Quick jump navigation
![3D""](3D"http://www.economist.com/images/left_h4.png")
![3DEconomist.com=20](3D"http://www.economist.com/images/economist_logo.png"){kind=logo}
PRINT = EDITION
Quick jump navigation
- NEWS ANALYSIS
- POLITICS THIS=20 WEEK
- BUSINESS THIS=20 WEEK
- OPINION=20
- Leaders=20
- Letters to = the=20 editor=20
- Blogs=20
- Columns=20
- Kallery =
- WORLD=20
- United States =
- The Americas=20
- Asia=20
- Middle East = &=20 Africa=20
- Europe=20
- Britain=20
- SPECIAL = REPORTS
- BUSINESS=20
- FINANCE & = ECONOMICS=20
- SCIENCE & = TECHNOLOGY=20
- BOOKS & ARTS=20
- PEOPLE=20
- Obituary =
- MARKETS & =
DATA=20
- Weekly=20 Indicators=20
- Currencies=20
- Rankings=20
- Big Mac = Index=20
- Chart = Gallery=20
- DIVERSIONS=20
- RESEARCH TOOLS
- AUDIO AND VIDEO
- DELIVERY OPTIONS=20
- Audio = edition=20
- Mobile Edition=20
- RSS Feeds=20
- Screensaver =
- CLASSIFIED = ADS=20
![3D"Economist](3D"http://www.economist.com/images/nav/economist_group_logo.png")
=20
- Economist Intelligence Unit=20
- Economist=20 Conferences=20
- The World In=20
- Intelligent=20 Life=20
- CFO=20
- Roll Call=20
- European Voice=20
- EuroFinance=20
- Economist Diaries and Business Gifts=20
- Reprints = and=20 Permissions
Advertisement
Quick jump navigation
Securitisation
Fear and loathing, and a hint of hope
Feb 14th 2008 | LAS VEGAS
From The Economist =
print=20
edition
Not all is lost for the structured-finance business. But it faces = further=20 discomfort before it can start to recover some of its past = sheen
AS GAGS go, it was cheap. But irresistible. As a banker from = Citigroup placed=20 his chips on the roulette table, a watching wise-guy sniggered: =93There = goes=20 another $15 billion.=94
Even though it was held (as usual) in Las Vegas, this year's = conference of=20 the American Securitisation Forum (ASF), = between=20 February 3rd and 6th, was a subdued affair. First staged only in 2004, = the event=20 has become a mecca for those whose job it is to spin mortgages, = credit-card debt=20 and other bread-and-butter financial assets into tradable securities. = But this=20 time attendance was down=97and tension up, as the neck-masseuses in the = exhibit=20 hall could attest. Black humour and self-deprecation replaced the=20 self-congratulation of past years. John Devaney, a hedge-fund manager = who had to=20 sell his 142-foot yacht, Positive Carry, and his Gulfstream IV = after=20 making bad bets on mortgage bonds, told an audience: =93I'd like to = thank the=20 market for dealing me a direct hit. As a trader if you don't get = sucker-punched=20 every once in a while, you don't understand what risk is.=94
You might suppose that meeting in America's gambling capital would = provide=20 symbolism enough. But the conference Super Bowl party had plenty more. = It was=20 hosted by Countrywide, a big, troubled mortgage lender that has had to = fall on=20 the charity of Bank of America. And, as the guests digested the dramatic = ending=20 of the New England Patriots' long winning streak by the New York Giants, = they=20 may have sensed an uncomfortable parallel. After a quarter-century of = growth=20 that turned structured finance from a capital-market cog into an engine = of=20 growth, their business has been buckled by the crash in subprime = mortgages and=20 the successive blows throughout credit markets. Worse, some blame = securitisation=20 for causing the pile-up in the first place.
The limits of gonzo finance
Securitisation has greatly enhanced the secondary market for loans, = giving=20 originators, mainly banks, more balance-sheet flexibility and investors = of all=20 sorts greater access to credit risk. Both have embraced it. By 2006 the = volume=20 of outstanding securitised loans had reached $28 trillion (see chart 1). = Last=20 year three-fifths of America's mortgages and one-quarter of consumer = debt were=20 bundled up and sold on.
