The operations in Belgium in August and September, 1914, are overshadowed by the more spectacular struggle which opened on August 28rd at Mons. The dramas of the retreat from Mons, of the Marne and of the Aisne, engrossed the attention of the world at the time, and have since almost monopolized the interest of historians. Not till after the Aisne, when the race for the sea began, did the eyes of Europe turn to the Channel ports, for which the struggle seemed only then to be beginning. On this reading, even the siege of Antwerp was an isolated episode, in which we were unwise to intervene, an irrelevant side issue which should not have distracted our attention from the battle of main armies.
Macaulay's schoolboy might welcome this interpretation of events, for it would spare his overburdened memory the recollection of many minor operations controversial in their inception, confusing in their brevity, and of an influence in the campaign as a whole which, if not disputable, is at any rate disputed.
Yet the determining triumph of the Allies in the first three months of the war did not consist only in the very important facts that Paris was saved and that the battle front was stabilized on a line running North and South, rather than on a line running East and West, but in the fact that, as late as October lOth, the Belgian coastline was still in our possession, and that we were thus enabled permanently to retain the more important Channel ports. Had the ports fallen in August or September, Paris could not have been saved. Had the Germans reached the Belgian coast in the first days of October, our victories on the Marne and Aisne would have lost their strategic significance; in the outflanking race northwards we should have been beaten. Neither the French ports nor the Belgian coast could be directly defended by our original expeditionary force, or by our allies. Why were they not seized by the enemy? How did it happen that the greatest opportunity ever offered to the Germans on the Western front was missed ? The truth is that the safety of the Channel ports was an essential of British naval strategy, and that it is, in great part, to the efforts of the Admiralty, in co-operation with the War Office and the French General Headquarters staff, that we must look for the explanation of the inaction of the German High Command.
In their efforts the Allies were assisted undeniably by the caution of the leaders of the enemy forces in Belgium, but the salient and determining fact is that the enemy were given reason for caution, and persistently encouraged to exercise it. Had it been otherwise the Channel ports would not have been saved.
The formation of the Advanced Base Force by the Admiralty, on the outbreak of war, was the initial step taken by them for the defence of these ports. The second step was taken on August 25th when the Marine Brigade under Brigadier-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B., was ordered to Ostend. The move was, as we have seen, prompted by no sudden vagary of the the First Lord of the Admiralty, but by the news that, on the evening of the 24th August, German patrols had approached Ostend. The Marine Brigade, though hardly at the time capable of offensive action (the battalions had been returned from camp load to their divisions for further training only a few days before), was embarked on the morning of the 26th, the Chatham Battalion on four Channel Fleet battleships under Rear-Admiral Currey, and the Plymouth Battalion in four Channel Fleet battleships under Admiral Bethell. These last (Vengeance, Goliath, Prince George and Caesar), with the light cruiser Proserpine, six destroyers and three monitors, formed the covering force.
Owing to difficulties of co-ordinating the movement of the different squadrons, bad weather and delays off Ostend, the force was not landed in its entirety till the morning of the 28th.
Sir George Aston's orders were to take up a defensive position round Ostend, keeping close to the coast, so as to enjoy the protection of the Fleet, and to facilitate re-embarkation should , events necessitate it. His force proceeded to entrench on the perimeter of the town, forming an outpost line, with bicycle patrols linking up the positions. The force was not mobile; it had no cavalry, no supply train, no engineers and no artillery; moreover, the lie of the land deprived it of the intended support of the guns of the fleet*. It was capable, however, of doing what was required, for its presence meant that the enemy must send a properly equipped force against Ostend if they wished to occupy it. Meanwhile, it provided an effective covering force to the landing of any French or Belgian troops who might be sent to garrison it, or to take the offensive against the enemy's communications. In fact, a very considerable force of somewhat disorganized Belgian troops from Havre were landed on August 31st under cover of this Brigade, and, had the situation developed as was feared on the 25th, there is no doubt that more effective forces would have followed. In short, the Allies retained the option of defending the town should they so decide.
