The Three Gorges Dam Project from a Systems
Viewpoint
Henry C. Alberts1, Renée M. Alberts2, Mitchel F. Bloom3*, A. Diane LaFlamme4, and Satu Teerikangas5
1 Graduate School of Management and Technology, University of
Maryland, University College, College Park, Maryland, USA.
2 Community Services Board, Fairfax County, Virginia. USA
3 Bloom Forecasting, Kelowna, B.C., Canada
4 Frontieres Journal for the Study of Death and Bereavement,
Universite du Quebec a Montreal, Canada
5 Institute of Strategy and International Business, Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
The Three Gorges
Dam on the Yangtze River is currently the largest construction project in the
world. Because of its complexity,
integration of social, environmental and technological systems, and tight
coupling required by the schedule, the project should be managed using a
systems approach. To find out if this
was the case, the authors formed a research team, sponsored by the International
Society of Systems Sciences, to tour the dam sight, interview managers and
engineers, travel up the Yangtze to Chongqing,
analyze problems posed by the critics of the dam and, finally, report
back to the ISSS annual meeting in Shanghai following the trip. This paper
reports on the team’s observations, the results of the interviews and a systems
model that analyzes the problems facing the dam builders. Finally, the paper concludes that the
engineers and managers are aware of the interrelated problems and have planned
for their solution.
Keywords Three Gorges Dam
Project, Yangtze River reservoir, systems approach, complexity and coupling,
large-scale engineering projects
INTRODUCTION
There is a gray fog hiding the peaks and valleys and hovering like a leaden cloud over the Yangtze River. Starting here, outside of Yichang, in 1993, China began moving people, pulverizing mountains, destroying riverbank cities and rebuilding them, high and white, on plateaus and mountain sides. This devastation and disruption was to facilitate the largest project of the century, the creation of the Three Gorges Dam Project (TGP). Phase 2 of this building project has been completed. In June, 2003, ships were able to navigate through the locks. By 2009, the construction will be complete and the reservoir will reach its ultimate height of 175 meters. The dam, the largest ever contemplated and built, is 2,309 meters long, 84 meters wide and rises 185 meters from the riverbed. In earlier stages, 30,000 people were employed in the construction; by summer of 2002, 20,000 were working. A new city exists at the dam site, 25 km up river from Yichang, where a smaller dam, the Gezhouba, was built on the city’s west end as a working test model from which lessons were drawn.
Four of the authors were scheduled to present papers at the 47th
Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Systems Sciences held in
August 2002 in Shanghai, China. Three months before the meeting opening date,
conference participants received a message from the conference organizing
committee announcing that Dr. Mitchel Bloom, the team leader, was in the
process of arranging for a special pre-conference visit to the Three Gorges Dam
Project – a visit that would offer an opportunity to speak directly with
officials and engineers at the dam site, and with people in the vicinity, some
of whom were going to be displaced, and to travel up the Yangtze River, passing
the Three Gorges, and arriving at Chongqing, traversing a distance of 660 kilometers. Much of the area through
which we traveled was scheduled to be flooded beginning October, 2002. Many existing tourist sites, cities, scenery
and archeological places would be inundated as the river level rises up to 175
meters to form the reservoir. The trip plan
included: a day of orientation in Shanghai; three days of touring the dam site,
interviewing and visiting nearby cities; four days traveling up the Yangtze to
Chongqing; and flight back to Shanghai in time to present our findings to the
ISSS conference.
To prepare for our trip, team members[1] were referred to a number of Internet web sites containing large amounts of material about the dam project from other than systems perspectives, see for example the State Council Three Gorges Project Construction Committee (1994) and Sklar and Luers (1997). More than 500 pages of material was downloaded and read prior to arriving at Shanghai. It discussed the dam from a critical perspective of the effects on existing ecology and culture, relocation of cities and populations, corruption of officials, and engineering problems of the dam. Given that much of the existing physical, social and cultural status quo would be changed, the material posed difficult questions about the technical feasibility of achieving the stated objectives of the project: (1) generating sufficient electrical power to extend electrification from the dam site to a radius of 1,000 kilometers in all directions; (2) providing flood control for regions of China that had been historically subject to periodic inundation with much loss of life; and (3) creating areas for farming and living that would allow for a better life for the citizenry.
Because the reservoir created by the dam will impact on the cities and
the environment both at the dam sites and the length of the Yangtze up river to
Chongqing, we wanted to be able to interview administrators and residents of a
town that will be relocated because of the flooding of the dam reservoir. We
were able to do that in the model city of Zigui. In fact, nearly all our requests were granted. We received red carpet treatment. We visited secure sites that ordinary
tourists would not be able to enter. We
took pictures of the dam, of workers, of our interviewees, asked questions
freely and got answers to all of our questions from our interviewees, even the
prickly ones involving relocation and corruption.
The team’s two guide/translators , who met us at the airport, would
remain with us until we embarked on the river journey. They brought other
technical experts into the discussions as the need for their knowledge and
understanding became clear. Well before the visit, the team leader had
developed a list of questions based on material downloaded from the Web sites.
The questions had been translated into Chinese and provided to Officials and
engineers at the dam. These experts were asked to provide answers and respond
to additional questions. The seven questions asked of the project engineers
followed by six questions asked of the dam managers and administrators together
with their answers are contained in the Appendix. The questions emphasized the
engineering and ecological disasters and social ills that might be created by
the project. They were a good
reflection of the perceptions of the special interest groups opposed to the
TGP.
The
kinds of information the team collected included observations of all types: of
the work, the workers, labor conditions, logistics, housing of workers,
logistics of materials, quality of manpower and materials; photos of the dam and
its progress; and interviews with the project managers and engineers. Also included was a large number of Internet
and published materials on the dam. Finally, the dam site technical report
(CTGPC, 2000), travel brochures, photos of towns that will be submerged, and
relocation schemes were further items that we collected.