![3D"](3D"http://media.economist.com/images/20080216/CBB767.gif"=20 "3D\"\"")
Along the way, banks cooked up a simmering alphabet soup. The =
ingredients=20
included collateralised-debt obligations (CDOs), which=20
repackage asset-backed securities, and collateralised-loan obligations =
(
The breakneck growth of this business went into reverse last summer, = when it=20 became clear that defaults would undermine the structures built around = America's=20 mortgage markets. So tarnished has the subprime-mortgage market become, = because=20 of shoddy loan underwriting and fraud, that investors are likely to shun = securities linked to it for months if not years. Securitisation of=20 better-quality =93jumbo=94 mortgages=97too big to be bought by = government agencies=97is=20 also at a near-halt. =93Mortgages were traditionally seen as very safe = assets. Now=20 all but the very best are stamped with a skull and crossbones,=94 says = Guy Cecala,=20 of Inside Mortgage Finance, a newsletter.
CDOs are unlikely to regain a following in =
a hurry=20
(see chart 2). Still less popular are CDO-squareds=20
(resliced and repackaged CDOs) and higher =
powers.
The prospects for SIVs are bleaker still. =
![3D"](3D"http://media.economist.com/images/20080216/CBB757.gif"=20 "3D\"\"")
Though few bankers worked in structured finance, it was a huge = earner,=20 accounting for 20-30% of big investment banks' profits before the = crisis,=20 according to CreditSights, a financial-research firm. Banks such as Bear = Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley, which bought or built=20 mortgage-origination businesses to fuel the securitisation machine, have = rushed=20 to close or pare them. Merrill, whose fees from CDOs=20 alone peaked at $700m in 2006, said recently that it would stop = packaging=20 mortgages altogether.
Alongside the banks, the =93gatekeepers=94 who were supposed to lend = stability=20 and credibility to the new originate-and-distribute model of finance = have also=20 been found wanting. Rating agencies' models underplayed the risk that = loans from=20 different lenders and regions could turn sour at the same time. Bond = insurers,=20 too, misjudged the risks lurking in CDOs. = That failing=20 has undermined the worth of their guarantees and strained their own = credit=20 ratings=97and hence financial markets.
George Miller, the ASF's executive = director, accepts=20 that this crisis of confidence will lead to a degree of = =93re-intermediation=94 for=20 a time, as some banks go back to balance-sheet lending. But he insists = that it=20 highlights the dangers of lax lending standards in a particular market = rather=20 than fundamental faults in securitisation itself.
A study by NERA, an economic consultancy,=20 commissioned by the ASF before the crunch, = offers some=20 support for this view. Preliminary results, based on data from 1990 to = 2006,=20 suggest that increased securitisation leads to lower spreads in consumer = credit=20 and softens interest-rate shocks for banks, especially smaller ones. On = the=20 other hand, in a recent paper two economists at the University of = Chicago's=20 business school conclude that securitisation encouraged mortgage = originators to=20 lend to dodgy borrowers.
Stresses and strains
What is not in doubt is that the subprime crisis has exposed four = deep flaws=20 in the practice of securitisation. The first is that by severing the = link=20 between those who scrutinise borrowers and those who take the hit when = they=20 default, securitisation has fostered a lack of accountability.
A debate has been rumbling over how to ensure that lenders have more = =93skin in=20 the game=94. Some think they should set aside a sliver of capital even = for loans=20 they sell on. Andrew Davidson, a structured-finance consultant, suggests = an=20 =93origination certificate=94, guaranteeing the quality of the = underwriting, issued=20 by the lender and broker, which stays with the loan. Alex Pollock of the = American Enterprise Institute thinks that securitisers should be = required to=20 guarantee the quality of their loan pools, as are America's = government-sponsored=20 mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Others counter that most = such=20 exposures can be neutralised these days through derivatives markets.
The second flaw is the sheer lack of understanding of some = instruments. Not=20 long ago investors took too much on trust. They are now clamouring for = more=20 =93transparency=94. Some want a central trade-quoting facility for lumpy = asset-backed products: regulators have approached the New York Stock = Exchange.=20 CME Group, which runs the world's largest = futures=20 exchange, is also looking to expand its clearing of over-the-counter=20 securities.
Yet reams of information already accompany mortgage-backed securities = sold in=20 public markets. Even SIVs provide a steadier = stream of=20 data to investors than most of the banks backing them. So some interpret = calls=20 for greater disclosure as whimpering by investors who did not do their=20 homework.
However, more information about the performance of loans after =
origination=20
would help, particularly those in leveraged structures such as
Understanding the underlying assets is, or should be, at the core of=20 securitisation. Securitisation is really an arbitrage: with surplus = collateral,=20 assets can be bundled into an entity with a supercharged credit rating. = But if=20 investors fail to spot the jiggery-pokery with credit scores and the = outright=20 fraud that permeated the subprime market, that cushion of safety quickly = disappears. Witness the speed with which losses have spread into = supposedly=20 safe, =93super senior=94 tranches of CDOs.