By the end of August, however, the intelligence reports made it fairly clear that no immediate descent on the Channel ,Ports need be feared, and, partly for this reason, partly to free the Naval covering force for more urgent tasks, the Marine Brigade was suddenly ordered on the night of the 31st - lst to re-embark. Though the force was deployed on a seven-mile front, and two hundred tons of baggage and stores had to be loaded on the transports, the task was accomplished in just over twelve hours. Reporting on the operations as a whole, the Admiralty stated that "the promptitude with which the Brigade was embarked, landed and re-embarked was highly creditable." Considering the limitations of the force in the matter of training and organization the tribute was well earned.
Sir Julian Corbett speaks of this expedition - it was really hardly more than an excursion - as having had little "material effect on the campaign."** As a statement of fact no one will quarrel with this verdict. The measure was one of precaution. When the threat to Ostend did not materialize, the precaution of providing cover for a landing of trained troops at that point became superfluous, and the Marine Brigade was naturally withdrawn.
* Corbett, "Naval Operations," Vol. I., page 98.
** Corbett, "Naval Operations," Vol. I., page 124.
page 15
By the middle of September the situation had profoundly changed - for the better, as far as concerned the operations of our own expeditionary force, but for the worse, as regards the threat to the Channel ports. These were now clearly menaced, from two quarters. The Germans in their advance had, according to their original plan, left behind in Belgium a strong force under General Von Beseler to engage and defeat the Belgian Field Army, and, having done so, to lay siege to Antwerp. This force (consisting of the 3rd Reserve Corps, the 4th "Ersatz" Division, a "Marine Division", three "Landwehr" Brigades and a strong quota of army troops and siege artillery) had by now taken the field, and the Belgian Field Army was falling back on Antwerp. In view of the Belgian losses and of the numerical superiority of the German containing forces, there would have been reason to fear for the safety of the ports, even if there had been no question of co-operation between Von Beseler and the German main armies. But, in fact, such cooperation was just what there was reason to fear. On September 15th the left flank of the main allied battle line was at Noyon. The German positions on the Aisne had proved impregnable to frontal attack, and the only way in which a further allied advance could be effected was by repeating against the German right the tactics of the Marne. There was, however, little or no hope that the manreuvre, so successful before, would have any similar results. Then, the enemy's right, attacked by Manoury, could not be reinforced. Foch in the centre had seen to that. The result was a rapid and im mediate retreat; the alternative would have been disaster. Now, it was almost certain that any threat to the German right would lead only to a counter turning movement, executed by troops drawn from other parts of the German line. This, as we know, is precisely what happened, and, within a few hours of the opening of the attack near Noyon, it became clear that the op posing armies were so evenly balanced, and so equally served by their communications, that the position would not be stabilized till one army or the other reached the coast. Who would reach the coast first and at what point? If the French ports were to be saved, we must prevent the Junction of the German right and Von Beseler's force until our own left had reached the Belgian coast.
It was in these circumstances that Sir John French drew the attention of the authorities at home to the necessity for safeguarding the Belgian coast*, and that on September I8th** the French Government made a formal request to London for the intervention of a British force, based on Calais or Dunkirk, to demonstrate against the menacing German right. To the British Admiralty, as well as to the War Office, the plan commended itself, for our short experience of St. Nazaire had strengthened the conviction that the Channel ports alone provided a satisfactory base for our growing army overseas. Seldom indeed was the interrelation of naval and military strategy more complete. The military situation required a threat to the German communications: the naval situation made it imperative to relieve the threat to our own. Where, however, were to be found the troops necessary for even the most audacious demonstration against Von Beseler and the German right?
