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By A. Blair Stonechild.
Indian Treaties Were a Commitment To Peace
In order to more clearly understand the Indian attitude
at the time of the Rebellion, one has to look back to
the period prior to the signing of the treaties. Indian
Nations waged tremendous battles against each other as
a result of inter-tribal conflicts created by the expansion
of the fur trade. In some battles between the Cree and
the Blackfoot, such as that on the Oldman River in 1870,
several hundred warriors were killed. An even greater
killer -- the epidemics -- wiped out over half of the
tribes in some outbreaks. The result of all this was the
drastic depopulation of the Indian Nations, and an increasing
awareness among Indian leaders that their Nations had
to come to grips with a very fundamental and real issue
-- that of survival.
Because of these experiences a strong peace movement
began to develop among the Indian Nations. One famous peacemaker
was the Cree Chief Maskipitoon, who strove to mend relations
between the Cree and the Blackfoot during the 1860s. He
eventually fell victim to a misguided warrior’s bullet.
The adoption of the Cree Poundmaker by the Blackfoot Chief
Crowfoot was another important development in the cementing
of peaceful relations between the two Nations.
It was because of this sentiment for peace that Indian
leaders were receptive to the signing of treaties in the
1870s. Not only had Indians never been at war with whites
in the North-West, but they also sought to prevent such
as thing from ever happening. Treaty Six stated, “they
will maintain peace and good order between each other, and
also between themselves and others of Her Majesty’s
subjects.” To Indian Nations, that was one of the
most important principles of the treaty.
For Indians, the signing of treaties was far more than
a political act -- it was also a sacred act. By the ceremony
of smoking the Sacred Pipe, the Indian people pledged before
the Creator that they would uphold the treaties. As Senator
John Tootoosis puts it, “We signed an agreement with
the Crown, with the Queen not to fight any more. We were
to live in peace. We had to live up to this Treaty. We promised
in the name of the Creator to keep the Treaty. The Indian
people feared offending the Creator.” If the treaty
was ever broken, it would not be the Indian people who broke
it first.
Around the time of the Rebellion, white people did not
fully appreciate the commitment of the Indian people. They
had the perception that Indian people were no more than
hunters and warriors. When the Marquis of Lorne, Queen Victoria’s
son-in-law, met Poundmaker in 1881, he expected to hear
many war stories, and was surprised that instead he heard
mainly about the spiritual and political ideas of the Indian
people.
The Solutions to Treaty Problems Would Be Political
The Indian leadership was aware that there were serious
shortcomings in the implementation of the treaties. In the
Councils of the political leaders the focus of attention
was on the dissatisfaction being experienced by those Indians
settling on reserves. During those days of “The Time
of the Great Hunger,” Indians were seeing few of the
benefits promised them under the treaty. The meager rations
provided to them did little to stop the loss of life. Between
1880 and 1885 the Indian population dropped from 32,549
to 20,170 -- a death rate of nearly 10 percent per year.
At the Duck Lake Council, held in early August of 1884,
Indian leaders presented a list of eighteen specific treaty
grievances including complaints about untamed horses and
cows, inadequate rations, poor implements, lack of schools
and medical assistance and general dissatisfaction with
government measures. The report on their presentation stated “that
requests for redress of their grievances have been again
and again made without effect. They are glad that the young
men have not resorted to violent measures to gain it. That
it is almost too hard for them to bear the treatment received
at the hands of the government after its ‘sweet promises’ made
in order to get their country from them. They now fear that
they are going to be cheated. They will wait until next
summer to see if this council has the desired effect, failing
which they will take measures to get what they desire. (The
proposed ‘measures’ could not be elicited, but
a suggestion of the idea of war was repudiated.)”
One measure being proposed by the Chiefs was a meeting
of the Grand Council to be held on Little Pine’s Reserve
in 1885. The Blackfoot would be invited to attend. Once
a united position was agreed upon, a delegation of Chiefs
would travel to Ottawa where it was believed someone with
sufficient authority could make some changes.