This points to the third flaw: that some securities were poorly = structured,=20 often because their risks were not fully understood. The upper layers of = a=20 well-designed securitisation vehicle should be all but impervious to = loss. But=20 poorly structured deals, like those stuffed with subprime and marginally = less=20 iffy =93Alt-A=94 loans in 2006 and early = 2007, have=20 crumbled as the weakness of the collateral becomes clear.
The fourth flaw was the market's over-reliance on ratings as a short = cut to=20 assessing risk. In the go-go years, people wrongly assumed that an AAA-rated mortgage bond=97even one with a high = yield=97would=20 never lose value. But the rating agencies, paid for their appraisals by = the=20 seller not the buyer, were compromised from the start. Moreover, their=20 quantitative models appear to have ignored =93fat-tail=94 risks=97the = possibility that=20 large losses are likelier than standard statistical models predict.
Though the agencies do not have to suffer giant write-downs, they = have paid a=20 high price. Before the market imploded, almost half the revenue of = Moody's, a=20 leading agency, came from structured finance. Now the agencies are = revising=20 their rating criteria in a bid to head off tougher regulation. =93Either = deals get=20 less complex or we have to find a better shorthand for measuring = risk,=94 says Ron=20 Borod of Brown Rudnick, a law firm. The rating agencies say they were = never=20 supposed to substitute for investors' own due diligence. That is = disingenuous,=20 given their past self-assuredness. Still, wise investors will take = future=20 ratings with a pinch of salt, as most hedge funds have long done.
As the market grapples with change, some is likely to be imposed from = above.=20 Separately, international regulators and the President's Working Group=20 (comprising America's Treasury, the Federal Reserve and others) are = looking into=20 securitisation's part in the crisis. By co-operating over loan = modifications,=20 the ASF may have gained favour with the = working group.=20
The industry is more worried about two bills in America's Congress.=20 Securitisers can live with much of the one that has been passed by the = House of=20 Representatives. What alarms them is an =93assignee liability=94 = provision that=20 would hold them partly responsible for lax lending by originators. This, = they=20 say, would send a chill through secondary markets, cutting credit to = thousands=20 of worthy borrowers. Precedent is on their side. Georgia introduced = assignee=20 liability, only to back-pedal after the state's subprime market started = to seize=20 up. Not all bankers are against it: in Las Vegas, Bianca Russo of = JPMorgan Chase=20 argued that some form of it was needed to counter the perception, if not = the=20 reality, that securitisation was harmful.
The other bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of = struggling=20 borrowers' mortgages. The industry argues that this would be an = intolerable=20 violation of the sanctity of loan-pooling contracts. In addition, = securitisers=20 face probes by several state attorneys-general, the Internal Revenue = Service,=20 the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Securities and Exchange = Commission and=20 the Justice Department, as well as lawsuits from investors and a rising = number=20 of stricken municipalities.
Bankers will tell you that the subprime meltdown was just that: the =
product=20
of irresponsible lending to, and borrowing by, flaky consumers, not a =
broader=20
crisis of securitisation. Maybe, but the severity of the credit crunch =
points to=20
broader pain ahead. More will come from housing: much of the 30-40% of =
American=20
home-equity loans that have been securitised looks wobbly, as does a =
growing=20
chunk of the $800 billion of Alt-A paper =
outstanding.=20
Loans for offices are an even bigger worry. The spread on the
![3D"](3D"http://media.economist.com/images/20080216/CBB768.gif"=20 "3D\"\"")
Trouble is also brewing for securities tied to non-mortgage consumer = assets,=20 such as credit-card debt, car loans and student loans, which make up a = good=20 slice of the asset-backed market (see chart 3). Credit-card = delinquencies are=20 creeping up as the economy turns down. The sharp slowdown in card = borrowing,=20 reported recently by the Fed, will mean less raw material for = securitisation.=20 Standards for car loans dropped in 2006-07, though not as dramatically = as they=20 did for mortgages.
One ominous sign is that structured instruments tied to student loans = are=20 coming unstuck, although the loans typically carry a federal guarantee. = Recent=20 auctions of such securities by Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and others have = failed.=20 Normally the banks would have bought in whatever did not sell. But they = have=20 declined, because they dare not cram even more assets onto their already = strained balance sheets.