The enterprise and enthusiasm which had raised and equipped the two Naval Brigades in a week was not to be damped by the request to organize a field force in the same time. The Naval Brigades themselves were still immobile. The men were there, but the organization, the training, the mobility were lacking. The Marine Brigade had, however, been reorganized with success: the more elderly reservists had moreover been replaced by younger men (though some of them were only recruits), and the force had enjoyed the benefits of a fortnight's field training. The War Office offered the necessary army troops (including the Oxfordshire Hussars, a famous yeomanry regiment), and a detachment of Royal Engineers. This force was ordered to Dunkirk, and was disembarked by September 21st. Sir George Aston was again in command, with Major Powys Sketchley, R.M.L.I., afterwards, and until his death in the summer of 1916, so well known a figure in the Naval Division as Brigade Major, and Lt.-Colonel H. D. Farquharson as A.A. & Q.M.G.
* For a fuller account see " 1914 " by the Earl of Ypres, 2nd Edition,
pages 155-156.
** Corbett : " Naval Operations," Vol. I., pages 169-170.
page 17
To enable the force to demonstrate over a wide area, and so keep the enemy in doubt as to the size of the concentration, extreme mobility was essential. A force of armoured cars belonging to the R.N.A.S., but manned by two hundred specially selected men of the R.M.A. and R.M.L.I. (fifty from Each Marine Division), under Major Armstrong, R.M.L.I., which Lad been operating independently under Commander Samson at Dunkirk since September 12th*, was placed under Sir George Aston's command; arrangements were made for more cars and motor transport to follow. Among this motor transport were a number of motor omnibuses from London, whose drivers lad been hurriedly enlisted as Royal Marines at Chatham**.
The idea underlying the operations of this heterogeneous force recalls, and was perhaps prompted by, the historic exploits of Stonewall Jackson and Stewart in the Shenandoah Valley. The almost insuperable administrative difficulties created by the despatch of a composite force for which the War Office was not responsible, and which had no regular supply service of its own, marred in some degree the execution of a very promising conception. Things mproved when Major Richardson went over a few days later, and gave the force the benefit of his wider experience of practical administration; but the infantry force remained necessarily almost immobile. The presence in the Marine Brigade of 687 recruits partly accounted for their inactivity: mainly, it was the absence of any reliable information of the enemy move nents which held them to their ground, since, with its ponderous administrative arrangements, the force could not afford a false move.
The armoured cars were, however, faced with no comparable difficulties. Till the composite force arrived, they had been based in Dunkirk, and had patrolled a very wide area, embracing Amiens, Albert, Arras, Courtrai and Ghent. Later, their headquarters were moved to Morbecque near Hazebrouck, from which advanced base patrols, operating in sections of from three to ten cars each, went out continuously searching for German cavalry detachments, and engaging them wherever possible. In one such action near Douai, towards the end of September, Lieut. Williams, R.M.A., was wounded.
* These cars had been sent overseas in the first instance to protect the
R.N.A.S. base at Dunkirk, from which point Commander Samson was operating
gainst the German air bases nearest to England. The employment of armoured
cars was a new departure destined to have very far-reaching results.
** These buses remained in France attached to the Army until the Autumn
of 1915, and were the pioneers of the Army 'bus companies. Their record is
of interest as that of another singularly fruitful and sensible improvisation
in which the Admiralty was first in the field.
page 18
Meanwhile, the Infantry had remained at Dunkirk, except for the Portsmouth Battalion, which had been sent, at the urgent request of the French, to Lille, to cover the withdrawal of a number of isolated French detachments. At the end of the month, however, Sir George Aston was invalided, and Colonel Paris, C.B., R.M.A., was sent out to take his place. He at once (September 27th) moved his headquarters to Cassel, and there concentrated all three battalions of his Brigade, less the recruits whom he left at Dunkirk. Cassel was a commanding position across the Belgian frontier, far better suited to form the advanced base for the more serious operations which seemed now likely to develop; and, by shedding his recruits, Col. Paris further strengthened his force. The dominating facts in the situation on the evening of September 30th were that the main armies in the race for the sea had reached Lens, that the Germans were closing on Antwerp, and that the effects of their bombardment on the outer forts showed that it was only a question of days before these positions would have to be abandoned. The French had, in these circumstances, already offered to send a force of 15,000 men to operate against the flank of the besieging army, if the British Government would co-operate, and Lord Kitchener, through Sir Francis Villiers (British Minister at Brussels), had suggested despatching as soon as possible the 7th and 8rd Cavalry Divisions, if the French support could be relied on. Neither Division (nor indeed the promised French contingent) was ready for immediate service, but till October 2nd the plan held the field.
