Downgrades And Downfall

=20

Downgrades = And=20 Downfall
How could a single unit of AIG cause the giant = company's=20 near-ruin and become a fulcrum of the global financial crisis? By = straying from=20 its own rules for managing risk and then failing to anticipate the=20 consequences.

By Robert O'Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis
Washington = Post=20 Staff Writers
Wednesday, December 31, 2008; A01

Third of three parts

The contracts were flying out of AIG Financial Products. Hardly anyone outside Wall Street had ever heard of credit-default swaps, but = by early=20 2005, investment banks were snapping them up to insure all kinds of = deals in=20 case of default, fueling one of the great financial booms in U.S. = history.

During twice-monthly conference calls that originated from the = company's=20 headquarters in Wilton, Conn., president Joseph Cassano would listen as=20 marketing executive Alan Frost listed the latest swap transactions for=20 associates in the firm's offices in London, Paris and Tokyo.

Once a small part of the firm's business, the increasingly popular = contracts=20 had helped boost the company's profits to record levels. The company's = computer=20 models continued to show only a minute chance that the firm would ever = pay out a=20 dime on the contracts, and it turned down deals that didn't meet its = standards.=20 After their reviews, Cassano and his team would consult with AIG = executives,=20 sometimes including chairman and chief executive Maurice "Hank" = Greenberg. "We=20 rode pretty tight rein on them," Greenberg recalls.

But the swaps also exposed Financial Products and its parent AIG, the = global=20 insurance titan, to billions of dollars in possible losses. By spring = 2005, some=20 Financial Products executives were questioning the surge in volume. = Among them=20 was Cassano, an early advocate for the swaps business who ran the firm = from its=20 London office.

"How could we possibly be doing so many deals?" one executive recalls = Cassano=20 asking Frost, the firm's liaison with Wall Street dealers, during one = conference=20 call.

"Dealers know we can close and close quickly," Frost said. "That's = why we're=20 the go-to."

Efficiency wasn't the only reason. Frost didn't have to say aloud = what=20 everyone at the firm already appreciated. Financial Products had become = the=20 "go-to" for credit-default swaps in part because of its knowledge and=20 reliability, but also because it had AIG's backing. The parent company's = top-drawer, Triple A credit rating and its deep pockets assured = customers that=20 they could rest easy.

Their comfort turned out to be illusory. The credit-default swaps = became a=20 primary force in the disintegration of AIG as a private enterprise and a = massive=20 government rescue aimed at preventing catastrophic damage to the world's = financial system. Never in U.S. history has the government invested so = much=20 money trying to save a private company.

Even as Frost spoke, trouble was brewing for AIG. On March 14, 2005,=20 Greenberg stepped down amid allegations about his involvement in a = questionable=20 deal and accounting practices at AIG. The next day, the Fitch Ratings service downgraded AIG's credit rating to = AA. The=20 two other major rating services, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, soon followed = suit.

The initial fallout came swiftly, as AIG's annual report to federal=20 regulators disclosed. The downgrades had triggered provisions in = Financial=20 Products' existing transaction, the report said, requiring its parent = company to=20 post $1.16 billion in collateral for the deals.

The company also warned that the downgrades could erode confidence in = Financial Products, a crucial element in the unit's phenomenal success.=20 "Historically, AIG's triple-A ratings provided AIGFP a competitive = advantage.=20 The downgrades will reduce this advantage and [some] counterparties may = be=20 unwilling to transact business with AIGFP except on a secured basis," = AIG=20 reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission in May 2005.

The swaps business had bound Financial Products to hundreds of = counterparties=20 in New York and Europe. Wall Street firms such as Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch favored the credit-default swaps as an = extra layer=20 of protection for mortgage-backed securities, one of the many investment = by-products helping to fuel the overheated housing boom. European banks = liked=20 them because they could treat the swaps as a form of collateral, which = freed up=20 cash that the banks would ordinarily have to set aside as protection = against=20 losses.

