close window
Part B: The Indian View of the 1885 Uprising

By A. Blair Stonechild.

Indian Treaties Were a Commitment To Peace
In order to more clearly understand the Indian attitude at the time of the Rebellion, one has to look back to the period prior to the signing of the treaties. Indian Nations waged tremendous battles against each other as a result of inter-tribal conflicts created by the expansion of the fur trade. In some battles between the Cree and the Blackfoot, such as that on the Oldman River in 1870, several hundred warriors were killed. An even greater killer -- the epidemics -- wiped out over half of the tribes in some outbreaks. The result of all this was the drastic depopulation of the Indian Nations, and an increasing awareness among Indian leaders that their Nations had to come to grips with a very fundamental and real issue -- that of survival.
Because of these experiences a strong peace movement began to develop among the Indian Nations. One famous peacemaker was the Cree Chief Maskipitoon, who strove to mend relations between the Cree and the Blackfoot during the 1860s. He eventually fell victim to a misguided warrior’s bullet. The adoption of the Cree Poundmaker by the Blackfoot Chief Crowfoot was another important development in the cementing of peaceful relations between the two Nations.
It was because of this sentiment for peace that Indian leaders were receptive to the signing of treaties in the 1870s. Not only had Indians never been at war with whites in the North-West, but they also sought to prevent such as thing from ever happening. Treaty Six stated, “they will maintain peace and good order between each other, and also between themselves and others of Her Majesty’s subjects.” To Indian Nations, that was one of the most important principles of the treaty.
For Indians, the signing of treaties was far more than a political act -- it was also a sacred act. By the ceremony of smoking the Sacred Pipe, the Indian people pledged before the Creator that they would uphold the treaties. As Senator John Tootoosis puts it, “We signed an agreement with the Crown, with the Queen not to fight any more. We were to live in peace. We had to live up to this Treaty. We promised in the name of the Creator to keep the Treaty. The Indian people feared offending the Creator.” If the treaty was ever broken, it would not be the Indian people who broke it first.
Around the time of the Rebellion, white people did not fully appreciate the commitment of the Indian people. They had the perception that Indian people were no more than hunters and warriors. When the Marquis of Lorne, Queen Victoria’s son-in-law, met Poundmaker in 1881, he expected to hear many war stories, and was surprised that instead he heard mainly about the spiritual and political ideas of the Indian people.
The Solutions to Treaty Problems Would Be Political
The Indian leadership was aware that there were serious shortcomings in the implementation of the treaties. In the Councils of the political leaders the focus of attention was on the dissatisfaction being experienced by those Indians settling on reserves. During those days of “The Time of the Great Hunger,” Indians were seeing few of the benefits promised them under the treaty. The meager rations provided to them did little to stop the loss of life. Between 1880 and 1885 the Indian population dropped from 32,549 to 20,170 -- a death rate of nearly 10 percent per year.
At the Duck Lake Council, held in early August of 1884, Indian leaders presented a list of eighteen specific treaty grievances including complaints about untamed horses and cows, inadequate rations, poor implements, lack of schools and medical assistance and general dissatisfaction with government measures. The report on their presentation stated “that requests for redress of their grievances have been again and again made without effect. They are glad that the young men have not resorted to violent measures to gain it. That it is almost too hard for them to bear the treatment received at the hands of the government after its ‘sweet promises’ made in order to get their country from them. They now fear that they are going to be cheated. They will wait until next summer to see if this council has the desired effect, failing which they will take measures to get what they desire. (The proposed ‘measures’ could not be elicited, but a suggestion of the idea of war was repudiated.)”
One measure being proposed by the Chiefs was a meeting of the Grand Council to be held on Little Pine’s Reserve in 1885. The Blackfoot would be invited to attend. Once a united position was agreed upon, a delegation of Chiefs would travel to Ottawa where it was believed someone with sufficient authority could make some changes.
Thus, the Indian people were charting their own course of action to deal with Indian problems. It was a plan which called for concerted political action, and under in any outbreak of violence would be viewed as an undesirable course of events.
The Spread of The Rebellion Tests Indian Loyalties
Following the outbreak of hostilities at Duck Lake, Riel, attempting to spark a Territory-wide insurrection, sent messengers to many reserves urging the Indians to join him. The response of most Indian leaders was to send messages to government authorities reaffirming their loyalty.