On that day the situation changed suddenly for the worse. The Germans broke through the outer line of the Antwerp forts, driving the Belgian Field Army back on the line of the Nethe, and the Belgian Government decided to abandon the defence of the position to the fortress troops. This decision was tanta mount - so much can be said with conviction in the light of the happenings on October 9th - to the surrender of the fortress within at most three days, and probably sooner*.
* For a detailed account of the capacity of the fortress troops and of their actual performances on October 8th and 9th, see "La Defense de la position fortifiee d'Anvers en 1914," by Lieut.-Genera1 Deguise, the Governor of Antwerp from September 8th till its surrender.
page 19
The surrender of Antwerp at this juncture would have involved the gravest possible danger of losing the Channel ports; for the junction of Von Beseler and the main German army (by this time at Lille), which must have meant the definite outflanking of the allied line, could hardly then have been prevented. "It was a position which, for naval reasons alone, could not be accepted without an effort to prevent the breakdown of our plans*."
There was one way out of the difficulty, though one only. If the Belgian Government could be induced to modify their decision to withdraw the Field Army, the German plans, which were clearly based on an attack from the East, and not on an enveloping movement culminating (in accordance with the plan prepared in peace time by the German staff) in an attack from the South, would be inevitably delayed for a definite number of days. The reason for this was that the Belgians would have to be driven from the line of the Nethe before the guns could be got into position to bombard the inner forts, the ramparts and the city. Insufficient attention has been paid to this fortunate modification of the German plan, which had so signal an influence on the situation at this date. Yet the reason of it is avowed in the German monograph on this campaign.** Von Beseler was afraid of the menace to his flank, constituted by the presence of allied troops at Ostend and Dunkirk, and the threat of a further intervention. The activities of the Marine Brigade and, perhaps still more, of Commander Samson and his "motor bandits," as they had come to be known, had had in fact precisely the intended effect. Thus the time was now come to take advantage of the delusions under which the enemy was labouring, to bring into operation, if possible, even at the eleventh hour, the plan already in being for the relief of Antwerp; or, in any event, by delaying the fall of the fortress, to perform the more vital service of saving the ports. It was in these circumstances, not to initiate an unpre meditated adventure, but to save from premature abandonment a plan of operation inaugurated at the instance of the French High Command, that the First Lord of the Admiralty undertook, at the request of the Government as conveyed to him by Lord Kitchener. his much discussed visit to Antwerp. on the evening of October 2nd.
* Corbett : " Naval Operations," Vol. I., pages 183-184 ; the "plans " were, of
course, those for the employment of the 7th and 8rd Cavalry Divisions in
conjunction with the French in the relief of Antwerp.
** "Antwerpen, 1914," Erich von Tschischwitz: Berlin, 1921.
page 20
Concrete promises of support were required of Mr. Winston Churchill before the Belgians were induced to hold their hand. But, on the understanding that the Marine Brigade was to go immediately to reinforce the line of the Nethe, that the two Naval Brigades from England would follow at once, and that, if no more substantial aid could be sent, the Belgian Government should be free to review the situation in three days' time (on October 6th), the matter was arranged. In these circumstances, and anticipating Government approval which was subsequently forthcoming, General Paris received orders, early on the morning of October 3rd, to take his infantry to Antwerp.
The Brigade entered Antwerp, without difficulty, by the railway running through Ghent, Lokeren, and St. Nicholas. and detrained at Edeghen, a suburb some four miles due south of the town, at 1 a.m. on October 4th. They moved at 9 a.m. into trenches on the Western bank of the Little Nethe. imme- diately north of Lierre, where they relieved the 21st Belgian Regiment.