The interlocking, complex nature of these contracts would speed their = downfall. When the housing market began to unravel in 2007, it set off a = chain=20 of events that would prove disastrous: downgrades in the ratings of = securities=20 that Financial Products had insured; demands by Financial Products'=20 counterparties for billions of dollars in collateral; AIG's desperate = search for=20 cash to meet the collateral calls; a panicky weekend of negotiations in = New York=20 and Washington; and, finally, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson's conclusion that AIG could not be = allowed to=20 collapse.

The taxpayer rescue of AIG stands at $152 billion, including $60 = billion in=20 loans, a $40 billion investment in AIG preferred stock and a $52 billion = purchase of troubled AIG assets that the government hopes to sell off to = recoup=20 its investment.

Meanwhile, federal investigators are examining statements made last = year by=20 the company and its executives to determine whether shareholders = received=20 misleading information. Several investors have filed civil lawsuits, = alleging=20 that executives at AIG and Financial Products hid the extent of their=20 credit-default swap troubles.

Whether that turns out to be the case, there's no doubt that = Cassano's=20 concern in spring 2005 did not slow the firm's mounting involvement in = the=20 credit-default swap business for several months. The deals mounted and = the risks=20 grew.

Even after Financial Products stopped writing the credit-default = swaps at the=20 end of 2005, it maintained a public veneer of confidence that the = contracts it=20 had on its books were fine and that their computer models were sound. As = Cassano=20 told investors in a December 2007 webcast, "Our fundamental analysis = says this=20 is a money-good asset. We would not be doing the shareholders any = benefit by=20 exiting this right now and taking that loss."

2 {smleft} Playing Catch-Up

By 2005, the world of debt had changed dramatically since Financial = Products=20 wrote its first credit-default swap in 1998. Back then, the swaps = involved=20 corporate debt, essentially the bonds that corporations use to finance = their=20 operations. There was a wealth of historical data about corporate debt, = which=20 gave Financial Products' executives a high degree of confidence in = consultant=20 Gary Gorton's computer models.

Gorton, a Yale business professor with a PhD in economics, had = written=20 scores of intricate papers about corporate finance, banking and the = history of=20 financial panics. Cassano saw Gorton as a valuable asset. "Gary has = helped us=20 tremendously in helping us organize our procedures, organize our = modeling=20 effort, developing the intuition," Cassano said during the December 2007 = webcast=20 for investors.

By then, Gorton had worked as a consultant for Financial Products for = nearly=20 a decade. At that same investor conference, Gorton explained how he saw = the=20 analysis that he and his colleagues had been doing. "These models are = guided by=20 a few very basic principles, which are designed to make them very robust = and to=20 introduce as little model risk as possible," he said. "No transaction is = approved by Joe if it's not based on a model that we built."

Financial Products had built itself on data, analysis and a culture = of=20 healthy skepticism. Even as the firm grew to about 400 in 2005 from 13 = employees=20 in 1987, it sought to maintain its discipline. At Financial Products, = God had=20 always been in the details, and the details were always rooted in the = math.

Over the years, the firm had stayed ahead of competitors by finding=20 innovative ways to manage and minimize the risks it took on for clients. = Financial Products executives made fortunes, some taking home tens of = millions=20 of dollars a year, as the firm created markets in untapped areas -- such = as=20 buying synthetic coal equipment to capitalize on energy tax breaks.

On credit-default swaps, the firm adapted as the market evolved. By = 2004,=20 Wall Street investment banks were discovering how to turn consumer debt = into a=20 moneymaker, churning out bond-like securities backed by mortgages and = other=20 assets. Credit-default swaps helped attract institutional investors to = these=20 mind-bendingly complex deals, known in Wall Street jargon as = collateralized debt=20 obligations, or CDOs.

CDOs defined a revolution in corporate finance called = "securitization." Wall=20 Street saw any income stream as a candidate for securitizing: mortgages, = credit=20 card payments, car loans, even student loans. The investment banks would = bundle=20 these loans, and the monthly payments that came with them, into a new = security=20 for investors looking for steady but higher yields than Treasurys or = corporate=20 bonds.

CDOs had been around for years, but the real estate boom suddenly = made=20 mortgages one of the hottest investments on Wall Street. The mortgage = industry=20 turned into the equivalent of a giant assembly line, lubricated by fees = from one=20 end to the other. New lenders sprung up by the month, offering loans to=20 first-time buyers as well as existing homeowners who wanted to move up = to more=20 square footage. For people with shaky credit, the industry provided = subprime=20 loans, with higher rates that some homebuyers now cannot repay.