At
the conclusion of our trip we had collected much information embracing many
different points of view that we organized into a coherent whole. Our role as researchers was to determine the
extent to which the TGP organization is using a systems approach in the
planning and implementation of the project (van Gigch, 1978, p.37). What are the major construction problems and
how are the engineers and managers attempting to solve those problems involving
complex technological-environmental-social interactions and tight coupling
(Perrow, 1999, p.97)? What tools and techniques are they using in managing both
hard and soft systems (Checkland, 1981, pp.146-147)? When we go beyond the construction phase of the project and look
at the projected various impacts, then what steps are being taken by the
managers to anticipate problems and prevent undesirable consequences (Linstone
and Mitroff, 1994, p.319)? Our mission
was to find answers to these questions.
The
question arose as whether our study could be considered a first round
technology assessment. A complete
technology assessment (OTA, 1973) includes eight steps ranging from identifying
impacts to presenting findings to authorities.
We only engaged in two of the eight steps, namely:
1)
Identifying existing or probable impacts of technology
or technological programs, and
2)
Ascertaining cause-and-effect relationships.
We
did not identify alternative technological methods or estimate impacts of alternative
methods on society, nor did we present our findings to the authorities,
although we interviewed them at length.
Finally, we did not undertake additional assessment activities as
requested by the authorities. Only in a
very limited way could our study be construed as a first round technological
assessment.
A
detailed bibliography of papers on technology assessment is found in (Flowers,
2003). For further information on
technology assessment see (OTA, 2003), (Hetman, 1973), (Blair, 1994), (Mohr, 1999), and (Mitroff and Turoff, 1973).
A complete list of OTA (Office of Technology Assessment) papers is available on the internet at (OTA, 1996).
Our
research group had very limited experience in China. Dr. and Mrs. Alberts visited China more than twenty years
ago. Our student member, Satu
Teerikangas, visited more recently and spent time in China with her family as
she was growing up. None of us
pretended to be experts on China or on the technology of dam building. Our research was limited to our interviews
of nine hours, our observations as we toured the dam site and surrounding
areas, our judgments based on our own specialties (engineering, science,
management, social science and system science), and extensive readings from the
literature and downloads from the Internet (Liou et al, 2000), (Embassy of the
PRC in the US, 2000), (International Rivers Network, 2002).
After completing the trip, the team organized the material gathered into five distinct subject classifications defined by the following questions:
1. What are the functions
the dam is supposed to perform when it is completed and operational?
2. Is it likely, from an
engineering perspective, that the project will be able to accomplish those
functions?
3. What will be the effects
of the reservoir on the relocation of cites and populations and on the
environment?
4. What are the likely human factor considerations and the mental
health effects of relocation and how are they likely to arise and exhibit
themselves?
5. What losses of
archeological and historical sites are most likely and how is this being
handled?
The discussion below distills and focuses the information the team developed from its discussion with dam personnel and local Yichang residents around the dam site, and other affected people up-river and in Chongqing, plus information collected from the Internet and the literature.
WULI SHILI AND RENLI
The Chinese approach to multiple perspectives is called the WSR (Wuli,
Shili and Renli) method. It derives
from the philosophy of Confucius and Tao, stressing harmony, balance,
knowledge, sincerity and virtue. Have
the dam administrators and engineers used the WSR approach in understanding the
complexities and solving the problems of the Three Gorges Dam Project? (Zhu, 2003),
(Zhu, 1999), (Zhu, 1996).
WSR views reality as a “dynamic web of multiple relations: relations with the (material) world, relations with the self (or mind), and relations with others, that are called wuli, shili and renli, respectively” ( Linstone and Zhu, 2000). Wuli involves the collection of information about the real world, in our case the collection of information about the construction of the dam, electric power, navigation, water transfer, irrigation, floods, earthquakes, population transfer, archeological artifacts and pollution. It would also involve bringing in outside experts to provide additional information. It is safe to say that the dam administrators and engineers have done their wuli well.
With respect to shili, we are considering the various models created to understand and forecast the impacts resulting from the dam project. These include both theoretical and physical models which encompass seasonal flooding, navigation, new ship lift technology, as well as destruction of old cities, construction of new cities and the transfer of over one million persons. They also include plans, programs and procedures for compensating the stakeholders who will suffer from the dam project – compensation in the form of housing and jobs, rescue of historical and archeological artifacts and provision for clean water supply and appropriate sewage treatment facilities. From what we were able to learn, from the perspective of shili, the dam administrators and engineers have done their homework and are prepared to deal with the consequences of the dam project.
Finally we come to renli and here is where there are potential problems, for renli deals with the dynamic interrelations, i.e., the politics, between groups. The major groups are the three layers of government (central, provincial and local), the dam engineers and administrators, the foreign groups critical of the dam project, domestic financial institutions and international investment banks, and Chinese experts in meteorology, archeology, environmental pollution, engineering and economics. The one group left out of the loop but which can ruin the project is the group representing the impacted farmers and urban residents who must be relocated as the reservoir behind the dam fills to its maximum height. Because in China the individual standing alone, not associated with any group, is ignored, there is a tendency for the major groups to disregard the needs of unorganized groups of affected farmers and urban dwellers until irreparable harm is done. Thus, up to the time of this writing we are not sure how well the engineers and administrators will deal with the renli part of the WSR method of multiple perspectives.
FUNCTIONS THE DAM IS SUPPOSED
TO PERFORM
The Dam in conjunction with
additional dams (Adams and Mu, 2002) in Yangtze tributaries, is supposed to:
- Form the
central distribution point providing Electrical power for a wide area of
China: i.e., permit creation of an electric resource.
- Provide a
central focus for accomplishing effective flood control for the geographic
region of the Yangtze River and a 1,000 km radius from the dam site.