The position in which the Brigade found themselves formed, with the line of the Scheldt as far as Termonde, the key to the remaining Antwerp defences; for the line covered the breach made by the enemy in the main (outer) defensive position. Once the river lines had fallen, nothing could save the town from intensive bombardment. On the contrary, while they held, the position was less definitely hopeless than has been imagined. The trouble was that the Belgian Field Army was exhausted, that there was virtually no efficient artillery support for the infantry, and that the trenches, at any rate on the line of the Nethe, were not only inadequate to sustain a fierce bombardment, and without any covered communications, but so sited as not to command the crossings of the river. It is, nevertheless, clear that the forcing of the line of the Nethe and the Scheldt by Termonde was a task to which the enemy would have to devote serious attention, so long as those lines were resolutely defended.
The battle on the Nethe was already in progress when the Marines entered the trenches, on the morning of October 4th, but the line was intact. The forces under General Paris's com- mand consisted, in addition to the Marine Brigade, of the 7th Regt. Belgian Infantry, the Ist Carabineers, some machine-gun detachments of the R.N.A.S. and a detachment of Royal Engineers under Captain Rooke, R.E. The 7th Regiment and the Chatham, Plymouth and Deal Battalions R.M.L.I. took over the front-line trenches, each battalion forming its own local reserve; the 1st Carabineers and the Portsmouth Battalion were in Brigade reserve. October 4th passed quietly; but, during the night of the 4th-5th, the enemy brought up field guns to the opposite bank of the river, and, firing into our advanced trenches at close range, compelled a retirement to the main line of defence, 800 yards further back. At the same time, enemy scouts crossed the river into Lierre, in the sector held by the 7th Belgian Regiment. On the afternoon of the 5th, the enemy achieved a more important success, when they crossed the Great Nethe (which was not under fire from the trenches on the west bank) in force, and drove back the Belgian troops on General Paris's right flank. Later in the afternoon, the position was partially restored, on the initiative of General Paris, the original line of trenches being retaken by the Belgians, in a counter attack "gallantly led by Colonel Tierchon, 2nd Chasseurs*;" but the Germans could not be dislodged from their holding on the west bank of the river. Later, on the same day, the enemy crossed the Lower Nethe north of Lierre - on the left of the sector held by the Deal Battalion.
The situation was at once reviewed by the Belgian General Staff, but it was decided, very late on the evening of the 5th, to fight on, and to make a determined attempt to throw the enemy back across the Nethe. This decision was taken, and the orders consequent on it were issued, without consultation with General Paris. An attack to have had any chance of success would have had to be carefully organized, well supported by artillery , and carried out by fresh troops. As it was, the order for the attack reached General Paris at 1.15 a.m. The troops under his command formed the only body of troops in the line who were not exhausted by previous fighting; but they were also there, primarily, to stiffen the defence, and, in the last resort, to cover a retreat. To risk this small body of troops in a night attack, for which no preparations had been made, seemed in the circumstances impossible. In the result, the attack was carried out by the Belgians alone, and was at first partially successful. By 11 a.m., however, on the 6th, German counter attacks deprived us of our gains, and the line of the Nethe became untenable.
* J.General Paris's dispatch to the Admiralty dated October 3lst, 1914
page 22
General Paris decided at once on a withdrawal to a position intermediate between the river line and the inner forts, and retirement was begun, under a very heavy bombardment, at 11 a.m. This was, superficially, a disappointing issue, the German account goes so far as to express surprise the British and Belgians did not persist further with their counter-attack on the night of the 5th-6th. The facts however, unquestionable. There were insufficient troops to fight, without adequate artillery support, more than a delaying action. Only by keeping his forces, and the Belgian troops under his command, intact, could the game of delay be at all prolonged. In the circumstances, the fact that the enemy did not dare to follow up the retirement, on the morning of the is ample justification for the decision to retire. The salient point was that, at this date, three days after that on which the Belgian Government had determined originally to withdraw field army, the field army was still in being in front of Antwerp, holding a position sufficiently defensible at any rate to give the Germans reason to pause before renewing their advance. The share of General Paris and his force in bringing about this situation was certainly not inconsiderable. It was not on the front held by the Marines that the decisive break-through had taken place.