On 28 March 1885, a delegation of Touchwood Chiefs sent a message expressing “to his Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor and through him to the Governor-General, their loyalty to their Great Mother the Queen, and further wish to express their disapproval of the course of action pursued by those at the head of the present struggle.”
At a meeting called by Riel’s messengers at the Crooked Lakes Reserves, the Indians decided to remain loyal. Chief Kahkewistahaw made the following statement: “Agent, you remember the time I promised I would go to my reserve. I also said that I and my young men’s fighting days were over. I stick to those words no matter what may be done up north, we will remain on our reserves and attend to our work.”
Chief Piapot, the main Cree in the South wrote: “It is eleven years since I gave up fighting. When I took the government Treaty I touched the pen not to interfere with the whiteman and the whiteman not to interfere with me.”
Also on 28 March, Indian Agent Rae visited old Chief Mosquito on his reserve a few miles south of Battleford and received the Chief’s assurances that the Band would remain loyal. At about the same time, Riel’s messengers were visiting both Mosquito’s and Red Pheasant’s Reserves.
On Mosquito’s Reserve a Band member named Itka had been grieving over the death of his daughter, which he blamed on Farm Instructor Payne. A few days before her death, Payne had physically thrown the frail girl out of his house. Itka decided the time was opportune for revenge, went to the Farm Instructor’s home and shot him dead. Relatives of Itka, convinced that Canadian authorities would conduct an American-style retaliation against them, decided that their best alternative would be to seek refuge. They went to the house of Barney Tremont, a local farmer, demanding horses. When Tremont refused, he was shot and killed.
While these events were occurring on the Mosquito Reserve, Chiefs Poundmaker and Little Pine, concerned about the outbreak at Duck Lake, decided to travel to Battleford to express their loyalty to the Queen. Poundmaker also decided that at the same time he would take the opportunity to attempt to gain government concessions for food and other treaty provisions. Hearing this, most of the Band member decided to accompany their Chiefs in the hope that they would be present for the distributions.
The two Chiefs and their followers met with Chief Young Sweetgrass on 28 March at the Sweetgrass Reserve, about ten miles west of Battleford. Farm Instructors Jefferson and Craig debated whether or not they should accompany the Indians at Battleford, but decided against it for fear of disapproval by their superiors, who wanted Indians to remain on their reserves.
Also present was Peter Ballantyne, who was operating as a spy for Edgar Dewdney. He checked on the Indians’ plans and came to the conclusion that their intentions were peaceful.
Meanwhile in Battleford, rumours were rampant that Poundmaker was approaching to attack the town.
Top
Battleford -- The Siege That Never Occurred
When Poundmaker and his followers reached Battleford on the morning of 30 March, they were surprised to find the town deserted. The residents had taken refuge in the North West Mounted Police Barracks on the other side of the river.
Poundmaker sent a message to the fort stating his peaceful intentions and requesting a meeting with Indian Agent Rae. Rae refused to leave the fort, but Peter Ballantyne and Hudson’s Bay Company Factor McKay came out to meet Poundmaker. McKay agreed to release food to the Indians from the Hudson’s Bay Company store.
Governor Dewdney was sent a telegram stating, “Indians willing to go back to reserves tomorrow if their demands for clothing are met. Strongly urge you to deal with them as we are not in a position at present to begin an Indian war.” Dewdney later replied, although too late, that he would meet with Poundmaker.
There were other groups who had arrived at Battleford -- some of the Stoneys from Mosquito’s Reserve, and Riel’s agitators from Duck Lake. As Ballantyne and McKay were returning to the fort after failing to arrange talks with Rae, some of the Metis took shots at them. Later that day, some of the Stoneys began to break into stores and loot. Poundmaker and Little Pine tried to restrain their followers from looting, but with only limited success.
By the next morning. Poundmaker and most of his followers were on their way home. The strain of the troubles was too great for Little Pine, who had been suffering from temporary blindness and other symptoms of starvation. He died on 31 March 1885, a few miles before reaching his reserve. Little Pine’s death, and that of old Chief Red Pheasant a few days earlier, meant that Poundmaker had become the main Indian leader in the Battleford area.
Accounts of the siege were blown well out of proportion. The telegraph line had not been tampered with, allowing the Battleford residents to send out daily messages of alarm. During the twenty-five days before relief troops arrived, the five hundred settlers barricaded in the fort were even able to obtain water safely from their only source a mile outside the barracks. According to one observer, “one solitary individual -- the cook -- had the temerity to continue in residence at the old government house. He had many visitors that day, gave them to eat, when they departed without harming him.”