Banks packaged and resold the mortgages in pools, which became the = basis for=20 mortgage-backed securities. Wall Street scooped them up. The CDO market = took=20 off, ballooning to $551 billion issued in 2006 from $157 billion in = 2004.

The CDO structure depended on the concept of layered risk. The = securities in=20 the "super senior" top tier were considered low risk and attracted the = highest=20 ratings. In return for their safety, these bonds paid the lowest = interest rate.=20 The reverse was true at the other end: The lower tiers absorbed the = first losses=20 in the case of loan defaults. For accepting extra risk, investors in = these tiers=20 earned a higher interest rate.

Financial Products made its money by selling credit-default swaps = only on the=20 super-senior tier. It seemed a safe bet: Cassano once defined super = senior as=20 the portion of the deal that was safe even "under worst-case stresses = and=20 worst-case stress" assumptions.

The mortgage-backed CDOs were also thought to be safe because of the=20 geographic diversity of the underlying loans. Surely, investment bankers = reasoned, people in different parts of the country would not default on = their=20 home loans at the same time. The real estate market was strong and = showed no=20 sign of faltering.

Financial Products executives said the swaps contracts were like = catastrophe=20 insurance for events that would never happen.

Hedging, the firm's hallmark, seemed largely unnecessary. "Given the=20 conservatism in that we've built these portfolios, we haven't had to do = a huge=20 amount of hedging over the years," Andy Forster, the firm's global head = of=20 credit trading, said at a May 2007 presentation to investors in New = York.

Cassano also emphasized that both Financial Products and AIG had a = review=20 role. "Each and every one of our transactions," he told investors = listening to=20 the December 2007 webcast, "passes through the same careful process. We = don't=20 have any short-cuts. . . . So there's always two eyes, two teams = reviewing our=20 business. There is not one dollar of this business that's been done that = hasn't=20 gone through that double-review check."

But there were provisions in the swap contracts that the computer = simulations=20 hadn't adequately addressed, as later events showed. There were also = tremors in=20 the mortgage industry that would convince one Financial Products = executive that=20 the company should get out of the credit-default swap business -- = fast.

3 {smleft} The Subprime Threat

In fall 2005, Eugene Park was asked to take over Alan Frost's=20 responsibilities at Financial Products. Frost had done exceedingly well = in=20 marketing the credit-default swaps to Wall Street, and was getting a = promotion.=20 He would now report to Cassano directly on other strategic projects.

Park had been at the firm for six years and ran the North American = corporate=20 credit derivative portfolio. Taking on that swaps business would boost = his=20 already handsome compensation.

But he wanted no part of it. He was worried about the subprime = component of=20 the CDO market. He had examined the annual report of a company involved = in the=20 subprime business. He was stunned, he told his colleagues at the = time.

The subprime loans underlying many CDOs formed too large a part of = the=20 packaged debt, increasing the risk to unacceptable levels. Those loans = could=20 default at any time, anywhere across the country because the = underwriting=20 processes had been so shoddy. The diversification was a myth -- if the = housing=20 market went bust, the subprimes would collapse, like a house of = cards.

Park spelled out his reasoning in meetings and conversations with = colleagues=20 over the next several weeks. It was as if he had scratched the needle = across an=20 old record album at full volume.

Cassano agreed the firm should dig deeper. Over the next few weeks, = Financial=20 Products executives worked with researchers from investment banks to = examine the=20 subprime threat.

They discovered that the subprime exposure had been growing since = early 2004,=20 when the composition of the CDOs were increasingly dominated by = mortgages rather=20 than other kinds of consumer debt.

Cassano decided it was time to stop. Gorton explained the decision to = investors during the December 2007 webcast: "We stopped writing this = business in=20 late 2005 based on fundamental analysis and based on concerns that the = model was=20 not going to be able to handle declining underwriting standards."