Thus, the Indian people were charting their own course
of action to deal with Indian problems. It was a plan which
called for concerted political action, and under in any
outbreak of violence would be viewed as an undesirable course
of events.
The Spread of The Rebellion Tests Indian Loyalties
Following the outbreak of hostilities at Duck Lake, Riel,
attempting to spark a Territory-wide insurrection, sent
messengers to many reserves urging the Indians to join him.
The response of most Indian leaders was to send messages
to government authorities reaffirming their loyalty.
On 28 March 1885, a delegation of Touchwood Chiefs sent
a message expressing “to his Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor
and through him to the Governor-General, their loyalty to
their Great Mother the Queen, and further wish to express
their disapproval of the course of action pursued by those
at the head of the present struggle.”
At a meeting called by Riel’s messengers at the Crooked
Lakes Reserves, the Indians decided to remain loyal. Chief
Kahkewistahaw made the following statement: “Agent,
you remember the time I promised I would go to my reserve.
I also said that I and my young men’s fighting days
were over. I stick to those words no matter what may be
done up north, we will remain on our reserves and attend
to our work.”
Chief Piapot, the main Cree in the South wrote: “It
is eleven years since I gave up fighting. When I took the
government Treaty I touched the pen not to interfere with
the whiteman and the whiteman not to interfere with me.”
Also on 28 March, Indian Agent Rae visited old Chief
Mosquito on his reserve a few miles south of Battleford
and received the Chief’s assurances that the Band
would remain loyal. At about the same time, Riel’s
messengers were visiting both Mosquito’s and Red Pheasant’s
Reserves.
On Mosquito’s Reserve a Band member named Itka had
been grieving over the death of his daughter, which he blamed
on Farm Instructor Payne. A few days before her death, Payne
had physically thrown the frail girl out of his house. Itka
decided the time was opportune for revenge, went to the
Farm Instructor’s home and shot him dead. Relatives
of Itka, convinced that Canadian authorities would conduct
an American-style retaliation against them, decided that
their best alternative would be to seek refuge. They went
to the house of Barney Tremont, a local farmer, demanding
horses. When Tremont refused, he was shot and killed.
While these events were occurring on the Mosquito Reserve,
Chiefs Poundmaker and Little Pine, concerned about the outbreak
at Duck Lake, decided to travel to Battleford to express
their loyalty to the Queen. Poundmaker also decided that
at the same time he would take the opportunity to attempt
to gain government concessions for food and other treaty
provisions. Hearing this, most of the Band member decided
to accompany their Chiefs in the hope that they would be
present for the distributions.
The two Chiefs and their followers met with Chief Young
Sweetgrass on 28 March at the Sweetgrass Reserve, about
ten miles west of Battleford. Farm Instructors Jefferson
and Craig debated whether or not they should accompany the
Indians at Battleford, but decided against it for fear of
disapproval by their superiors, who wanted Indians to remain
on their reserves.
Also present was Peter Ballantyne, who was operating
as a spy for Edgar Dewdney. He checked on the Indians’ plans
and came to the conclusion that their intentions were peaceful.
Meanwhile in Battleford, rumours were rampant that Poundmaker
was approaching to attack the town.
Top
Battleford -- The Siege That Never Occurred
When Poundmaker and his followers reached Battleford
on the morning of 30 March, they were surprised to find
the town deserted. The residents had taken refuge in the
North West Mounted Police Barracks on the other side of
the river.
Poundmaker sent a message to the fort stating his peaceful
intentions and requesting a meeting with Indian Agent Rae.
Rae refused to leave the fort, but Peter Ballantyne and
Hudson’s Bay Company Factor McKay came out to meet
Poundmaker. McKay agreed to release food to the Indians
from the Hudson’s Bay Company store.
Governor Dewdney was sent a telegram stating, “Indians
willing to go back to reserves tomorrow if their demands
for clothing are met. Strongly urge you to deal with them
as we are not in a position at present to begin an Indian
war.” Dewdney later replied, although too late, that
he would meet with Poundmaker.