- Provide for improved navigation for
large vessels seeking to travel from the sea to the city of Chongqing and
lesser population centers en route.
- Provide
water transfer to the Yellow River region which is experiencing a severe
water shortage.
- Provide
irrigation from the large quantity of water in the reservoir.
- Create an
environment for a more modern way of life for citizens within a 1,000 km radius
of the dam site by insulating them from some of the historical sources of
natural disasters and limitations of the environment.
Unless it can be reasonably shown that the forebodings of disaster
associated with the project are unlikely to become reality, the dam will not
likely be able to satisfactorily perform the totality of its functions –
engineering, electric power, flood control, water transfer, water supply,
irrigation, relocation of people and cities, environmental purification, and
ecological, cultural and archeological protection (Qing, 1998). Therefore, a
relational network map of the elements and components of the project was
created for the group to study and evaluate (Warfield, 1974, 1990a, 1990b,
1994). Figure 1 below indicates the first relational map.
Figure 1. A relational
network map of the physical components of the dam project
The elements on the leftmost side of the map were thought to be the
fundamental project building blocks on which functional performance would
depend. The two major functions of providing electrical and water resources are
shown as being dependent upon construction of other dams on Yangtze
tributaries. Also shown is a power grid box.
Creating a power grid requires the integration of a control and
distribution system, while creating the power itself requires installation and
operation of a number of generator elements.
These unfortunately have associated with them a probability that silt
from the water passing through them will create a problem of reduced capability
and increasing rates of wear and tear on the generators (Leopold, 1998).
We asked the vice director of engineering[2]
of the dam about the silt accumulation in the generators. His reply was that
the intake to the generators is at a height of 108 meters. The sluice gates are at 90 meters so when
they open, they can flush out the silt; and there is another gate at 75 meters
between generators number 6 and 7. If
silt accumulates at the base of the dam, dredging can be used if the flushing
does not get rid of the silt. Extensive
physical model tests were conducted and the tests showed that the silt could be
flushed out. The policy of operating
the dam will be to impound the clear and discharge the turbid waters (CTGPC,
2000, p.9).[3] Regarding silt accumulation at Chongqing, the engineer
stated that this may pose a problem. Due to the natural rise of the river from
the dam to Chongqing, the city is only 10 to 20 meters higher than the planned
flooding level of the reservoir.
However, according to the official TGP document, “sedimentation will not
bring any serious adverse impacts to the navigation and power generation,
whether in the site area or in the backwater region (Chongqing)…adverse impact
can be solved by combined measures as optimizing the reservoir operation
(raising and lowering the water level), proper river training…(and) engineering
measures” (CTGPC, 2000, p.11).
Referring to the water resource box in Figure 1, the water resource
function requires construction of a flood control system element that is
interconnected with the other tributary operating dams. The control elements
will need to monitor water quality throughout the system and integrate the
information to provide the basis for taking appropriate action to maintain
acceptable quality levels throughout the system. It must also provide for
controlling navigational capability along the extent of the integrated water
resource system. Finally, it must permit distribution of the water resource for
irrigation purposes, an especially important activity considering recent
changes in regional climatology.
The extent of the reservoir created upstream of the dam also has
implications for its surrounding area. Provision for accommodating the weight
of the stored water resource must be made. As shown by the dotted lines,
reservoir and dam weight may create conditions favoring ground subsidence that
would affect the surrounding geography as well as the required dam structure.
The stability of the earth layer upon which
the dam is constructed also has implications on the dam structure (see dam
structure box). Of primary importance are the stability of the tectonic plate
on which the dam site rests and the base layer of material that covers it.
Information appearing in an official publication of the China Three Gorges Dam
Project Corporation, said that after the impounding of the reservoir, the
highest intensity earthquake expected would be 6 on the Richter scale. The dam was designed to withstand an
earthquake of magnitude 7 on the Richter (CTGPC, 2000, p.11). Regarding
subsidence of the base layer underlying the dam, our group was told that tests
made had indicated there would be no subsidence that would imperil the
integrity of the dam.[4]
Taken in the context of the entire series of discussions with dam personnel, we
had no reason to doubt the veracity of the assertion. Notwithstanding, however,
we did see a number of locations where work on the dam had caused slides of
material from hillsides on to the lower levels of terrain. When we questioned
the cause of the slides, we were told they were due to the mining of granite
from the mountains.
In
Figure 1, base layer and stability considerations are shown to directly
influence the dam structural requirements, and these in turn are shown to
affect the concrete granite cement used. The dam builders have established a
process for making concrete by producing it on site using crushed granite mined
from the mountains surrounding the dam site, treating the mixture with chemical
stabilizing substances and then permitting the mixture to cure for suitable
time periods. Consequently, there are possible effects on surrounding
geographic pollution potential from the addition of stabilizing chemicals to
the cement mixture. Also shown is the possibility that as the surrounding area
becomes flooded, geographical changes will occur that can cause subsidence and
consequent structural effects on the dam.
Additional
relationships arising from considerations of the surrounding geography are
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Additional relationships from the surrounding geography
As shown in Figure 2, effects of the dam on surrounding geography will
have effects on the society and culture not only in the surrounding areas but
also throughout the region within which the electrical and water resource
distribution systems are operational. The scenic changes and inundation of
archeological sites might result in a
decrease in tourists visiting the sights.
Conversely, tourism possibly could increase because of improved
navigation of large ships up the previously shallow tributaries of the three
smaller gorges. Additionally, the
increase of the reservoir level will create the need for newly developed areas
and cause large-scale out-migration from flooded areas.