It will be remembered that the Marine Brigade was not the sum total of the immediate assistance promised by Mr. Winston Churchill. He had also undertaken, subject to the consent of the Cabinet, that the two untrained Naval Brigades from Walmer and Betteshanger should follow at the earliest possible date. This undertaking also had been carried out, on this same morning the Brigades had begun to detrain at the city station.
The decision to send these Brigades cannot be seriously challenged. The promise to send them had indeed justified itself by the time it was fulfilled, for the Belgian resistance had been prolonged. If it is fairly certain that this could not have been done but for the timely arrival and judicious handling of the Marine Brigade, it is also true that the effort would not have been made but for the definite promise of further reinforcements. Moreover, the actual arrival of the Brigades created the greatest enthusiasm, and undoubtedly counteracted to some extent the then prevailing depression.
The Naval Brigades were, however, a slender asset from a military point of view. and their capacity for service in an emergency had been considerably weakened by their experiences since they left camp two days before. After a long march to Dover, the Brigades had loaded their own stores (of which too many were taken. including the men's kit-bags and officers' uniform cases), and embarked late in the evening on transports so over-crowded that many of the men were compelled to stand almost the whole time on board. Not till 12 noon. on the 5th, had the transports been able to get into Dunkirk Harbour. Since leaving camp more than twenty-four hours before. the men had had only one meal (at Dover at about noon). and that an improvised one and when they reached Dunkirk they had to set to work at once unloading the transports, and loading up the waiting trains. In the interval. an attempt had been made by the base staff to remedy the more glaring deficiencies in kit and equipment, and 120 rounds of ammunition (which had to be carried in pockets for the most part, as few had bandoliers or haversacks) were served out. The absence of a trained staff, and the inexperience of some of the battalion and company commanders. had made the business of disem barking, issuing stores and entraining exceptionally long and tedious. and the men were thoroughly exhausted by the time they had started for Antwerp. Even in the train, the men had the strictest injunctions not to sleep lest the train was attacked. Rupert Brooke summed up a day of chaotic improvisation as a "very tragic and amusing affair." from which we may infer that for some at least of the junior officers the day brought a certain measure of disillusion.
The first train for Antwerp. consisting of advance parties. had left the quayside at 9 p.m., but it was not till 11.30 p.m. that the last battalions of the 2nd Brigade got away.
The trains began to arrive at Antwerp in the early hours of the 6th, and the 1st Brigade, as soon as they were formed up, were marched off again to Wilryk, an eastern suburb a few miles from the station. As the men passed the station barriers many had been given tinned meat, sardines, or coffee by the civil population, and when, on arrival at Wilryk, orders were given to arrange billeting accommodation, it looked as though they were going to get the essential rest. Almost at once, however, they were ordered by Major Richardson to Vieux Dieux, another suburb further east, near which ran the line of the inner forts. Here, while the Brigade were breakfasting, Mr. Winston Churchill came on the scene, and spoke to many of the officers of the intended plan, which was still, at this time, to hold the Germans on the line of the Nethe, till the 7th Division and the expected French divisions could join hands on the west of Antwerp and attack the flank of the besieging army.
After breakfast, the Brigade got orders from the Belgian staff to move forward to some dismantled trenches, between the line of the inner forts and the line of the Nethe, there to remain in reserve to what was still (at 10 a.m.) our line of resistance.
Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade had detrained. By the time they were ready to move off the whole city was astir, and the scene was one of poignant humour, of romantic excitement, of that unintelligible optimism which comes to men in any brief respite from an incalculable menace. To the station had come the Civic Guard and numerous officials; as the Brigade marched away (in this case direct to Vieux Dieux), the shops were open, and, as in all times of public excitement, the whole population was in the streets, fearful lest solitude might perhaps reveal for a moment the face of truth. "Every one cheered," writes Rupert Brooke, "and flung themselves on us, and gave us apples and chocolate and kisses" - another more prosaically-minded eye-witness includes also jugs of beer in this Homeric catalogue of gifts - "and cried 'Vivent les Anglais' and'Heep! Heep! Heep!'"