Interestingly enough, another observer reported, “They [the Indians] had been too hurried to take much; the principal looting was the work of white men. As soon as the coast was clear in the morning they came over in detachments and finished what the Indians had begun. They made a clean sweep.”
Not the least of these raiders was Farm Instructor Craig, who “devoted his time and attention to looting the stores and houses that had been broken into by the Indians, but his enterprise was frustrated by persistent robbing of his ten whenever he left it.”
Several observers were of the opinion that looting would never have taken place had the townspeople not deserted their houses and stores. By and large, the “siege” was a fabricated event.
Top
Big Bear’s Misfortune Peaks At Frog Lake
Big Bear had become the principal leader of the northern Plains Cree in 1877, following the death of Chief Sweetgrass. Unfortunately, he had a poor relationship with the government. One of the tactics used by the government during treaty negotiations had been to fail to send notification of the meetings to Indian leaders who were considered difficult to deal with. Such was the reason for Big Bear’s arrival at Fort Pitt a day after Treaty Six had been signed.
During a speech objecting to the lack of consultation with the several Bands he was representing, Big Bear said:
I have come off to speak for the different bands that are out on the Plains. It is no small matter we were to consult about. I expected the Chiefs here would have waited until I arrived… I heard the Governor was to come and I said I shall see him; when I see him I will request that he will save me from that which I most dread, that is: the rope to be about my neck, it was not given to us by the Great Spirit that the red man or the white man should shed each other’s blood.

The official treaty interpreter had already left and Reserved McKay, whose mastery of Cree was far from perfect, misinterpreted Big Bear’s words to mean a fear of hanging (ayhahkotit). Big Bear was actually saying that he did not wish to lose his freedom, like an animal with a rope around its neck (aysakapaykinit). Nevertheless, the impression created of Big Bear was that he was evil and cowardly, an image which would haunt him up to his final days.
Steadfast in his belief that he could get a revision of Treaty Six, similar to those of Treaties One and Two, Big Bear held out from signing Treaty Six longer than any other Chief. He was forced to sign six years later, when it became clear that his Band members would starve unless they obtained government rations.
In 1884, after years of urging, Big Bear agreed to choose a reserve next to Poundmaker’s. Deputy Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs Lawrence Vankoughnet, a man who disliked Big Bear, vetoed the plan, suggesting that it would not be a good idea to have too many “idle Indians” in one area. Instead, Vankoughnet warned Big Bear to take a reserve already set aside near Fort Pitt -- a location which Big Bear had already rejected -- or face a cut-off of rations during the winter of 1884-85. Big Bear refused to comply.
An unhealthy blend of ingredients was being mixed. Many members of Big Bear’s Band, including his son Imases and the War Chief Wandering Spirit, were becoming frustrated with the state of affairs. Compounding the problem was the presence of Indian Agent Quinn, a man known to have been abusive to Indians, and Farm Instructor Delaney, who had been accused of violating Indian women. The government was aware of the unpopularity of these men with the Indians, and had been planning to relocate them.
News of the Duck Lake fight did not reach Agent Quinn until late on 31 March 1885. The next day, 1 April or “Big Lie Day,” as the Indians called it, Quinn summoned Big Bear’s Band members to inform them of the incident. Imases, speaking on behalf of Big Bear, who was out hunting for food for the Band, replied:
They have already risen; we knew about it before you. They have beaten the soldiers in the first fight, killing many. We do not wish to join the half-breeds, but we are afraid. We wish to stay here and prove ourselves the friends of the white man
Imases then asked Quinn to provide rations to the Band. Quinn refused, saying he would have to speak to Big Bear first.
Later that day Big Bear returned empty-handed from hunting and led a delegation to request rations from Quinn. Big Bear was upset at his refusal. Imases, hoping to win a compromise, suggested that Quinn give the Indians food for a feast as a gift to the Band, and he would not then have to call it rations. Quinn, however, had decided to give them nothing.
That night, unknown to Big Bear, Wandering Spirit and several members of the Rattler’s Warrior Society held a dance in secret. As dawn broke some twenty armed warriors came to the Frog Lake community, waking up the residents and herding them to Quinn’s house.
That morning, when asked for food and other supplies, Quinn was willing to comply, and various Indians were allowed to have goods from the stores.