It seemed to the team that the actions taken and contemplated represent reasonable assurance that the project will accomplish its immediate engineering objectives (power production and distribution, water resource creation and distribution) but not necessarily its social, environmental and cultural objectives. It appeared that modern technology, together with the level of skills of the Chinese engineers, descendents of men who built the Great Wall and the Grand Canal, had been applied to the Three Gorges Dam Project (CTGPC, 2000). Notwithstanding, however, after the discussions were complete, three questions emerged as of great importance to issues of stability and utility of the dam when built as planned. These were:
Table 1. Three questions relating to the stability of the dam
1. SCALING – This is the largest project of its type
in the world. What is the robustness of the technical base when scaled to this
dimension that extends outside the range of previous experience?
2. NEW METHODS & CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS – Use of granite as a base for concrete mix
might not have much prior experience in use for such structures. What is the
effect of chemical stabilization on the likely life of structures built with
this material?
3. NATURAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE – What effects are
likely to be felt from global temperature and rainfall changes and how have
such changes been factored into the project?
While there is no indication that the scale of this project extends
current “states of the art” beyond their limits, the team did raise the
question with the engineering staff. It is hoped they will explore the
implications of scaling and take appropriate measures to ensure integrity of
structural stability in the dam and its component systems. Similarly, although
the engineering staff tests indicate that the granite based concrete will be
stronger and last longer than other much used mixtures, the team shared
concerns with the engineering staff and recommended incorporation of structural
tests and warning measurements within the body of the dam and its surrounding
geography. As for future natural environmental changes, neither the team nor
the engineering staff knew of any mechanisms to predict extreme environmental
changes which could cause potential effects on the dam over time. As has
already been demonstrated by other studies, the environmental models based on
prior historical data may not be useful in predicting future events, especially
if continuing temperature, upper altitude wind patterns, and rainfall levels
change in unpredictable ways (Bernstein, 1996, pp.202-203).
EFFECTS ON RELOCATION
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Chinese
Authorities will have to meet a severe challenge before they can allow the
water in the Yangtze River to rise to 135 m in 2003 and to 175 m in 2009, that
is, to clear a land area of 632 square kilometers and to resettle a large
number of people (see Table 2).
Originally, 844,000 individuals were targeted for resettlement. It is expected that this number could grow
to 1.2 million people before the project comes to an end. Both farmers and city
dwellers are now living on the land that will be submerged when the dam becomes
fully functional.
Table 2. Areas to be submerged along the Yangtze River
by 2009
Farmland: 31,000 hectares
Villages: 1,300
Towns: 140
Cities: 13
To
implement such a massive relocation plan involving families, who have been
farming their land for generations, as well as city people used to enjoying
urban facilities as part of their life styles for their work or entertainment,
would constitute a major challenge for any government (Wu, 1999). Who will be
accountable for the redistribution of resources? Who will take responsibility
to guarantee equity in the processing of so many individual claims, with
different profiles? Who will take care of the well-being of the person versus
the “higher good of the nation”? These
are some of the questions we asked Dr. Ma Xiang, who heads the relocation
effort of the TGP.
In a lengthy interview[5]
Dr. Ma Xiang stated that the government is actively involved and will meet the
relocation challenge. Dr. Ma Xiang is the person in charge of relocation in the
reservoir area[6] that is
indicated on the map in Figure 3. Dr. Ma Xiang’s description gave us some insight
on how the relocation and environmental cleaning efforts are actually carried
on in a limited area. He helped us
envision the full extent of the work involved to cover the 1,084 square
kilometers and the 3,000 pollution points officially identified, across the two
provinces of Hubei and Sichuan and the municipality of Chongqing. Dr. Ma Xiang
identified three levels of supervision (Table 3) involved in the Relocation
Plan and in the Environment Cleaning Program. He expressed his great
satisfaction with the results obtained up to then in relocating people and
cleaning the environment in the reservoir area. However, his explanations did not establish if the area around
the dam came under county authorities or provincial authorities, nor the scope
of the intervention power at each level.
Table 3. Three Levels of supervision of relocation
budget
|
|
Relocation
plan |
Pollution points targeted in the cleaning program (factories, mining sites, hospitals,
waste water, etc.)
|
|
County
authorities: |
Relocation budget is
administered
|
Thorough
examination of not less than 30 % of the area |
|
Provincial
authorities: |
Coordination
between county and central gov’t |
Thorough
examination of not less than 30 % of the area |
|
Central
government: |
Total
relocation budget is determined |
3
months before the flooding, thorough examination of not less than 20 % of the
area |
Dr. Ma Xiang indicated that he had personally
met with many of the individuals covered by the Relocation Plan in the area he
was supervising, and he seemed confident his team could meet the target for the
Environment Cleaning Program around the dam site. He insisted that the Central
government had in 2002 allocated an additional 40 billion yuan (US $4.8
billion) to improve the quality of water, to treat waste water and to plant
trees. But he did not specify how this total amount was to be allocated between
the two provinces and the municipality of Chongqing.
HUMAN FACTOR
CONSIDERATIONS AND MENTAL HEALTH EFFECTS
Acknowledging
that the central government has moved forward with good intentions, there still
remains the issue of whether enforced life style changes, granted even with
improvements, will bring happiness. Resettled people have alternatives, but no
choice to remain where they are. Their former homes will be destroyed. The
trees will be cut down. Their terraced farm land will be flooded. From new
cities on the hilltops, they can watch the destruction of their old homes. (In
the People Square Park in Chongqing there is a photo exhibit with a picture of
an old woman being carried out of her home with both eyes closed).
There
seems to be a dichotomy between city and farm options. The city dweller may
double living space from 50 to 100 square meters and upgrade to a new, clean,
broad- streeted city with trees and shops, medical clinics, schools and even
hotels and a movie theater if the model
city is the new city of Zigui replacing old Zigui. But not every city is Zigui.