Yet securities of these types should be more resilient than those = tied to=20 subprime loans. Their structures are tried and tested, having evolved, = along=20 with performance data in their markets, over many years. In contrast, = subprime=20 mortgages with only a short record were shoved into many-layered = structures that=20 depended on house prices holding up. =93They started from the other end = entirely,=20 asking how can we create CDOs, backed by=20 mortgage-backed securities, themselves backed by collateral with barely = any=20 history, and their stress tests assumed house prices would be stable and = the=20 loans in the pools uncorrelated,=94 says Mr Borod.
![3D"](3D"http://media.economist.com/images/20080216/CBB758.gif"=20 "3D\"\"")
Encouragingly, credit-card receivables are still being bundled and = sold.=20 There are even shoots of hope in the mortgage market, thanks to a = refinancing=20 mini-boom in the wake of interest-rate cuts=97though most new deals are = backed by=20 the giant agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, not Wall Street (see = chart=20 4).
Saunter down the strip
It is also worth remembering that securitisation has not been = confined to=20 consumer and corporate loans. In the past decade financial engineers = have found=20 ways to package and sell tobacco-settlement and mutual-fund fees, sports = and=20 fast-food franchise rights, life-insurance premiums, intellectual = property,=20 music royalties and much more. Hollywood studios use securitisation to = help=20 finance film-making. With intangible assets accounting for an = ever-growing share=20 of corporate value, this trend looks likely to continue.
That may be scant consolation to the banks whose bets have gone so=20 spectacularly wrong. Their fingers are still being singed by = mortgage-backed=20 securities and CDOs that continue to burn. = Those hoping=20 for a recovery face a long wait, maybe 18 months or more for = out-of-favour=20 collateral such as non-agency mortgages. Some once-enthusiastic = cheerleaders are=20 turning gloomy: Bear Stearns said recently that its net short position = on=20 subprime loans and bonds had risen to $1 billion. Others are redeploying = staff=20 and capital to fee businesses that don't put a strain on the balance = sheet, such=20 as merger advice.
But it would be a mistake to write the obituary of structured = finance. Even=20 its sternest critics accept that securitisation has brought real = economic=20 benefits, and that it would be wrong to throw away the whole barrel = because of a=20 few subprime apples. Some students of financial innovation think the = market will=20 come back even more inventive after scorching its less attractive = pastures. =93As=20 with past forest fires in the markets, we're likely to see incredible = flora and=20 fauna springing up in its wake,=94 says Andrew Lo, director of the = Massachusetts=20 Institute of Technology's Laboratory for Financial Engineering.
So it may just be a matter of hanging on. As any punter in Las Vegas = will=20 tell you, every losing streak ends eventually, if you can only stay = solvent for=20 long enough.
Advertisement
Advertisement
Classified ads
Jobs
Business=20
/ Consumer
Tenders
Property
Jobs
Business=20
/ Consumer
Sponsors' feature About sponsorship =
=BB =20
Quick jump navigation
![3D""=20](3D"http://stats.surfaid.ihost.com/crc/images/uc.GIF?1.20&economi&=)
------=_NextPart_001_0047_01C873B9.BAA3CC60
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Location: http://ad.doubleclick.net/adi/N3271.Economist/B2695491.5;sz=728x90;click=http://ad.doubleclick.net/click%3Bh=v8/366c/3/0/%2a/f%3B184939546%3B0-0%3B1%3B7053569%3B1-468/60%3B24758064/24775917/1%3B%3B~sscs%3D%3f;ord=5898458?
To print this illustration, please = close this window and then click on “Printable page” at the = top of the article.
Close = window
| ");
newWin.document.writeln(" "); newWin.document.writeln("Custom Search FoldersTM are = the little blue folders at the right of your results page that guide you = to just what you've been searching for. These folders make looking for = information easier and faster by dynamically grouping your results into = meaningful categories."); newWin.document.writeln(" |
Close window
Readers' comments
Review our comments policy."; var strCommentsHtml =3D "The Economist welcomes your views.Please = stay on topic and be respectful of other readers. " + strPolicyLink; var strCommentsClosedHtml =3D 'Reader comments on this article are = listed below.
' + strPolicyLink; var strNoCommentsHtml =3D "The Economist welcomes your views.