There were other groups who had arrived at Battleford
-- some of the Stoneys from Mosquito’s Reserve, and
Riel’s agitators from Duck Lake. As Ballantyne and
McKay were returning to the fort after failing to arrange
talks with Rae, some of the Metis took shots at them. Later
that day, some of the Stoneys began to break into stores
and loot. Poundmaker and Little Pine tried to restrain their
followers from looting, but with only limited success.
By the next morning. Poundmaker and most of his followers
were on their way home. The strain of the troubles was too
great for Little Pine, who had been suffering from temporary
blindness and other symptoms of starvation. He died on 31
March 1885, a few miles before reaching his reserve. Little
Pine’s death, and that of old Chief Red Pheasant a
few days earlier, meant that Poundmaker had become the main
Indian leader in the Battleford area.
Accounts of the siege were blown well out of proportion.
The telegraph line had not been tampered with, allowing
the Battleford residents to send out daily messages of alarm.
During the twenty-five days before relief troops arrived,
the five hundred settlers barricaded in the fort were even
able to obtain water safely from their only source a mile
outside the barracks. According to one observer, “one
solitary individual -- the cook -- had the temerity to continue
in residence at the old government house. He had many visitors
that day, gave them to eat, when they departed without harming
him.”
Interestingly enough, another observer reported, “They
[the Indians] had been too hurried to take much; the principal
looting was the work of white men. As soon as the coast
was clear in the morning they came over in detachments and
finished what the Indians had begun. They made a clean sweep.”
Not the least of these raiders was Farm Instructor Craig,
who “devoted his time and attention to looting the
stores and houses that had been broken into by the Indians,
but his enterprise was frustrated by persistent robbing
of his ten whenever he left it.”
Several observers were of the opinion that looting would
never have taken place had the townspeople not deserted
their houses and stores. By and large, the “siege” was
a fabricated event.
Top
Big Bear’s Misfortune Peaks At Frog Lake
Big Bear had become the principal leader of the northern
Plains Cree in 1877, following the death of Chief Sweetgrass.
Unfortunately, he had a poor relationship with the government.
One of the tactics used by the government during treaty
negotiations had been to fail to send notification of the
meetings to Indian leaders who were considered difficult
to deal with. Such was the reason for Big Bear’s arrival
at Fort Pitt a day after Treaty Six had been signed.
During a speech objecting to the lack of consultation
with the several Bands he was representing, Big Bear said:
I have come off to speak for the different bands that
are out on the Plains. It is no small matter we were to
consult about. I expected the Chiefs here would have waited
until I arrived… I heard the Governor was to come
and I said I shall see him; when I see him I will request
that he will save me from that which I most dread, that
is: the rope to be about my neck, it was not given to us
by the Great Spirit that the red man or the white man should
shed each other’s blood.
The official treaty interpreter had already left and Reserved
McKay, whose mastery of Cree was far from perfect, misinterpreted
Big Bear’s words to mean a fear of hanging (ayhahkotit).
Big Bear was actually saying that he did not wish to lose
his freedom, like an animal with a rope around its neck
(aysakapaykinit). Nevertheless, the impression created of
Big Bear was that he was evil and cowardly, an image which
would haunt him up to his final days.
Steadfast in his belief that he could get a revision
of Treaty Six, similar to those of Treaties One and Two,
Big Bear held out from signing Treaty Six longer than any
other Chief. He was forced to sign six years later, when
it became clear that his Band members would starve unless
they obtained government rations.
In 1884, after years of urging, Big Bear agreed to choose
a reserve next to Poundmaker’s. Deputy Superintendent-General
of Indian Affairs Lawrence Vankoughnet, a man who disliked
Big Bear, vetoed the plan, suggesting that it would not
be a good idea to have too many “idle Indians” in
one area. Instead, Vankoughnet warned Big Bear to take a
reserve already set aside near Fort Pitt -- a location which
Big Bear had already rejected -- or face a cut-off of rations
during the winter of 1884-85. Big Bear refused to comply.