In most places smaller, 2 to 3 story housing is being replaced by larger 10 to
12 story apartments. This is a subtle change with more neighbors and less
community. It is a picture of big city living dotting the countryside. Possibly
more problems will exist for older people as some of the new cities have
streets too steep for bicycle use and plazas must be reached by ascending
stairways. A talk with a non-official person, about resettling, elicited this
response: he smiled and said “Rich!” The 1993 evaluation price paid out as
compensation to those being resettled has been upped by at least 20% based on
the cost of living and in some cases even more based on current values.
Re-training
Centers reputedly are, or will be established in every city receiving these
immigrants, as the available factory jobs may be different. Industries are
being encouraged by tax advantages to relocate to new cities. Yet, a young
female guide in Fengdu (Ghost City) said she was sad, as her home would be
flooded out by October, 2002 and though her family has a house in new Fengdu,
that city has been built on the other side of the Yangtze from where she works.
Farmers,
although given similar compensation and replacement options have reason to be
less happy. They tend to be more traditional with a history of a commitment to
a particular location and a pattern of close family connections and ancestor
worship. Many have chosen to stay close by, and have moved up the mountains.
However, life seems to get harder as you go up the mountainside. The slopes are
steeper, at times canted at 30º or more, and in some cases rockier. Although
Dr. Ma Xiang said that the bottom land, being abandoned, was poor, the areas we
saw boating up the Yangtze looked fertile, and were reported to be growing
corn, rice, wheat and potatoes as main crops as well as, in some places, a full
assortment of fruit and vegetables. Some of the relocation slopes are too steep
to grow these traditional area products and the farmers have been encouraged to
replace them with sesame seeds, tea bushes, orange and pine trees. There is a
two-year tax forgiveness for tree planting and the farmer is paid by the
Government. Will the farmer who changes crops need retraining, and is that
offered to farmers? Whole villages, such as Pipa village, with its 200 people
on the DaNing River, will be moved to Guangdong Province. Pipa village is on a
tributary of the Yangtze in the area of the Small Three Gorges, with clear jade
green water, spectacular mountains of over 1,000 meters and a history of
primitive people going back 3,000 years. What is the psychological effect of
such a move?
In the United States, scientists have studied
the effects of stress. Forced displacement, seeing your home destroyed, being
told your ancestor who has died within the last 20 years will be cremated and
older ancestor’s graves will be flooded, are real life stressors which can
bring about belated physical and mental illness. Chinese responses to stress
may be sufficiently different to make it difficult to predict what will happen.
Traumatic stressor research found an 18-month delay factor. At the later date,
alcoholism, family dissolution and intergenerational problems appear. In our
discussion, when asked whether these factors had been taken into account in
relation to relocation, Dr. Ma Xiang laughed and dismissed the question with
the response that, “Chinese people drink but can hold their liquor.” Dr. Ma Xiang stated that he had personal
contact with many of the 12,000 settled people in his area and so did the
employees he supervised. A computer listing capable of checking on each displaced person annually
is in the planning stage. We are talking about at least 1.2 million people.
When asked how many workers were assigned to the checking task, he said, ”maybe
100” which computes to an average caseload of 12,000 persons per worker.[7]
LOSSES OF
ARCHEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL SITES
The
loss of cultural heritage is another consequence of the Three Gorges Dam
project. This stems from the importance of the future reservoir area to the
rise and development of Chinese civilization. The Three Gorges of the Yangtze
River hold a special place in the cultural history of China (Winchester, 1996).
The Yangtze River, 6,300 km in length, is the largest and greatest of the
Chinese rivers. Moreover, its geographic position at the center of the country
provides both a uniting and a dividing role in the country. Geographically, the
Three Gorges have been the center of China, uniting the country’s northern and
southern parts, eastern and western parts. Navigation along the river has
enabled contact between different parts of the country.
Recently, archeologists found that the earliest
signs of Chinese civilization came from the Yangtze area. The long history of
the area also explains its archeological importance. Relics, such as the Kong
Ming tablet, can be found from times as far back as the Three Kingdoms (AD
220-280). Finally, on the Yangtze River, the area of the Three Gorges is
considered the most beautiful. The beauty of its landscapes has inspired
Chinese poets, painters and philosophers for centuries. The landscapes appear
on numerous Chinese paintings. Temples and pagodas have been built along its
shores.
Once
the water level of the reservoir rises, the loss of archeological sites and
monuments range between forty-four (CTGPC, 2000, p.24) and 1,282 (Lin, 1999).
These include archeological sites dating as far back as the Paleolithic Age,
fossil remains, sculptures, temples, ancestral burial groups and old villages.
These sites span the historical and cultural development of the Chinese
civilization.
It is claimed that the original budget for the
Dam did not include allocations for saving the scenic or cultural heritage.
This changed in 1998, when a historical relic, a rare candelabra, from a Han
Dynasty (206BC to AD220) tomb in the Three Gorges area was sold in a New York
art auction for US $2.5 million dollars (Yang, 2002). The Chinese administrators realized the economic importance of
preservation and not only for the sake of face-saving. Since then, a budget for
the archeological excavations has been set up. Experts still claim that at best
only 8% of the total cultural heritage would be saved. Today, administrators
claim that intensive digging is taking place around the clock. Schemes to
relocate or save key sites (Liu, 1996) have been made (see Table 4). On a hill
outside of the new city of Zigui, we saw a Bhuddist temple in the process of being rebuilt. Along the Yangtze, an ancient sculpture that will be submerged
will be the site of an underwater museum. In the famous Ghost City, Fengdu, the
lowest part of the temple park will be inundated but the famous temples of
Bhuddism, Confucianism and Taoism will remain above the water line. To make up
for this loss, a huge modern ghost sculpture bust of what appeared to be Mao is
being constructed on the hills behind the temple. However, to save money,
rebuilding relics involves modern construction and material in which salvaged
ancient lintels, doors, windows and artifacts are reassembled to model the
historic structures.