Please = stay on topic and be respectful of other readers. " + strPolicyLink; var strNoCommentsClosedHtml =3D ''; var strSitelifeUnavailable =3D "
Comments to this article are = temporarily unavailable. Please try again later.<\/p>"; =09 var blnDisabled =3D ""; =09 var blnHasPluck =3D checkAtCookie(); var blnIsLoggedIn =3D checkAuthCookie(); =09 var strText1 =3D "
Readers' comments
"; strTemp =3D strTemp + "@@INTRO@@
"; strTemp =3D strTemp + "Comments to this article are =
temporarily unavailable. Please try again later.<\/p>";
var commentCountBlock =3D document.getElementById(strTargetDiv);
if (sitelifeAvailable){
if (responseBatch.Responses.length =3D=3D 0) {
if (blnCommentsOn){
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D strNoCommentsHtml;
} else { // comments not enabled
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D strNoCommentsClosedHtml;
}
=20
} else { // no response from Pluck
var commentPage =3D responseBatch.Responses[0].CommentPage;
var commentCnt =3D Number(commentPage.NumberOfComments) ;
=20
if(commentCnt > 0){
if (blnCommentsOn){
strHtml =3D baseHTML();
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@INTRO@@', strCommentsHtml);
strLinksHtml =3D strViewCommentsLink.replace('@@COUNT@@', =
commentCnt);
strLinksHtml =3D strLinksHtml + strAddCommentsLink;
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@LINKS@@', strLinksHtml);
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D strHtml;
} else { //comments off
strHtml =3D baseHTML();
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@INTRO@@', strCommentsClosedHtml);
strLinksHtml =3D strViewCommentsLink.replace('@@COUNT@@', =
commentCnt);
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@LINKS@@', strLinksHtml);
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D strHtml;
}
} else { // no comments as yet
if (blnCommentsOn){
strHtml =3D baseHTML();
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@INTRO@@', strNoCommentsHtml);=20
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@LINKS@@',strFirstCommentLink);
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D strHtml;
} else {
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D '';
}
}
}
} else { // pluck not available
strHtml =3D baseHTML();
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@INTRO@@', strSitelifeUnavailable);=20
strHtml =3D strHtml.replace('@@LINKS@@', "");
commentCountBlock.innerHTML =3D strHtml;
}
}
// this is called from the article comments page
function getCommentsPageIntro(articleId, targetDiv, commentsOn) {
blnCommentsOn =3D commentsOn;
strTargetDiv =3D targetDiv;
if (typeof gSiteLife =3D=3D 'undefined'){ // if Sitelife isn't =
available, display alternative message
buildCommentsPage(0,false);
=09
} else { // display comments
var requestBatch =3D new RequestBatch();=20
var articleKey =3D new ArticleKey(articleId);
var commentPage =3D new CommentPage(articleKey, 10, 1, =
'TimeStampDescending'); =20
requestBatch.AddToRequest(commentPage);=20
requestBatch.BeginRequest(daapiServerUrl, commentsPageResponse);=20
}
}
// this is called from the article page
function getArticlePageIntro(articleId, targetDiv, commentsOn){
strTargetDiv =3D targetDiv;
blnCommentsOn =3D commentsOn;
=09
if (typeof gSiteLife =3D=3D 'undefined'){ // if Sitelife isn't =
available, display alternative message
buildArticlePageIntro(0,false);
=09
} else { // otherwise build comments as expected
var requestBatch =3D new RequestBatch();
var articleKey =3D new ArticleKey(articleId);
var commentPage =3D new CommentPage(articleKey, 10, 1, =
'TimeStampDescending');
requestBatch.AddToRequest(commentPage);
requestBatch.BeginRequest(daapiServerUrl, articlePageIntroResponse);
}
}
------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C873B9.BA99E150
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Location: http://www.economist.com/JavaScript/adcode1.js
//19726 SA 26-Apr-07
function loggedIn() {
if (document.cookie.indexOf('AUTH=3D1') >=3D 0 && =
document.cookie.indexOf('LOGGED_OUT=3DLogged') < 0)=20
{
return true; // User logged in
}=20