By then, the firm had $80 billion worth of existing CDOs that = included=20 subprime mortgages as underlying assets. About half had been issued = before=20 Greenberg's ouster, Nicholas J. Ashooh, an AIG spokesman, said this = week.=20 Greenberg said in a recent interview that his research shows only $7 = billion in=20 swaps were issued on CDOs with subprime assets during his tenure.

Either way, the exposure would prove significant. If additional = downgrades=20 occurred, either in AIG's credit rating or in the CDO ratings, Financial = Products would have to come up with tens of billions of dollars in = collateral it=20 did not have.

4 {smleft} 'Not a Lot Of Risk'

In May 2007, Cassano stepped before a crowd of entrepreneurs in=20 Manhattan.

Financial Products was itself an entrepreneurial success story, with = the=20 numbers to prove it: an investment portfolio in excess of $50 billion; a = trading=20 operation that dealt in dozens of currencies, 18 commodities and a host = of=20 credit and equity services; a reputation for finding innovative ways to = assess=20 and manage the risks in interest rates, equities and other deals for its = clients.

"And who are our clients?" Cassano asked. "It's a broad global swath = of=20 mostly high-grade institutions, mostly high-grade entities around the = world and=20 it includes banks and investment banks, pension funds, endowments, = foundations,=20 insurance companies, hedge funds, money managers, high-net-worth = individuals,=20 municipalities and sovereigns and supranationals."

Cassano went on. "My colleagues and myself have $500 million invested = in the=20 company," he said. "And so we've become very, very good caretakers of = the value=20 of the company."

As a company with billions of dollars riding on arcane financial = transactions=20 such as derivatives, Financial Products certainly faced challenges, = Cassano=20 said. He then alluded to the debate within the firm over credit-default=20 swaps.

"Credit risk is the biggest risk our group has. It's the single = biggest risk=20 that we manage," he said. "But with a AA plus/AA credit portfolio, = there's not a=20 lot of risk sitting in there. And so while it is the largest risk, it's = not by=20 any stretch a risky business."

Three months later, in a conference call with investors, AIG chief = executive=20 Martin Sullivan struck a different note, acknowledging = the growing=20 unrest over defaults in the U.S. mortgage market.

The 52-year-old Sullivan had taken the reins at AIG after Greenberg's = ouster=20 in March 2005. He was an AIG veteran, with more than 35 years at the = company,=20 primarily on the insurance side. His rise to the top was an exclamation = point on=20 a career that began at 17, when he joined AIG's London office as a = clerk.

Cassano joined Sullivan on the call. Asked by a Goldman Sachs analyst about the stability of Financial = Products'=20 huge portfolio of credit derivatives, Cassano responded with calm and=20 confidence.

"It is hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario = within any=20 kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those=20 transactions," Cassano said.

Sullivan added: "That's why I am sleeping a little bit easier at = night."

5 {smleft} Collateral Calls

After Sullivan's comment to investors, a wave of collateral calls = would=20 begin, swamping AIG.

The first came from Goldman Sachs, the venerable Wall Street = investment bank=20 and one of Financial Products' biggest counterparties. Citing the = plummeting=20 value of some subprime assets underlying securities that Financial = Products had=20 insured, Goldman demanded $1.5 billion to help cover its exposure.

The 2005 downgrade of AIG to a AA company now came into play. Under = the swaps=20 contracts, AIG had to post more collateral than in its Triple A = days.

AIG disputed the amount, but had no choice but to negotiate. It = agreed to=20 post $450 million.

As if AIG didn't have enough problems, the rapidly crumbling real = estate=20 market was causing the ratings services to downgrade the securities in = CDOs,=20 including the top layers that investors had been led to believe were = safe. Those=20 downgrades also made AIG more vulnerable under the swaps contracts.

In October, Goldman came calling again, demanding $3 billion. AIG = balked once=20 more, but agreed to provide another $1.5 billion.

These and other events sent AIG's stock price tumbling. In six weeks, = between=20 early October and mid-November, it fell more than 25 percent, = contributing to=20 the perception that AIG was in trouble.

