A Brief History of Conflicts in the Modern Middle East
by Jim Cobb Prologue The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1919 created a void that the British and French mandates in the Middle East did a bad job filling. A nascent Arab nationalism was harnessed by the Western powers to meet their own needs. Many Arabs recognized this and resented it. This anger manifested itself in Palestine when, spurred by the Mufti in Jerusalem, the Arab Revolt began in 1936. The revolt turned not only on the British but the growing Zionist colonies. The British were never able to put down the revolt or protect the Jewish community. The Jews defended themselves with the Irgun and Stern Gang. Anxious to be rid of a troublesome piece of property, the British began to set Transjordan up to govern Palestine. World War II changed not only this plan but the whole calculus of Middle Eastern affairs. Four Cases of Tragedy The Modern conventional Arab-Israeli conflicts cover the period 1948 to present campaigns with each of these periods has a distinct character and flavor. The evolution of all combatants can be seen over twenty-five years of strife. 1948 was amateur hour. Transjordan (now Jordan) had the only organized military force in the region with the Arab Legion. The Legion was well-led and well-equipped, thanks to the British. However, the various irregular forces fielded by Transjordan's Arab rivals, Syria and the Mufti of Jerusalem, dissipated this force's power. Operations were rarely coordinated and often counter-productive. "Volunteers" from other Arab countries were ill-trained, disoriented and a liability in the field. Arab armor tended to be used as mobile artillery and was never exploited to its fullest extent. Israel had a nascent army in the Haganah, which had served as a "shadow" army during the British mandate. Here, too, factionalism reigned. The numerous and powerful militant forces of the Irgun and Stern Gang accepted Haganah orders only after much negotiation. Plans were often products of committee and produced the usual results of such arrangements. Ad hoc armaments and supply arrangements further hampered the Israelis. Logistics was a combination of erratic shipments from American supporters, purchases from Czechoslovakia and material "liberated" from the departing British. Armor vehicles were homemade affairs using trucks and buses. Under these circumstances, the initial fighting in the cities and along strategic roads for both sides became vicious, small-scale affairs over strategic positions important to either maintain a friendly village or to force the evacuation of an enemy one. Therefore, the 1948 War of independence doesn't really lean itself to an operational scale of Wargaming. The Arab armies from Transjordan, Syria and Egypt reinforced by contingents from other Arab countries, did however invaded the State of Israel in May 1948. Despite heavy losses caused by faulty tactics and determined defenses, the Arab forces made in-roads into Israel. The Egyptians advanced on Tel Aviv and Beer Sheba, the Syrians and Iraqis captured key towns in the North while the Arab Legion advanced in the center and laid siege to the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem. A truce was called in early June during which both sides re-equipped and re-organized. When fighting commenced again, the Israelis launched a counter-offensive that eventually drove the Egyptians back to the Sinai, the Syrians to the Golan Heights and the Arab Legion to the West Bank of the Jordan. The infant Israeli Air Force won its first victory by strafing an Egyptian supply column with Messerschmidts. Jerusalem was relieved and, in October, a long truce was established. The 1956 War The low-intensity conflicts that continued in Palestine and geopolitical events changed the nature of military reality in the Mid East in the 1950's. Gamal Nasser broke with the West and attempted to make Egypt leader of a united Arab movement by seizing the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union saw a potential partner in him and began to equip Egypt with modern weapons. Israel consolidated her forces into the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Experience in border raids led the IDF to adopt an infantry philosophy of bypassing fortified position and striking deep into enemy territory to wreak confusion. Also, Israel was able to purchase tanks from Britain, France and the U.S. Most of these vehicles were modified and up-gunned to provide a support role for the infantry. The small Israeli Air Force (IAF) concentrated on ground support tactics. (Click on the map at the right to view a larger image.) When the French and British attempted to re-take the Suez Canal in 1956, they brought Israel into the plot by asking her to attack the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli infantry attacks, supported by air power, succeeded as expected against the ill-trained Egyptian troops and Palestinian militia in the area. What came, as a