An unhealthy blend of ingredients was being mixed. Many
members of Big Bear’s Band, including his son Imases
and the War Chief Wandering Spirit, were becoming frustrated
with the state of affairs. Compounding the problem was the
presence of Indian Agent Quinn, a man known to have been
abusive to Indians, and Farm Instructor Delaney, who had
been accused of violating Indian women. The government was
aware of the unpopularity of these men with the Indians,
and had been planning to relocate them.
News of the Duck Lake fight did not reach Agent Quinn
until late on 31 March 1885. The next day, 1 April or “Big
Lie Day,” as the Indians called it, Quinn summoned
Big Bear’s Band members to inform them of the incident.
Imases, speaking on behalf of Big Bear, who was out hunting
for food for the Band, replied:
They have already risen; we knew about it before you.
They have beaten the soldiers in the first fight, killing
many. We do not wish to join the half-breeds, but we are
afraid. We wish to stay here and prove ourselves the friends
of the white man
Imases then asked Quinn to provide rations to the Band.
Quinn refused, saying he would have to speak to Big Bear
first.
Later that day Big Bear returned empty-handed from hunting
and led a delegation to request rations from Quinn. Big
Bear was upset at his refusal. Imases, hoping to win a compromise,
suggested that Quinn give the Indians food for a feast as
a gift to the Band, and he would not then have to call it
rations. Quinn, however, had decided to give them nothing.
That night, unknown to Big Bear, Wandering Spirit and
several members of the Rattler’s Warrior Society held
a dance in secret. As dawn broke some twenty armed warriors
came to the Frog Lake community, waking up the residents
and herding them to Quinn’s house.
That morning, when asked for food and other supplies,
Quinn was willing to comply, and various Indians were allowed
to have goods from the stores.
That day was Holy Thursday, and two priests who had come
for the occasion asked permission to hold church services.
The hostages were all allowed to attend church. By this
time Big Bear had learned of the trouble and had joined
the whites in the church to ensure that nothing worse occurred.
As the church service progressed the noise outside increased.
The warriors had broken into the stores and had found wine,
spirits and painkillers. As these were consumed the shouting
and yelling of the warriors grew louder, and they eventually
began to enter the church and disrupt the service.
Big Bear decided to leave the church and begin warning
the other residents of the community, who were in their
houses, to leave in case trouble broke out. He was at Mrs.
Simpson’s house when he heard shot. The church service
had been cut short.
Wandering Spirit, the War Chief, ordered the whites to
go to the Indian camp, a short distance away, Quinn refused
to move, and after repeated warnings Wandering Spirit shot
him dead.
Big Bear ran outside, yelling at the warriors to stop
it, but it was too late. Urged on by the prompting of Wandering
Spirit, the warriors soon killed eight white men.
Perhaps the violence would have been averted had Quinn
simply given food to the starving Band the day before. It
did not appear that the Band was thinking seriously of any
sort of insurrection at that time. Even on the following
day, had Quinn been liberal with Indian requests for food
and simply complied with the warriors’ orders, it
is possible that bloodshed could have been averted entirely.
The presence of alcohol and painkillers can be the only
explanation for the gruesomeness of the murders. In Indian
thinking, it was considered dishonourable and cowardly to
kill an unarmed man for no reason at all.
Big Bear’s hopes of peaceful dealings with government
had all but vanished, yet he distinguished himself by protecting
the lives of the remaining white captives, and by preventing
greater bloodshed at Fort Pitt.
The warriors moved to seize the provisions at Fort Pitt
on 14 April. Big Bear, no longer in control of the Band,
argued for an attempt to arrange a peaceful surrender of
the Fort. He held the warriors back for one night, and the
next day persuaded forty-four civilians to surrender to
the Band. With this achieved, the North West Mounted Police
detachment had little reason to stay, and was allowed to
escape down the river by boat. Big Bear’s vigilance
was an important factor in preventing any deaths among them.