Table 4:
Some of the Archeological and Cultural Sites from Yichang to Chongqing
Area Archeological Artifact
Zigui county: Grave of Qu Yuan, a
great poet of the Warring State period (475-221 BC).
Badong county: Gezihe Stone forest
Wushan: Wushan ape-man
fossil, found at Damiao Longgu Ruins, is one of the earliest human fossil ever
found.
Daxi Town: Ruins of a Stone
Age hamlet built by people of the Daxi Culture 4000-6000 years ago.
Qutang Gorge: Eight Armies Array,
Bellows Gorge, Mengliang Stairs, White Wall, etc.
Baidicheng: Baidi temple,
Mingliang Hall, the Star Viewing Pavilion, the Forest of Steel, etc.
South bank of River: Zhang
Fei temple (to be rebuilt on a hill)
North bank of River:
ShibaoZhai,
a 13-storey pavilion built during the Ming
Dynasty (AD1545).
Zhongxian county: Baigong Ancestral temple and a stone tablet of
Confucius painted by Wu Daozi during the Tang Dynasty.
Fengdu county: The
“Ghost City” of Fengdu; Mingshan Hill
in the north east, with its 70 temples (the city will be inundated and the Hill
will then stand by the river bank).
Fuling (1 km west): Baihe, a natural stone ridge
in the center of the Changjiang River; 163 pieces of poetry have been carved on
the ridge since the Tang Dynasty.
China is currently a country with 1.3 billion
people and the majority seem to be obedient and law abiding. Much time and
money have been allocated to making the relocation project a success. Time will
tell the whole story. Time also allows for re-evaluation of ideas and concepts
that are not working correctly. The TGP planning staff hopefully will continue
to re-evaluate the effects of the project and keep an open mind regarding
mid-course corrections. They will have brought about a monumental, planned,
human endeavor of the magnitude of the Great Wall and the Grand Canal. Will
everyone be happy or satisfied? Probably not. But no one is undoing what has
been done, and so, our best hope is that as problems arise, beneficial
solutions will be found. By watching and reporting, critics can help make that
happen.
CONCLUSIONS
The
team concluded that the engineers and managers of the TGP are indeed using a
systems approach in their execution of the project. They are well aware of the potential problems in building the dam
and filling the reservoir. They know
all about silt, earthquakes, landslides, shoreline pollution, relocation of
people and production of electricity.
They have plans to make the TGP work for the benefit of all the
stakeholders. What we do not know at
this time is whether there will be resources and the political will to carry
out the plans. Only time will tell.
With
regard to the unrelenting criticisms posted on the Internet that the project
will fail, we have this to say. Despite
the huge scale and the difficult technical and social challenges posed by the
Three Gorges Dam, the Chinese engineers have been able to overcome the
obstacles at each phase of the project. (Bridle, 2000 concurred). But that does not mean that the criticisms
were invalid or useless. What the
critics did was to focus the engineers and administrators on problems which
they might have ignored or treated with less attention (see Haggart,
2002). As a result of the criticisms,
management was forced to test out their assumptions with detailed physical
models, bring in outside experts, allocate funding where it was insufficient or
entirely absent, and consult with affected stakeholders before plans were fixed
in place. Thus, the role of the critics and their use of the Internet to arouse
public opinion would seem to have had a beneficial and countering effect on the
traditional Chinese practice of top-down decision-making in the case of the
Three Gorges Dam Project.
The “higher good of the nation” appears to be
the driving force in China. The
prestige of the dam, the usefulness of the dam, the thrust to improve living
standards through greater electricity, water supply, navigation, irrigation,
flood control and water transfer has the highest priority. The individual has never figured highly in
the calculus of Chinese governments, whether dynastic, Kuomintang, Communist,
or the current market-socialist government.
The goal of economic development of China has the support of both
capitalists and communists and, as we observed, the man in the street. China desires, above all, to take its place
among the developed nations and to emerge as the world’s second superpower in
the 21st century. By
building the largest dam in the world, the Chinese government is demonstrating
that China is on the way to fulfilling its goal.
APPENDIX
Questions
and answers:
The
following are the questions we asked and the answers we received from our
interviews with engineers[8],
managers[9] and
administrators[10] of the dam
project. All questions were translated
to Chinese and distributed to the respondents a week before the
interviews. The respondents answered
all questions in Chinese which were then translated to English by our
guides. No tape recorders were used at
the interviews but detailed notes were taken by the group and the guides.[11] The general layout of the Three Gorges Dam
is shown in Figure 4.
Q: Is the
dam able to withstand floods?
A: The dam
can withstand a flood of 100 year frequency (71,000 cubic meters per second)
but not a flood of 1000 year frequency (120,000 cubic meters per second). If a big flood is expected, we would lower
the level of the dam to allow room for the larger than normal flow. Upstream dams will be developed; an entire
dam system will be built consisting of four or five dams with reservoirs whose
levels can be adjusted to flow conditions.
The National Flood Control Office in the provincial capitol,Wuhan,
downstream from the dam will manage the system of flood control by controlling
the sluice gates that allow additional water to pass through the dam. The
amount of water in all the reservoirs will be five billion cubic meters,
consisting first of three dams, then four or five dams later on. The Three Gorges Project (TGP) improves the
ability to control floods from the 10 year flood to the 100 year flood.
Q: What
are the main factors to prevent failure of the dam and to achieve success?
A: This
question took our respondents, two engineers, by surprise. It was not one of the written
questions. Their answer was
three-fold. First, there was a long
period of preparation and research work, especially geological research at the
dam site. A lot of technical research
went into the design of the locks, the ship lift, the concrete matrix (due to
the use of crushed granite instead of sand, gravel and pebbles), and
construction research as a result of the huge scale of the dam. Second, the engineers have very good cost
control. The budget was 20 billion yuen[12]
but the actual construction costs will be 18 billion yuen. Finally, the managers and engineers made
sure every small project performed by contractors had an insurance guarantee
including foreign companies (operating under joint ventures with Chinese
companies). Contract and project
management was something they learned on the job and not in school.