The collateral calls also set off alarms at PricewaterhouseCoopers, AIG's outside auditing firm. The = auditors=20 told Sullivan on Nov. 29 that they had found serious oversight problems = and=20 "that AIG could have a material weakness" relating to risk management. = More=20 ominously, they said, no one knew whether the value that Financial = Products=20 placed on its portfolio of derivatives was accurate. That meant the = losses in=20 market value could be much worse.

About the same time, the SEC required companies like AIG to adopt an=20 accounting standard known as "mark-to-market," designed to give = investors a=20 better sense of the current values of a company's assets. As the housing = market=20 declined, and the rate of defaults increased, the swaps looked at = greater risk.=20 That allowed counterparties to ask for more collateral.

Greenberg questioned the merits of the rule. "Mark-to-market = accounting, I=20 would argue, probably caused a great deal of the trauma that the = financial=20 industry is in today," he said.

On paper, the value of the credit-default swaps was sliding. In = November, the=20 company reported the portfolio had lost $352 million. At the December = 2007=20 webcast for investors, Cassano reported a higher number, $1.1 = billion.

Sullivan, Cassano and others at the company remained bullish on their = ability=20 to weather the calls, and in the long run, even recover the collateral = they had=20 posted. "But because this business is carefully underwritten," Sullivan = said,=20 "we believe the probability that it will sustain an economic loss is = close to=20 zero."

AIG's chief risk management officer, Robert E. Lewis, reminded = investors of=20 the company's culture. "If you look at AIG's history," Lewis said, "I = think you=20 can realize that AIG in its culture does not have an appetite for undue=20 concentrations of risk."

Cassano made the case that Financial Products would survive the storm = because=20 it had one of the world's best companies behind it.

"Clearly this is a time where it's a huge benefit to be part of the = AIG=20 family," he told the investors. "It's these crises and these points in = time that=20 give us the wherewithal right now to stand here with you and say on the = back of=20 giants, on the back of everybody at AIG who has built the capital that = AIG has,=20 the AIGFP unit is able to withstand this aberrant period."

Federal investigators are examining the December 2007 webcast as part = of=20 their effort to determine whether Cassano, Sullivan and others at the = company=20 misled investors about how dire the situation had become.

Two months later, on Feb. 11, AIG disclosed that its auditors had = found the=20 company "had a material weakness in its internal control over financial=20 reporting and oversight relating to the fair value valuation of the = AIGFP=20 super-senior credit-default swap portfolio." On Feb. 28, AIG announced = that its=20 estimate of paper losses had spiraled to $11.5 billion. The company also = acknowledged that its collateral postings had reached $5.3 billion.

The next day, Sullivan announced that the Cassano era was over. The = Financial=20 Products president had resigned, effective March 31. Sullivan did not = reveal=20 that Cassano would get $1 million a month as a consultant. That fact = came out=20 months later during congressional hearings on AIG's near-collapse. AIG = has also=20 provided a record of Cassano's compensation history to the committee, = showing=20 that he received $43.6 million in salary and bonuses in 2006, and $24.2 = million=20 in 2007.

"Joe has been a very valuable member of the AIGFP senior management = team for=20 over 20 years," Sullivan said in making the announcement. "He has had a = great=20 career with us, and we wish him the very best in the future."

The worst was still to come.

6 {smleft} A Deep Hole

The urgent phone call that alerted Eric Dinallo to the extent of the financial meltdown = came Friday,=20 Sept. 12, as he drove to his family's weekend home in the Hudson Valley, = north=20 of Manhattan.

Dinallo, head of New York State's insurance department, got a = briefing about=20 AIG, where panicked executives were desperately trying to come up with a = huge=20 infusion of cash. They had heard the bond rating agencies were going to=20 downgrade the company's already ailing credit grade, which would trigger = more=20 collateral calls. "And if downgraded -- even like one notch -- they = didn't have=20 sufficient liquidity" to meet the calls, Dinallo said recently.

Dinallo recognized the danger. AIG had operated for so long at the = center of=20 the world's financial web, with so many counterparties, that its = collapse would=20 be felt in every corner of the globe. As insurance superintendent, = Dinallo was=20 aware of the previous calls. But he was still taken by surprise. "I = never=20 realized things were as bad as they were," he said. "I didn't realize = how deep=20 the hole was they had created."