Top The Unprovoked Attack on Cutknife Hill
Although Poundmaker had been forced to relinquished power
to the warrior society, he was influential in maintaining
calm among the Indians camped at Cutknife Hill following
the so-called siege of Battleford.
Lieutenant-Colonel Otter arrived at Battleford on 24
April 1885 with close to 550 troops. Also, part of his arsenal
was a Gatling gun sent for demonstration by the United States
Army
Otter’s troops were sorely disappointed at not seeing
action on arrival at Battleford. Otter had been ordered
by Middleton to stay at Battleford and guard the townspeople.
Sensing the unrest of his troops, and seeing the opportunity
to gain personal glory, Otter wired Dewdney, “I proposed
taking part of my force at once to punish Poundmaker leaving
100 men to garrison Battleford. Great depredations committed.
Immediate decisive action necessary. Do you approve?”
Dewdney, probably after consulting the Prime Minister,
wired Otter with approval.
Otter planned to surprise Poundmaker and force him to
surrender. On the evening of 28 April, he left Battleford
for Cutknife Hill. Otter’s timing was good, and he
arrived at the foot of Cutknife Hill at 5:15 the following
morning. Fortunately for Poundmaker’s camp, an old
man, Jacob With the Long Hair, was awake and heard the sounds
of the approaching soldiers. He ran through the camp shouting
warnings.
At that point Otter ordered his guns to open fire on
the sleeping camp. The barrage knocked over some tipis,
but all of the occupants managed to scramble to safety.
Some of the Indian warriors ran out to confront the troops
while others began shooting from nearby coulees. According
to Robert Jefferson, an eyewitness, “Not more than
50 [Indians] altogether, had taken part in the battle. This
was excusable since few were armed,…” As the
battle continued throughout the morning, Otter realized
that his troops were in a vulnerable position and were slowly
being surrounded. Just before noon, he ordered his men to
retreat.
The warriors wanted to pursue Otter. Knowing the land
like the backs of their hands and gaining the advantage
of nightfall, the warriors could have inflicted heavy casualties
on the tiring soldiers. Poundmaker refused to agree, maintaining
that while the Indians were right in defending themselves
on their land, it would be wrong to go on the offensive.
There had been a split among the people at Cutknife Hill.
On the one side was the pro-Riel faction consisting of the
Metis agitators and the Stoney warriors. On the other side
were those led by Poundmaker who wanted to have as little
as possible to do with the Rebellion. Poundmaker had tried
to lead his followers west towards the hilly country around
Devil’s Lake, with plans to eventually take refuge
near Crowfoot, but the warriors and Metis prevented them
from leaving.
Poundmaker was essentially being used as a spokesman
by the belligerent faction. An example of this was a letter
to Riel dictated by Riel’s sympathizers but bearing
the “signatures” of Poundmaker and several other
Indians. Poundmaker’s lack of verbal or written knowledge
of either French or English put him at a great disadvantage.
The fact was that Poundmaker was not in control, and the
insinuation of support for Riel contained in the letter
was out of character with his actions. That letter later
became the main piece of evidence used in convicting Poundmaker.
Following the Battle of Cutknife Hill, it was decided
that it was no longer safe to remain on the reserve. When
the pro-Riel faction decided to join Riel at Batoche, Poundmaker
attempted to lead his followers west, away from trouble.
The dispute nearly led to bloodshed, but Poundmaker’s
poorly armed followers relented. Poundmaker’s lack
of cooperation and additional efforts to break away from
the camp slowed the Indians’ progress to Batoche by
several days.
Poundmaker’s stalling tactics saved many Indian lives,
for as they neared Batoche on 14 May, they received news
that Middleton’s army had just defeated the Metis.
After some discussion, Poundmaker sought terms of surrender
from Middleton; when refused, he surrendered unconditionally
at Battleford on 26 May 1885.
Poundmaker’s plan to abandon his reserve and seek
refuge by moving to an isolated area was not unique. A significant
number of Band members, from reserves such as Mosquito’s,
Red Pheasant’s, One Arrow’s and Thunderchild’s,
went north to avoid any involvement in the troubles.