Q: Are you
able to keep on schedule? This question
arose from the Three Rivers Network assertion that the project was falling
behind schedule on the one hand and that it was being rushed to completion
without proper attention to detail on the other. The accusation was that the schedule was moved up from completion
in 2013 to completion in 2009 for political reasons.
A: The
construction completion date of 2013 never appeared on the schedule. The plan was always 2009. By 2007 all construction work will be
completed and the level of the reservoir will go from 135 meters to 156
meters. By 2009, the level will rise
from 156 meters to 175 meters, its maximum height. Normal operation of all the generators will be by the year 2013
with all twenty-six generators producing a total of 18,200 megawatts, 25% of
China’s current hydroelectric capacity but only 6% of its total capacity.[13] The flood control level of the dam will be
at 145 meters when the dam level is lowered with the anticipation of summer
rains. As a result, power production will be reduced at that time.
Q: What
about cracks in the dam?
A: Cracks really happened but they are a minor
problem; the concrete quality is reliable.
Cracks, however, are being repaired.
Tests showed that the concrete composed of a crushed granite matrix is
stronger than normal concrete and is stable chemically. On the other hand, it should be noted the
matrix has not been tested over long time periods.
Q: Is it
true that the quality of the generators may not be high because never before
has China built such large generators?
(This kind of criticism, that what the Chinese are doing will be likely
to fail because it has never been done before or done on such a large scale,
was made at every step of the way in the project. Yet the Chinese engineers have been able to overcome difficult
obstacles at every stage in the project.)
A:
According to the Three Gorges Project official document, “The TGP power station
is planned to be equipped with 26 sets of hydro turbine generators having a
rated capacity of 700 megawatts each” (CTGPC, 2000, p.20). The engineer
interviewed said that of the twenty-six generators only twelve will be built by
China; fourteen will be manufactured on contract by foreign companies such as
GE of Canada, Voith and Siemens of Germany, Alstom of France and ABB of
Switzerland.
Q. What
about cracks in the generators?
A.
Regarding cracks in the generators, the engineer stated that cracks don’t seem
to be a problem; it is not unusual to have them; and cracks were found in all
foreign generators. The cracks are
being repaired.
Q: Will
there be an excess of electricity generated because demand has fallen as a
result of many government factories along the river being closed?
A: First, the price of electricity will be
competitive with coal. Secondly, demand
is expected to go up because living standards of relocatees will be going up,
i.e., more more air conditioners, various appliances, TV’s, etc. Finally, as we
found out in the interview with the economic development administrator of the
new city of Zigui, industry is being offered tax breaks to relocate to the new
cities on the Yangtze. It is expected
that increased sales of electricity will be sufficient to compensate for the
decrease in demand resulting from the closure of government factories.
Q: Will
you be able to recoup your investment through the sales of electricity?
A: Yes.
Even when the level of the dam is lowered for flood control, the central
government will compensate the TGP for any electricity production loss as a
result of decreasing the pressure head from 113 meters to 52 meters (CTGPC,
2000, p.19).
Q: What
happens to the thousands of workers once the dam is built?
A: There
are currently (August, 2002) 20,000
workers on the dam. In the initial
phases of construction, there were 30,000 workers. The workers belong to contractors and are not employees of the
TGP. After the Three Gorges Dam is
built, the contractors will have much work to do on tributary dams, although
they will have to compete for the work.
The hydroelectric market (for projects and workers) is up for the next
20 years. Workers will find employment
with the firms that win the contracts.
Q: Is it
true that the dam is built on a geological unstable area that is prone to
landslides and earthquakes? Will the
huge body of water in the reservoir be likely to cause earthquakes and
landslips? What steps have been taken
to avoid natural disasters resulting from earthquakes and landslips?
A: The dam
is built on a huge anticline, a 700 million year old granite formation which is
50 to 60 kilometres long. The dam was
designed to withstand an earthquake of magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale
while only a 6.0 at most is expected.
As for the reservoir causing earthquakes, they will be small, not strong
enough to damage the dam. Regarding
landslips, there are some unstable places along the Yangtze River but they are
30 to 40 kilometers up-river from the dam.
If they occur, they will not affect the dam. In addition, from 1998, we have budgeted two billion yuen (US
$242 million) to do geological treatment far away from the dam.
Q:
Questions on the ship-lift: (The ship-lift is a large box into which ships of
3000 tons or less, together with water, can be lifted 600 feet in a half hour
from the bottom to the top of the dam.)
Is it true that the ship-lift will be the largest in the world? Is the
technology to operate the ship-lift complicated and as difficult to operate as
the Germans say? Is the construction of
the ship-lift on schedule? How long will the shipping on the river be suspended
while the ship-lift is being constructed? What
steps are being taken to speed up the passage of ships up the Yangtze?
A: It is
true that the ship-lift will be the largest in the world whether one considers ship’s tonnage, total lift weight or
lift height. The most important issue
is safety, especially the reliability of the safety-locking device. The
ship-lift is not the main method of getting ships through the Three Gorges Dam;
the locks are a main method. The locks, which can handle ships up to 10,000
tons, take 2.5 hours to transport a ship 600 feet in elevation. The ship-lift can lift a smaller vessel of
3000 tons in a half hour. The total weight of the ship, the water and the lift
can be not more than 11,800 tons. The
TGP have experimented on several models plus the experience collected on the
Jin Jan Jian River with a smaller 300 ton ship-lift. Although the Germans have
been studying the problem of the ship-lift for 10 years, as yet they have not
settled on a solution. The project is
currently open to design bid from several countries. The technical problem is
that the four points on the corners of the box need to be lifted up at the same
time and a safety lock has to be activated if the lift is stuck so that it
cannot collapse. The problem is with
the control system, with the software and with the supporting cables. Because of all the problems connected with
scaling from an 8000-ton ship-lift in Belgium to 11,800 tons in the TGP, the
designers are not sure it will work. Still, the construction of the ship-lift
remains on schedule since the engineers have until 2009 to complete it. Shipping on the river will not have to be
suspended while the ship-lift is being constructed because the locks will be in
operation as early as 2003.