AIG was going to try selling some of its life insurance affiliates. = AIG=20 officials also made a pitch for a $20 billion loan from the state = insurance=20 department. "They said, 'We will pay this loan quickly,' " Dinallo = recalled.

Dinallo cut short his weekend plans and headed back to Manhattan = early=20 Saturday. By noon he had assembled a small team at AIG headquarters. = Working on=20 the 18th floor, not far from where Greenberg once reigned, Dinallo and = his crew=20 pored through AIG's books, looking for ways to raise money.

Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan set to work on a $75 billion = bridge=20 loan from a syndicate of major financial institutions, which was = intended to=20 give AIG cash until it could sell enough assets to bail itself out.

The urgency and tension were palpable. New York's governor, David A. Paterson, called in. So did Timothy Geithner, head of the New York Federal Reserve. Geithner was swamped that day = with the=20 imminent collapse of Lehman Brothers, but he wanted constant updates.

By Sunday night, no solution emerged, and AIG executives were worried = that=20 the company's stock price would take another hit when the market opened = on=20 Monday.

On Monday morning, Paterson announced he would relax insurance = regulations so=20 that AIG could borrow up to $20 billion from its subsidiaries to cover = operating=20 expenses. Meanwhile, the Goldman-J.P. Morgan effort on the bridge loan = wasn't=20 coming together.

Hour by hour, it became clear that AIG was far more exposed by = Financial=20 Products' commitments than anyone realized. The next day, sensing = disaster, the=20 Federal Reserve Board, with the backing of the U.S. Treasury Department, stepped in and took control of = what had=20 been one of the most successful private enterprises ever.

"The Board determined that, in current circumstances, a disorderly = failure of=20 AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market = fragility and=20 lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, = and=20 materially weaker economic performance," the Federal Reserve said.

7 {smleft} 'An Unacceptable Situation'

In October, SEC chairman Christopher Cox appeared at a roundtable discussion that = the=20 agency was hosting at its Washington headquarters. He delivered a tough, = grim=20 message: The federal government had failed taxpayers by not regulating = the swaps=20 market.

"The regulatory blackhole for credit-default swaps is one of the most = significant issues we are confronting in the current credit crisis," Cox = said,=20 "and it requires immediate legislative action."

He tried to put the regulatory failure into context. "The market for = CDS is=20 barely 10 years old. It has doubled in size since just two years ago," = he said.=20 "It has grown between the gaps and seams of the current regulatory = system, where=20 neither the commission nor any other government agency can reach it. No = one has=20 regulatory authority over credit-default swaps -- not even to require = basic=20 reporting or disclosure."

He went on: "The over-the-counter credit-default swaps market has = drawn the=20 world's major financial institutions and others into a tangled web of=20 interconnections where the failure of any one institution might = jeopardize the=20 entire financial system. This is an unacceptable situation for a = free-market=20 economy."

8 {smleft} Recriminations

The question of what went wrong at AIG and its Financial Products = unit=20 provoked some finger-pointing in recent interviews with former = executives.

Greenberg, the ousted AIG chairman, says that the responsibility = rests with=20 the people who ran the company after his forced resignation in 2005. He = said=20 that Cassano, the man he appointed to run Financial Products in 2001, = never=20 would have been allowed to do anything untoward under his leadership. = "No. No,"=20 Greenberg said. "Because he was controlled."

His longtime deputy, former AIG vice chairman Edward Matthews, also = blamed=20 their successors. "When Hank and I left," he said, "those chains that = bound Joe=20 Cassano were off."

Cassano doesn't agree. Through his lawyer, F. Joseph Warin, he = maintained=20 that "every single super-senior CDS investment was authorized by AIG=20 corporate."

Warin said, in a statement: "Regardless of what Mr. Greenberg says = today, the=20 facts speak for themselves: Mr. Cassano decided on his own, after Mr. = Greenberg=20 left AIG, to stop writing CDS [credit-default swap] protection. Mr. = Cassano=20 instructed his team to analyze the mortgage underwriting standards and = then made=20 the decision to exit the business in late 2005, all within months of Mr. = Greenberg leaving the company."