During this period, Sir John A. Macdonald was attempting
to exploit tribal differences by inquiring about sending
Indian patrols against Poundmaker and Big Bear. He wrote
Dewdney on 29 March 1885, “I understand that the Crees
dread the Blackfeet like the devil. Now a corps of scouts
under Crowfoot might be formed.” Because of the relationship
between Crowfoot and Poundmaker this plan never succeeded,
despite repeated requests from the Prime Minister.
Top At Batoche Against Their Will
Part of the strategy of Riel’s Provisional Government
was based on the belief that they held influence over the
Indians. In a note to the English half-breeds on 22 March
1885, they wrote, “We are sure that if the English
and French half-breeds unite well in this time of crisis,
not only can we control the Indians, but we will also have
their weight on our side.” With Indians outnumbering
both Metis and whites in the North-West, their support in
a conflict could be critical, but the presumption of Indian
involvement was made without consultation with any of the
Indian leaders.
On 18 March 1885, one day before Riel’s proclamation
of his Provisional Government, that process of “controlling” Indians
began. About forty Riel supports arrived at One Arrow’s
Reserve, approximately two miles east of Batoche, taking
the Indian Agent and Farm Instructor prisoner. The next
day, One Arrow and fifteen of his men came to Batoche. As
One Arrow testified at his trial,
I am an old man now… I was taken to the place, Batoche’s,
to join Riel by Gabriel. I did not take myself to the place.
They took me there. I could not say how many there were
of them that took me there, but there was quite a number
of them…. So when I went there and got there I was
taken prisoner.
Witnesses testified that One Arrow was seen in the area
during both the Duck Lake fight and the Battle of Batoche.
In his defence, One Arrow testified that,
All that was said against me was thrown upon me falsely.
I did not take up my gun with the intention to shoot at
any man. I was on the brink of the hill the whole day, and
I had my gun there, but, of course, not with the intention
to use the gun against any man, and when I saw the white
men coming down, I ran down the hill too, and ran off.
On 10 April 1885, around twenty Riel supporters arrived
at Whitecap’s Reserve, a few miles south of Saskatoon.
Whitecap, the Chief of a Band of refugee American Dakota,
had resisted Riel’s overtures two weeks previous.
Before the Metis began forcing Whitecap and twenty of his
men towards Batoche, Whitecap managed to send a message
to a white friend in Saskatoon, Gerald Willoughby, asking
him for assistance. When the group reached Saskatoon, a
group of nine citizens tried to persuade the Metis to allow
Whitecap to return to his reserve. Outnumbered, their attempt
was unsuccessful.
When Whitecap arrived at Batoche, he was appointed the
only Indian member of Riel’s council on internal matters,
but because he understood neither French nor Cree, he attended
only one meeting.
Whitecap’s men were seen at the battles of Fish Creek
and Batoche. Testimony provided by the main prosecution
witnesses showed that Whitecap could not be positively identified
as having been among the several old Indian men at Batoche,
but it was mainly because of the evidence showing that Whitecap
had been coerced to fight that all charges against him were
dropped.
Top
The Indian Trials: Unwarranted Punishment
Poundmaker, despite evidence of his efforts to maintain
peace, was convicted of treason-felony on the basis of the
letter to Riel bearing his name. Speaking after hearing
the guilty verdict, Poundmaker categorically denied any
wrongdoing, saying, “Everything that is bad has been
laid against me this summer, there is nothing of it true.” On
hearing that he was sentenced to three years at Stony Mountain,
Poundmaker declared, “I would prefer to be hung at
once than to be in that place.” Poundmaker was released
in the spring of 1886, largely because of public sympathy,
but he died in June after making a trek on foot to visit
his adoptive father, Crowfoot.
Although the evidence was strongly in favour of Big Bear,
it appeared that the outcome of the trial was predetermined,
and he was sentenced to the same three year term as Poundmaker.
There was less public sympathy for Big Bear, and he was
not released until 3 February 1887, after a medical report
confirmed his badly deteriorating health. He had no Band
to return to, as it had been dispersed by the government.