That day was Holy Thursday, and two priests who had come for the occasion asked permission to hold church services. The hostages were all allowed to attend church. By this time Big Bear had learned of the trouble and had joined the whites in the church to ensure that nothing worse occurred.
As the church service progressed the noise outside increased. The warriors had broken into the stores and had found wine, spirits and painkillers. As these were consumed the shouting and yelling of the warriors grew louder, and they eventually began to enter the church and disrupt the service.
Big Bear decided to leave the church and begin warning the other residents of the community, who were in their houses, to leave in case trouble broke out. He was at Mrs. Simpson’s house when he heard shot. The church service had been cut short.
Wandering Spirit, the War Chief, ordered the whites to go to the Indian camp, a short distance away, Quinn refused to move, and after repeated warnings Wandering Spirit shot him dead.
Big Bear ran outside, yelling at the warriors to stop it, but it was too late. Urged on by the prompting of Wandering Spirit, the warriors soon killed eight white men.
Perhaps the violence would have been averted had Quinn simply given food to the starving Band the day before. It did not appear that the Band was thinking seriously of any sort of insurrection at that time. Even on the following day, had Quinn been liberal with Indian requests for food and simply complied with the warriors’ orders, it is possible that bloodshed could have been averted entirely. The presence of alcohol and painkillers can be the only explanation for the gruesomeness of the murders. In Indian thinking, it was considered dishonourable and cowardly to kill an unarmed man for no reason at all.
Big Bear’s hopes of peaceful dealings with government had all but vanished, yet he distinguished himself by protecting the lives of the remaining white captives, and by preventing greater bloodshed at Fort Pitt.
The warriors moved to seize the provisions at Fort Pitt on 14 April. Big Bear, no longer in control of the Band, argued for an attempt to arrange a peaceful surrender of the Fort. He held the warriors back for one night, and the next day persuaded forty-four civilians to surrender to the Band. With this achieved, the North West Mounted Police detachment had little reason to stay, and was allowed to escape down the river by boat. Big Bear’s vigilance was an important factor in preventing any deaths among them.
Top The Unprovoked Attack on Cutknife Hill
Although Poundmaker had been forced to relinquished power to the warrior society, he was influential in maintaining calm among the Indians camped at Cutknife Hill following the so-called siege of Battleford.
Lieutenant-Colonel Otter arrived at Battleford on 24 April 1885 with close to 550 troops. Also, part of his arsenal was a Gatling gun sent for demonstration by the United States Army
Otter’s troops were sorely disappointed at not seeing action on arrival at Battleford. Otter had been ordered by Middleton to stay at Battleford and guard the townspeople. Sensing the unrest of his troops, and seeing the opportunity to gain personal glory, Otter wired Dewdney, “I proposed taking part of my force at once to punish Poundmaker leaving 100 men to garrison Battleford. Great depredations committed. Immediate decisive action necessary. Do you approve?”
Dewdney, probably after consulting the Prime Minister, wired Otter with approval.
Otter planned to surprise Poundmaker and force him to surrender. On the evening of 28 April, he left Battleford for Cutknife Hill. Otter’s timing was good, and he arrived at the foot of Cutknife Hill at 5:15 the following morning. Fortunately for Poundmaker’s camp, an old man, Jacob With the Long Hair, was awake and heard the sounds of the approaching soldiers. He ran through the camp shouting warnings.
At that point Otter ordered his guns to open fire on the sleeping camp. The barrage knocked over some tipis, but all of the occupants managed to scramble to safety.
Some of the Indian warriors ran out to confront the troops while others began shooting from nearby coulees. According to Robert Jefferson, an eyewitness, “Not more than 50 [Indians] altogether, had taken part in the battle. This was excusable since few were armed,…” As the battle continued throughout the morning, Otter realized that his troops were in a vulnerable position and were slowly being surrounded. Just before noon, he ordered his men to retreat.
The warriors wanted to pursue Otter. Knowing the land like the backs of their hands and gaining the advantage of nightfall, the warriors could have inflicted heavy casualties on the tiring soldiers. Poundmaker refused to agree, maintaining that while the Indians were right in defending themselves on their land, it would be wrong to go on the offensive.
There had been a split among the people at Cutknife Hill. On the one side was the pro-Riel faction consisting of the Metis agitators and the Stoney warriors. On the other side were those led by Poundmaker who wanted to have as little as possible to do with the Rebellion. Poundmaker had tried to lead his followers west towards the hilly country around Devil’s Lake, with plans to eventually take refuge near Crowfoot, but the warriors and Metis prevented them from leaving.