Q: We have
heard of cases of corruption and bribery regarding money appropriated for
construction and relocation of people. Is it true that in the year 2000, 97
officials were convicted of embezzlement from the dam fund? What has been their punishment? Is it true that a number of culprits have
vanished with the money? How can this
happen?
A: The
answer to this question came from the administrator, Dr. Ma Xiang, who is a
specialist in relocation and now responsible for relocating all the people displaced by the dam.
On the subject of bribery and corruption, he stated, “It is an open
system. Each family knows how much it
is supposed to get (in terms of compensation).
Supervising this is easy. A
special office does the supervising, independent of local government, but out
of Beijing. An official from the
central government is in charge of relocation.
Cooperation with officials in Hubei Province and Chongqing Municipality
are good. Any corruption was at the
local level. There is a three-step
process: report to supervisor; follow-up on relocatee; then independent
audit. Nobody can interfere with this
system.”[14] As for corruption, 1.25% of revenues from
the sales of electricity from the TGP are allocated to the relocatees. If
embezzlers are caught, they are punished according to the law. Later on, we
learned from the economic development administrator of Zigui that 1,000,000
yuen stolen (approximately $125,000) means the death penalty. Penalties are proportional to the amount
embezzled or bribes received.[15]
Q: How
have the culprits vanished?
A: They
have changed their ID (not difficult to obtain forged documents), emigrated
abroad, first to Hong Kong then to Canada.
(With an investment of $400,000 Canadian dollars ($252,000 U.S.) and new
identity, he can be accepted into Canada as an investor-immigrant.) As for the 97 officials convicted of
embezzlement from the dam fund in year 2000, Dr. Ma Xiang did not believe the
figure and asked the source of our information. We replied, the Internet.[16]
Q: What actions
are you taking to ensure that the reservoir is not polluted by the land which
will be inundated? What steps are being
taken to clean up the hillsides and the soil from industrial and human
pollution that will be under water when the reservoir has risen to its planned
height of 175 meters (574 feet) by year 2009?
A: We will
be investing 40 billion yuan (US$4.8 billion)
to improve the environment, the soil, the water, for reforestation and
to treat wastewater. Water treatment
facilities are being improved. People
are getting money for planting trees.
According to a 1993 UN report, 3000 pollution points have been found in
the reservoir area. The government has
demanded that the quality of water will be improved relative to that before the
TGP. All land along the banks of the
Yangtze River has been cleared to the 135 meters elevation markers. We now must clear the land to the height of
175 meters, the maximum height of the reservoir at the dam. The cost of clearing and cleaning the
hillsides has been fully estimated. For example, toilets and pig houses will be
buried more than two meters. Hospital
and factory waste will be burned. Not
less than 30% of the cleared hillsides will be checked by officials of the
province and county. The central government
will check more than 20% of the hillsides independently before the water floods
the reservoir. The work of clearing and
cleaning started by the end of 2001.
Note on
water pollution: According to the TGP document, “The fundamental measures to
protect water quality are to treat pollution sources according to the national
environmental protection laws. The
Chinese government takes water quality protection of large rivers and lakes as
the most important task. The State
Council has made a decision that all industry pollution sources must be treated
to reach a discharge standard according to the environment protection
requirement before 2000. A number of
small paper mills which discharge heavy pollution water have already been
closed and various large wastewater treatment plants have been under
construction or planned to be constructed in Chongqing city, Wanxian city,
Fuling city and Yichang city (see Figure 3).
On the basis of wastewater reaching discharge standard, the cost used to
treat the additional pollution induced by the reservoir operation will be
financed by TGP (CTGPC, 2000, p.25). It should be noted that on our trip up the
Yangtze, we saw many places on the river banks that had large catchments of
coal, the products of mines that will be flooded, waiting for shipment. These surely will have to be cleaned
up. Dr. Ma Xiang concluded, “According to our experience, it
looks to be a hard job. Each local
government has been assigned its area to clean up. We are confident that every place can accomplish the job on time.”
[17]
Q: What
sort of farmland are you moving the farmers to? Will the land be level or steep hillsides? Will the soil be rich or filled with rocks? Will they have enough land to feed
themselves?
A: In
answering these questions, Dr. Ma Xiang also discussed the quality of housing
of the urban relocatees, the question of removal of gravesites, an important
issue in a society that worships its ancestors, and the compensation to
farmers. He stated that the relocatees must be compensated. Their new homes will be an improvement over
their old homes, especially for city, town and village dwellers. They will have a choice. They can take the money and move to another
city entirely or they can obtain a new flat in a newly built city. Farmers are offered land, equal in amount to
their present land, in another location.
The new land could be at a higher elevation than their present farms or
it could be a great distance away. If
it is at a higher elevation, and the slope is greater than 25 degrees, the
government has offered to pay them to plant tea, orange and pine trees to hold
the soil on the steep hillsides (and not rice crops) that would provide income
for them in the initial period after moving. A farmer that plants more than 50
trees will receive a bonus. A second method of compensating farmers is to lend
them money at no interest to get them started in the new location. Regarding
pollution on the new land, Dr. Ma Xiang said that in the Three Gorges area
farmers use much less chemical fertilizer and more natural fertilizer. Farmers
will receive bonuses for reporting pollution to the authorities.
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