Most of his familiy he would never see, as they were fugitives
in the United States. With his heart broken and no cause
to live for, he died on 18 January 1888.
When Chief One Arrow heard the charges of treason-felony
translated to him, it came out in Cree as “knocking
off the Queen’s bonnet and stabbing her in the behind
with a sword.” This moved One Arrow to ask the interpreter
if he was drunk. The conviction of One Arrow was based on
his presence at the battle sites, and his account of how
he came to be there was ignored.
One Arrow was not so fortunate as to make it back to
his own reserve. He was released from Stony Mountain Prison
on 21 April 1886, and died four days later at Archbishop
Tache’s residence in St. Boniface. He was baptised
just before his death and lies in St. Boniface cemetery
in an unmarked grave.
In order to save money, a decision was made not to hold
all of the Rebellion trials at Regina. Several of them were
held in Battleford instead. The atmosphere in Battleford
was not hospitable towards Indians, as an editorial in the
Saskatchewan Herald on 23 April 1885 shows:
The petted Indians are the bad ones. The Stonies have
been treated as being of a superior race, and are the first
to shed the blood of their benefactors. Poundmaker has been
petted and feted, and stands in the front rank as a raider.
Little Pine, bribed to come north and kept in comfort, hastens
to the carnage. Big Bear, who has for years enjoyed the
privilege of eating of the bread of idleness, shows his
gratitude by killing his priests and his best friends in
cold blood. Little Poplar, a non-treaty Indian, has been
liberally supplied with provisions and other necessaries
and thus enabled to spend all his time in travelling up
and down the land plotting mischief and preparing for this
season’s carnival of ruin. The petted Indians have
proved the bad ones, and this gives weight to the old adage
that the only good Indians are the dead ones.
Judge Rouleau, who would pass the judgements, had narrowly
missed being murdered along with Farm Instructor Payne,
and was also bitter about the burning of his mansion at
Battleford. He was known before the trials to advocate harsh
punishment as a deterrent to future rebellious acts by Indians.
The eight Indians eventually hanged were at a disadvantage.
They knew nothing of the legal system and had no legal counsel
or other advice. No effective defence of any sort was mounted
which might have created sympathy for the defendants --
for example, the reality of their starvation under Indian
Affairs administration, or the excesses brought on by alcohol
and drugs at the Frog Lake massacre.
Several Indian Elders are certain that at least one of
the Indians, Man-Without-Blood, was wrongly hanged for the
shooting of Farm Instructor Payne. They claim it was done
by the other Stoney, Man-With-a-Black-Blanket. According
to one story.
The two Stoney young men were arrested also. They were
accused of killing the farm instructor and they were both
arrested. And at that time people were very respectable.
There was a lot of respect for the older people. Now the
one who did not kill the Indian Agent, he was the one who
was accused by his partner. So the one who was accused of
killing the farm instructor, when he went to trial, the
officer asked him, “Is this true what you did? Or
is it not true?” He replied, “Maybe it is true,
and maybe it is not.” And he really had nothing to
do with it, he didn’t shoot the Indian Agent. So when
he said, “Maybe they are telling the truth,” that
was accepted as his plea, as telling the truth. So he got
the blame for the death of the farm instructor. So he was
one of them that got hanged. They weren’t They weren’t
going to sympathize with him or feel sorry for him.
According to another story, “It’s him who killed
the ration feeder. And the one who followed him shot the
dog. He was the one who got hung instead, said my father,
the one who shot the dog. He did not want to report his
partner.”
No clear evidence of committing murder was shown against
Iron Body and Little Bear, two of the six Indians tried
for their role in the Frog Lake massacre. They were hanged
on the basis that, by aiding and abetting the others, they
were equally guilty.
Four Sky Thunder received a sentence of fourteen years
for burning down the Frog Lake church. Another Indian, whose
only wrongdoing was having been seen with Big Bear, was
sentenced to six years in prison.