Poundmaker was essentially being used as a spokesman by the belligerent faction. An example of this was a letter to Riel dictated by Riel’s sympathizers but bearing the “signatures” of Poundmaker and several other Indians. Poundmaker’s lack of verbal or written knowledge of either French or English put him at a great disadvantage. The fact was that Poundmaker was not in control, and the insinuation of support for Riel contained in the letter was out of character with his actions. That letter later became the main piece of evidence used in convicting Poundmaker.
Following the Battle of Cutknife Hill, it was decided that it was no longer safe to remain on the reserve. When the pro-Riel faction decided to join Riel at Batoche, Poundmaker attempted to lead his followers west, away from trouble. The dispute nearly led to bloodshed, but Poundmaker’s poorly armed followers relented. Poundmaker’s lack of cooperation and additional efforts to break away from the camp slowed the Indians’ progress to Batoche by several days.
Poundmaker’s stalling tactics saved many Indian lives, for as they neared Batoche on 14 May, they received news that Middleton’s army had just defeated the Metis. After some discussion, Poundmaker sought terms of surrender from Middleton; when refused, he surrendered unconditionally at Battleford on 26 May 1885.
Poundmaker’s plan to abandon his reserve and seek refuge by moving to an isolated area was not unique. A significant number of Band members, from reserves such as Mosquito’s, Red Pheasant’s, One Arrow’s and Thunderchild’s, went north to avoid any involvement in the troubles.
During this period, Sir John A. Macdonald was attempting to exploit tribal differences by inquiring about sending Indian patrols against Poundmaker and Big Bear. He wrote Dewdney on 29 March 1885, “I understand that the Crees dread the Blackfeet like the devil. Now a corps of scouts under Crowfoot might be formed.” Because of the relationship between Crowfoot and Poundmaker this plan never succeeded, despite repeated requests from the Prime Minister.
Top At Batoche Against Their Will
Part of the strategy of Riel’s Provisional Government was based on the belief that they held influence over the Indians. In a note to the English half-breeds on 22 March 1885, they wrote, “We are sure that if the English and French half-breeds unite well in this time of crisis, not only can we control the Indians, but we will also have their weight on our side.” With Indians outnumbering both Metis and whites in the North-West, their support in a conflict could be critical, but the presumption of Indian involvement was made without consultation with any of the Indian leaders.
On 18 March 1885, one day before Riel’s proclamation of his Provisional Government, that process of “controlling” Indians began. About forty Riel supports arrived at One Arrow’s Reserve, approximately two miles east of Batoche, taking the Indian Agent and Farm Instructor prisoner. The next day, One Arrow and fifteen of his men came to Batoche. As One Arrow testified at his trial,
I am an old man now… I was taken to the place, Batoche’s, to join Riel by Gabriel. I did not take myself to the place. They took me there. I could not say how many there were of them that took me there, but there was quite a number of them…. So when I went there and got there I was taken prisoner.
Witnesses testified that One Arrow was seen in the area during both the Duck Lake fight and the Battle of Batoche. In his defence, One Arrow testified that,
All that was said against me was thrown upon me falsely. I did not take up my gun with the intention to shoot at any man. I was on the brink of the hill the whole day, and I had my gun there, but, of course, not with the intention to use the gun against any man, and when I saw the white men coming down, I ran down the hill too, and ran off.

On 10 April 1885, around twenty Riel supporters arrived at Whitecap’s Reserve, a few miles south of Saskatoon. Whitecap, the Chief of a Band of refugee American Dakota, had resisted Riel’s overtures two weeks previous. Before the Metis began forcing Whitecap and twenty of his men towards Batoche, Whitecap managed to send a message to a white friend in Saskatoon, Gerald Willoughby, asking him for assistance. When the group reached Saskatoon, a group of nine citizens tried to persuade the Metis to allow Whitecap to return to his reserve. Outnumbered, their attempt was unsuccessful.
When Whitecap arrived at Batoche, he was appointed the only Indian member of Riel’s council on internal matters, but because he understood neither French nor Cree, he attended only one meeting.
Whitecap’s men were seen at the battles of Fish Creek and Batoche. Testimony provided by the main prosecution witnesses showed that Whitecap could not be positively identified as having been among the several old Indian men at Batoche, but it was mainly because of the evidence showing that Whitecap had been coerced to fight that all charges against him were dropped.