surprise was when an Israeli local commander unleashed an armored brigade to act in a classical "blitz" fashion despite orders to the contrary. Its success changed Israeli armor and command doctrine. However, all territorial gains were lost under the terms of an UN-imposed cease-fire. The Six Day War (1967) The situation in 1967 reflected each side's response to the 1956 campaign. Egypt received more arms from the Russians and bound Jordan and Syria into a pact, ensuring a three-front war for Israel. Israel had improved her armor and air forces immensely, not only in weapon systems but in training and esprit. An eighty-minute preemptive air strike destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on June 5, 1967. A series of coordinated infantry, armor and air attacks saw the Israelis destroy the Egyptian Army and advance to the Canal within 72 hours. They then pushed the Syrians off the Golan Heights and threatened Damascus while taking the West Bank of the Jordan. This six-day campaign came to be a model for offensive war. Such successes breed a taste of vengeance in the defeated and overconfidence in the victor. The Egyptians beefed up the anti-aircraft defenses around the Canal and, by 1970, had limited Israeli air activity to the Canal zones. Reforms had improved both the officer corps and the quality of the troops. An off-again, on-again relationship with the Soviet Union produced not only an influx of material but also "desertization" of Russian weapons. The same phenomenon occurred to a lesser extent in Syria. Although their armaments increased in both quality and quantity, the Israelis considered the Arab military impotent and relied on the fortifications of the Bar Lev line while concentrating on stepped-up terrorist attacks. Well-planned Egyptian preparations were either misinterpreted or dismissed. Meanwhile, the Israelis maintained their qualitative superiority but came to depend on static fortifications backed by pure tank formations such as the Bar Lev line east of the Canal. These defenses were to delay any Egyptian crossing for forty-eight hours, allowing for armored counter-attacks. The Israelis doubted that the Egyptians would actually attack. The Yom Kippur War (1973) Thus, the Egyptian attack on October 5, 1973 was a complete tactical surprise. Egyptian air raids were successful and the crossing plans were ingenious. Within forty-eight hours, all Bar Lev forts had been captured or isolated. Confused, penny-packet Israeli armored attacks were met by stoutly manned SAGGER, SNAPPER and RPG-7 teams and led to heavy Israeli losses and, for the first time, a drop in Israeli morale. Egyptian ranger deep penetrations and crises in regional commands also eroded confidence. Although not as spectacular as Egyptian successes, the Syrians did well initially on the Golan Heights. Attacking first with infantry followed by armor, sheer weight of numbers allowed the Syrians to push south. The Israelis fought desperately but were surprised and unnerved by the tenacity of their attackers. A concerned Moshe Dayan pulled his forces back. Despite having suffered heavy losses already, the Syrians followed. The Israelis struck back at the stretched and exhausted Syrian forces with heavy air and artillery attacks. An Israeli counterattack pushed the Syrians back to the point where they were no longer an immediate, mortal threat. Subsequent attacks by Iraqi and Jordanian forces were halted with significant losses on both sides. In the Sinai, the Egyptians took a "strategic pause" at the edge of the Air Defense Barrier. Although bloody local attacks continued, the period October 9 - 13 was used by both sides to re-supply, reinforce and reorganize. On October 14, the Egyptians renewed their drive east. The IAF was freed from the SAM threat and intervened with vigor. The Israelis had remembered the usefulness of combined-arms tactics and had TOW-armed infantrymen along with their tanks. The SAGGER teams were neutralized by long-range fire so the Israelis first blunted then pushed back the Egyptian thrust. October 16 saw confused fighting as the Israelis made a coordinated counter-attack to cross the Canal and overrun SAM sites. Israeli paratroopers gained a toehold on the west bank and the approaches on the east bank were cleared after fierce fighting. Pontoon bridges were in place the next day and Israeli armored formations fanned out in the rear of the Egyptian army. Although both ends of the bridgeheads were under continuous fire until the end of the war, the Israelis managed to cut off the Egyptian army in the Sinai. Both the Soviets and the Americans saw the possibility of a nuclear exchange and their own involvement in order to support their respective allies. To avoid this, a cease-fire was imposed and the Egyptians and Israelis returned to their start lines. Egyptian honor had been avenged and the Israelis could no longer dismiss Arab military capabilities.
Amateur Hour
Glenn Saunders
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