else=20
{
return false; // User logged out
}
}
function subSect(){
if (loggedIn()){
var sect =3D ';sect=3Dsubscriber'
}
//start cc20193
else if (left(getURLParam('sa_campaign'),35) =3D=3D =
'search_engines/google_uk/uk_aug2007')
{
var sect =3D ';sect=3Dgoogle'
}
else
{
var sect =3D ';sect=3Dnonsubscriber' //19813 added sect for =
ultramercial to target
}
return sect;
}//end 19726 SA
function getURLParam(strParamName)=20
{
var strReturn =3D "";
var strHref =3D window.location.href;
if ( strHref.indexOf("?") > -1 )=20
{
var strQueryString =3D =
strHref.substr(strHref.indexOf("?")).toLowerCase();
var aQueryString =3D strQueryString.split("&");
for ( var iParam =3D 0; iParam < aQueryString.length; iParam++ )=20
{
if (aQueryString[iParam].indexOf(strParamName + "=3D") > -1 )=20
{
var aParam =3D aQueryString[iParam].split("=3D");
strReturn =3D aParam[1];
break;
}
}
}
return strReturn;
}=20
function left(str, n)
{
if (n <=3D 0)
return "";
else if (n > String(str).length)
return str;
else
return String(str).substring(0,n);
}
//end cc20193
------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C873B9.BA99E150
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Location: http://s7.addthis.com/js/widget.php?v=10
var addthis_url =3D '';=0A=
var addthis_title =3D '';=0A=
=0A=
function addthis_click(obj, str){=0A=
=0A=
var aturl =3D 'http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php';=0A=
aturl +=3D '?v=3D10';=0A=
aturl +=3D '&pub=3D'+addthis_pub;=0A=
aturl +=3D '&url=3D'+encodeURIComponent(addthis_url);=0A=
aturl +=3D '&title=3D'+encodeURIComponent(addthis_title);=0A=
=0A=
=
window.open(aturl,'addthis','scrollbars=3Dyes,menubar=3Dno,width=3D620,he=
ight=3D520,resizable=3Dyes,toolbar=3Dno,location=3Dno,status=3Dno,screenX=
=3D200,screenY=3D100,left=3D200,top=3D100');=0A=
=0A=
=0A=
return false;=0A=
}=0A=
------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C873B9.BA99E150
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Location: http://track.roiservice.com/track/track.aspx?ROIID=932049107000016
var ROIID=3D'932049107000016';var sn =3D =
'fece5dd8d8324b99bb827575fb10d36b';var dm=3Dnull;var gt_url =3D '';var =
gt_cid=3D '';var xDate=3Dnew =
Date();xDate.setFullYear(xDate.getFullYear() + 1);function get2LD(){var =
ddom =3D document.domain;var isdom =3D false;for (i=3D0; (i < =
((ddom.length) -1)) && !(isdom); i++){ if(isNaN(ddom.substring(i, i+1)) =
&& ddom.substring(i, i+1) !=3D'.') {isdom =3Dtrue;}}var sdom =3D =
'';if(isdom){ isdom=3Dfalse; var dotsofar=3D0; for(i=3Dddom.length-1;i =
>=3D0 && !(isdom); i--){ if(ddom.substring(i-1, i) =
=3D=3D'.'){dotsofar++;if(dotsofar =3D=3D2){isdom =3D =
true;sdom=3Dddom.substring(i, ddom.length);}}}}return ('.' + =
sdom);}dm=3Dget2LD();function au(nm, vl){gt_url+=3D'&' + nm + '=3D' + =
escape(vl);}function SGTC (name,value,expires,secure,path,domain) =
{path=3D'/';document.cookie=3Dname + '=3D' + escape(value) + =
((expires=3D=3Dnull) ? '' : ('; expires=3D' + expires.toGMTString())) + =
((path=3D=3Dnull) ? '' : ('; path=3D' + path)) + ((domain=3D=3Dnull) ? =
'' : (';domain=3D' + domain)) +((secure=3D=3Dtrue) ? '; secure' : =
'');}GTC=3D'fece5dd8d8324b99bb827575fb10d36b';function =
TrackEvent(sd,da,so,sm){if(so+''=3D=3D'undefined'){so=3D'';}if(sm+''=3D=3D=
'undefined'){sm=3D'';}gt_url =3D =
'http://track.roiservice.com/track/LogToDb.asp.aspx';gt_url +=3D =
'?merchantid=3D' + ROIID ;au('merchantsessionid', GTC);au('description', =
sd);au('pgurl', document.URL);au('amount', da);au('orderid', =
so);au('cid', gt_cid);au('sm', sm);au('referer', =
document.referrer);au('nsid', sn);document.write('
@@INTRO@@
"; strBaseHtml =3D strBaseHtml + "Yo= u are solely responsible for all content you post to the site. Libel, = copyright and trade mark infringement, links to commercial websites, = products, or sales materials, and offensive or threatening language are = not permitted and may be removed based on our comments policy (for more = information, please review our terms and = conditions).
Your pen name will appear alongside any comments = that you post.