Top
The Indian Trials: Unwarranted Punishment
Poundmaker, despite evidence of his efforts to maintain peace, was convicted of treason-felony on the basis of the letter to Riel bearing his name. Speaking after hearing the guilty verdict, Poundmaker categorically denied any wrongdoing, saying, “Everything that is bad has been laid against me this summer, there is nothing of it true.” On hearing that he was sentenced to three years at Stony Mountain, Poundmaker declared, “I would prefer to be hung at once than to be in that place.” Poundmaker was released in the spring of 1886, largely because of public sympathy, but he died in June after making a trek on foot to visit his adoptive father, Crowfoot.
Although the evidence was strongly in favour of Big Bear, it appeared that the outcome of the trial was predetermined, and he was sentenced to the same three year term as Poundmaker. There was less public sympathy for Big Bear, and he was not released until 3 February 1887, after a medical report confirmed his badly deteriorating health. He had no Band to return to, as it had been dispersed by the government. Most of his familiy he would never see, as they were fugitives in the United States. With his heart broken and no cause to live for, he died on 18 January 1888.
When Chief One Arrow heard the charges of treason-felony translated to him, it came out in Cree as “knocking off the Queen’s bonnet and stabbing her in the behind with a sword.” This moved One Arrow to ask the interpreter if he was drunk. The conviction of One Arrow was based on his presence at the battle sites, and his account of how he came to be there was ignored.
One Arrow was not so fortunate as to make it back to his own reserve. He was released from Stony Mountain Prison on 21 April 1886, and died four days later at Archbishop Tache’s residence in St. Boniface. He was baptised just before his death and lies in St. Boniface cemetery in an unmarked grave.
In order to save money, a decision was made not to hold all of the Rebellion trials at Regina. Several of them were held in Battleford instead. The atmosphere in Battleford was not hospitable towards Indians, as an editorial in the Saskatchewan Herald on 23 April 1885 shows:
The petted Indians are the bad ones. The Stonies have been treated as being of a superior race, and are the first to shed the blood of their benefactors. Poundmaker has been petted and feted, and stands in the front rank as a raider. Little Pine, bribed to come north and kept in comfort, hastens to the carnage. Big Bear, who has for years enjoyed the privilege of eating of the bread of idleness, shows his gratitude by killing his priests and his best friends in cold blood. Little Poplar, a non-treaty Indian, has been liberally supplied with provisions and other necessaries and thus enabled to spend all his time in travelling up and down the land plotting mischief and preparing for this season’s carnival of ruin. The petted Indians have proved the bad ones, and this gives weight to the old adage that the only good Indians are the dead ones.

Judge Rouleau, who would pass the judgements, had narrowly missed being murdered along with Farm Instructor Payne, and was also bitter about the burning of his mansion at Battleford. He was known before the trials to advocate harsh punishment as a deterrent to future rebellious acts by Indians.
The eight Indians eventually hanged were at a disadvantage. They knew nothing of the legal system and had no legal counsel or other advice. No effective defence of any sort was mounted which might have created sympathy for the defendants -- for example, the reality of their starvation under Indian Affairs administration, or the excesses brought on by alcohol and drugs at the Frog Lake massacre.
Several Indian Elders are certain that at least one of the Indians, Man-Without-Blood, was wrongly hanged for the shooting of Farm Instructor Payne. They claim it was done by the other Stoney, Man-With-a-Black-Blanket. According to one story.
The two Stoney young men were arrested also. They were accused of killing the farm instructor and they were both arrested. And at that time people were very respectable. There was a lot of respect for the older people. Now the one who did not kill the Indian Agent, he was the one who was accused by his partner. So the one who was accused of killing the farm instructor, when he went to trial, the officer asked him, “Is this true what you did? Or is it not true?” He replied, “Maybe it is true, and maybe it is not.” And he really had nothing to do with it, he didn’t shoot the Indian Agent. So when he said, “Maybe they are telling the truth,” that was accepted as his plea, as telling the truth. So he got the blame for the death of the farm instructor. So he was one of them that got hanged. They weren’t They weren’t going to sympathize with him or feel sorry for him.

According to another story, “It’s him who killed the ration feeder. And the one who followed him shot the dog. He was the one who got hung instead, said my father, the one who shot the dog. He did not want to report his partner.”