As for the allegations that Cassano and others made misleading = statements in=20 December 2007, Warin has said his client acted lawfully and is = cooperating with=20 investigators. "He provided full and complete information to investors, = his=20 supervisors and auditors," Warin said.

Howard Sosin and Randy Rackson, two of Financial Products' founders, = left the=20 company in 1993 after a bitter dispute with Greenberg. Sosin lives in=20 Connecticut, not far from Financial Products' headquarters. He traces = the roots=20 of the firm's demise to Greenberg's decision to force him out.

"We did really well with it. AIG did really well with it," Sosin = said, adding=20 that recent events could have been avoided with more attention to the = firm's=20 "core values." "It did not have to be this total failure of = control."

In his brownstone on Manhattan's Upper West Side, Rackson said, "You = put=20 something together that was good, and then somebody takes the controls = and=20 drives it into the ground."

9 {smleft} Epilogue

On Nov. 11, Gerry Pasciucco pulled open the front door of AIG = Financial=20 Products headquarters in Wilton, Conn. For much of Pasciucco's career on = Wall=20 Street, Financial Products had drawn some of the smartest, most = ambitious people=20 in the business, while doing pioneering work.

Now, it was in ruins.

Just weeks before, the 48-year-old Pasciucco, a vice chairman at Morgan Stanley, had heard from colleagues working with = federal=20 authorities that AIG was looking for someone to end Financial Products. = He spoke=20 with current AIG chief executive, Edward Liddy, who invited him to the Manhattan = headquarters of the=20 hemorrhaging insurance giant. Sullivan was gone; he had resigned as of = July 1=20 with a $47 million severance package.

As Liddy and Pasciucco sat in the office once occupied by Greenberg = and=20 Sullivan, Liddy spelled out what he needed from Pasciucco: To identify = Financial=20 Products' outstanding obligations, resolve those transactions as = profitably and=20 quickly as possible, and then close the doors and turn out the = lights.

Pasciucco had worked at Morgan Stanley for 24 years in capital = markets and=20 risk assessment. He had once been filmed by Harvard Business School for a case study on how to = manage in a=20 fast-paced financial market. But even with that background, he wondered = whether=20 he had the chops to sort out Financial Products' problems.

"How solvable is it?" Pasciucco recalled asking Liddy. "I'm up for a=20 challenge, but there has to be a chance."

Liddy told Pasciucco to think about it. Back in his Morgan Stanley = office,=20 overlooking Times Square, Pasciucco did more homework. The = organization was in=20 desperate need of leadership and a game plan for unwinding its enormous = book of=20 transactions. Pasciucco came to believe that he could make a difference = and=20 decided to take the job, in part because he saw it as a chance to pitch = in on=20 the great economic crisis of his time.

Now, in Wilton for his first day on the job, Pasciucco knew from the = demeanor=20 of new colleagues that it was going to be even rougher than he thought. = Their=20 faces looked glum, their arms were crossed and they seemed unsure what = to=20 do.

He dove into the company's books. The story he found in the numbers = was=20 fascinating and daunting: Financial Products had $2.7 trillion worth of = swap=20 contracts and positions; 50,000 outstanding trades; 2,000 firms involved = on the=20 other side of those trades; and 450 employees in six offices around the = world.=20 The majority of the firm's trades had been hedged, essentially along the = lines=20 that Sosin, Rackson and others had laid out two decades before.

"The place made sense when I got here," Pasciucco said last week. = "They were=20 very, very smart."

But Pasciucco soon found evidence of a fatal miscalculation. It seems = that as=20 Financial Products ramped up its credit-default swap business, its = leaders=20 assumed that its parent, AIG, would always be as strong as it was the = day it=20 backed the firm's first big trade in 1987. He said they had failed to = prepare=20 for the possibility of a downgrade in AIG's credit rating.

The executives who had pushed or approved the credit-default swap = business=20 had placed too much faith in the math that told them the worst would = never=20 happen, that AIG and its deep pockets would be there to usher them = through the=20 trouble.

"When the unexpected happens and you have the biggest credit crisis = since=20 1929, you have to be prepared to deal with it, and they weren't," = Pasciucco=20 said. "There was no system in place to account for the fact that the = company=20 might not be a Triple A forever."