can't = answer.

Christopher Hayes is a senior editor of In These = Times.=20