No clear evidence of committing murder was shown against Iron Body and Little Bear, two of the six Indians tried for their role in the Frog Lake massacre. They were hanged on the basis that, by aiding and abetting the others, they were equally guilty.
Four Sky Thunder received a sentence of fourteen years for burning down the Frog Lake church. Another Indian, whose only wrongdoing was having been seen with Big Bear, was sentenced to six years in prison.
Several Indians were never brought to justice. Among them was Man-Who-Speaks-Our-Language, who nearly caused the outbreak of fighting with the North West Mounted Police on Poundmaker’s Reserve in 1884, and was responsible for some of the killings at Frog Lake.
The hangings at Battleford took place on 27 November 1885. Indians from several reserves were there to witness the event.
A new section was built at Stony Mountain Penitentiary to accommodate the twenty-five Indians and eighteen Metis sentenced to prison. Several of the Indians never returned to their reserves, and are buried in the St. Boniface cemetery.
Top The Aftermath: Suppression of Indians
The government saw the rebellion as an opportunity to achieve a goal which had eluded it since 1870, that of gaining total control over Indians. In July of 1885, Assistant Commissioner Hayter Reed drew up a list of fifteen recommendations on actions to be taken following the Rebellion. Among these were the following:
The leaders of the Teton Sioux who fought against the troops should be hanged and the rest be sent out of the country;
Big Bear’s band should either be broken up and scattered among other bands or be given a reserve adjacent to that at Onion Lake;
One Arrow’s band should be joined with that of Beardy and Okemasis and their reserve surrendered;
No annuity money should be now paid any bands that rebelled, or to any individuals that joined the insurgents;
The tribal system should be abolished in so far as is compatible with the Treaty;
All half-breeds, members of rebel bands, although not shown to have taken any active part in the rebellion, should have their names erased from the pay sheets;
No rebel Indians should be allowed off the Reserves without a pass signed by an Indian Departmental official; and
All Indians who have not during the late troubles been disloyal or troublesome should be treated as heretofore.

Reed had also prepared a list of every Indian Band in the North-West and had identified twenty-eight disloyal Bands. In his enthusiasm he erroneously included several reserves, such as Sweetgrass and Thunderchild, which had been very loyal. Most of the others had actually been loyal, with only the odd individual implicated in the Rebellion. Of all the Bands identified as disloyal in the Rebellion, it is clear that none of the Chiefs, whether Big Bear, Poundmaker, Mosquito, Red Pheasant, Little Pine, Beardy, One Arrow or Whitecap, politically supported the Rebellion. All were drawn into the conflict by circumstances beyond their personal control. In all, less than 5 percent of the Indian population of the North-West was involved.
The original proposal to disallow rebel Indians from leaving their reserves without a pass soon became a measure applied to all Indians. In approving this plan, Sir John A. Macdonald was aware that he was contravening the treaties. He noted:
Mr. Dewdney thinks that the pass system can be generally introduced in July. If so, it is in the highest degree desirable. As to the disloyal Bands, this should be carried out as a consequence of their disloyalty. The system should be introduced in the loyal Bands as well and the advantage of the change pressed upon them. But no punishment for breaking bounds could be inflicted and in the case of resistance on the grounds of Treaty rights should not be insisted on.The measures taken against Indians, in particular those restricting them to reserves, were measures which would have a profound effect on subsequent Indian developments. What little influence Indian people had over their own lives was removed, and Indian people became vulnerable to government whim, manipulation and mismanagement.

It was regrettable that Sir John A. Macdonald, who was Superintendent General of Indian Affairs and Prime Minister, never once bothered to visit the people over whom he had charge during the eight critical years he held office, from 1879 to 1887.
Had the Indian people been able to retain their freedom of movement, things might have turned out much differently. Big Bear and other Indian leaders might have met Sir John A. Macdonald in 1885. Nationally, efforts to form the League of Indians of Canada in the 1920s and the North American Indian Brotherhood in the 1940s would have been more successful and probably would have received the bulk of their strength from the prairies. Indian political development in Canada was probably put back by two generations.
The Rebellion has left a legacy of a century of suspicions about Indian political abilities and loyalties, and misconceptions about the validity of Indian treaties.
In concluding, I would say that a clear understanding of the Indian view of the 1885 Uprising is the least that can be done to right the blunders of the past.

http://www.smokylake.com/history/native/indianview.htm

close window