Several Indians were never brought to justice. Among
them was Man-Who-Speaks-Our-Language, who nearly caused
the outbreak of fighting with the North West Mounted Police
on Poundmaker’s Reserve in 1884, and was responsible
for some of the killings at Frog Lake.
The hangings at Battleford took place on 27 November
1885. Indians from several reserves were there to witness
the event.
A new section was built at Stony Mountain Penitentiary
to accommodate the twenty-five Indians and eighteen Metis
sentenced to prison. Several of the Indians never returned
to their reserves, and are buried in the St. Boniface cemetery.
Top The Aftermath: Suppression of Indians
The government saw the rebellion as an opportunity to
achieve a goal which had eluded it since 1870, that of gaining
total control over Indians. In July of 1885, Assistant Commissioner
Hayter Reed drew up a list of fifteen recommendations on
actions to be taken following the Rebellion. Among these
were the following:
The leaders of the Teton Sioux who fought against the
troops should be hanged and the rest be sent out of the
country;
Big Bear’s band should either be broken up and scattered
among other bands or be given a reserve adjacent to that
at Onion Lake;
One Arrow’s band should be joined with that of Beardy
and Okemasis and their reserve surrendered;
No annuity money should be now paid any bands that rebelled,
or to any individuals that joined the insurgents;
The tribal system should be abolished in so far as is
compatible with the Treaty;
All half-breeds, members of rebel bands, although not
shown to have taken any active part in the rebellion, should
have their names erased from the pay sheets;
No rebel Indians should be allowed off the Reserves without
a pass signed by an Indian Departmental official; and
All Indians who have not during the late troubles been
disloyal or troublesome should be treated as heretofore.
Reed had also prepared a list of every Indian Band in the
North-West and had identified twenty-eight disloyal Bands.
In his enthusiasm he erroneously included several reserves,
such as Sweetgrass and Thunderchild, which had been very
loyal. Most of the others had actually been loyal, with
only the odd individual implicated in the Rebellion. Of
all the Bands identified as disloyal in the Rebellion, it
is clear that none of the Chiefs, whether Big Bear, Poundmaker,
Mosquito, Red Pheasant, Little Pine, Beardy, One Arrow or
Whitecap, politically supported the Rebellion. All were
drawn into the conflict by circumstances beyond their personal
control. In all, less than 5 percent of the Indian population
of the North-West was involved.
The original proposal to disallow rebel Indians from
leaving their reserves without a pass soon became a measure
applied to all Indians. In approving this plan, Sir John
A. Macdonald was aware that he was contravening the treaties.
He noted:
Mr. Dewdney thinks that the pass system can be generally
introduced in July. If so, it is in the highest degree desirable.
As to the disloyal Bands, this should be carried out as
a consequence of their disloyalty. The system should be
introduced in the loyal Bands as well and the advantage
of the change pressed upon them. But no punishment for breaking
bounds could be inflicted and in the case of resistance
on the grounds of Treaty rights should not be insisted on.The
measures taken against Indians, in particular those restricting
them to reserves, were measures which would have a profound
effect on subsequent Indian developments. What little influence
Indian people had over their own lives was removed, and
Indian people became vulnerable to government whim, manipulation
and mismanagement.
It was regrettable that Sir John A. Macdonald, who was
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs and Prime Minister,
never once bothered to visit the people over whom he had
charge during the eight critical years he held office, from
1879 to 1887.
Had the Indian people been able to retain their freedom
of movement, things might have turned out much differently.
Big Bear and other Indian leaders might have met Sir John
A. Macdonald in 1885. Nationally, efforts to form the League
of Indians of Canada in the 1920s and the North American
Indian Brotherhood in the 1940s would have been more successful
and probably would have received the bulk of their strength
from the prairies. Indian political development in Canada
was probably put back by two generations.
The Rebellion has left a legacy of a century of suspicions
about Indian political abilities and loyalties, and misconceptions
about the validity of Indian treaties.
In concluding, I would say that a clear understanding
of the Indian view of the 1885 Uprising is the least that
can be done to right the blunders of the past.

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