The enthusiasm was infectious. The doubts of the evening dusk had given way to the resilient optimism of midday, and so these raw battalions, without any orders, without equipment, with but few senior officers skilled in the control of troops in the field, and few junior officers who had been taught anything save to be controlled with a good grace, marched through Antwerp without more, perhaps, than a subconscious repudiation of the cheers which acclaimed them as seasoned troops, possessing in their bayonets the veritable means of deliverance to a great city.
The 2nd Brigade halted on the way to Vieux Dieux for breakfast, and eventually arrived there at about 4 p.m. Here they found part of the 1st Brigade, which had been brought back from the trenches in front of Vieux Dieux, on its way to join the Marine Brigade on the new advanced position, now being consolidated.
The retirement of General Paris's force from the Nethe line was now completed, and the Marine Brigade and the Belgians were entrenching on a line from Vremde to Bouchout. General Paris had learnt of the arrival of the Naval Brigades while the retirement was in progress, and, as soon as the situation was clearer, not knowing, of course, of the literally continuous activities of the lst Brigade since 9 a.m. on October 4th, he had ordered it to come up on the left of the Marines, and extend the line across the Malines Railway.
The scene in Vieux Dieux as the 2nd Brigade arrived, and the 1st Brigade re-entered it on the way to the front, was a memorable one. The two brigades of British troops filled the Square, yet, through the ranks, came endless Belgian troops returning from the trenches. Excited staff officers shouted indiscriminately to everybody to keep cool, guns galloped in all directions, motor cyclists rushed through with apparently endless dispatches, and, threading their way in humble, pitiful groups, by by-streets and on the edges of crowds, the refugees from the outlying villages fled from the certain, to the uncertain, disaster. Here, too, the brigades had their first sight of war-weary troops. Later, the Division came to know well enough that look, which marks out men exhausted by desperate and long-continued exposure to the risks of imminent and horrifying death. The sight of the Belgian troops in Vieux Pieux was their first introduction to the realities of war.
Amid these scenes of excitement, Commodore Henderson's Brigade moved forward to the new position, the Drake and Benbow Battalions going into line on the right of the Chatham, and the Hawke and Collingwood Battalions into support to the Marine Brigade near Chateau Weyninex. On the right of the Benbow Battalion were some Belgian troops, who, however, retired later in the evening.
More fortunate than their fellows, Commodore Backhouse's Brigade, though less exhausted, were able, on arrival at Vieux Dieux, to go into billets, where for a time they remained. Already, however, grave decisions had been taken, which made it necessary before the night was out to reconsider the dispositions of the force.
It must be understood that there were, on the morning of the 6th, no fewer than four separate bodies of troops fighting in and round Antwerp. There was the Belgian Field Army, under H.M. the King of the Belgians, the garrison of the fortress of Antwerp, under the immediate command of Lieut.-General Deguise, General Paris's advanced base force (with Belgian units attached for tactical purposes), and the two Naval brigades, who did not know, till after they arrived in Antwerp, that they were to come under General Paris's command. There were also present in Antwerp Mr. Winston Churchill, who, as First Lord of the Admiralty, stood in a special relation to the Naval and Marine brigades, and Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had been sent by Lord Kitchener to command the force which was assembling at Ostend, and which had been originally intended for the relief of Antwerp.
During the early part of October 6th, the future arrangements for the defence of Antwerp remained undecided. In pursuance of the agreement arrived at with Mr. Churchill on the 3rd, the Belgian General Staff, under whose orders came General Paris's force, had, as we have seen, continued a vigorous defence on the Nethe and, subsequently, on the Vremde line. They had also strengthened their forces on the Scheldt, and had beaten off very determined efforts of the Germans to cross the river at Schoonaerde. During the forenoon, however, the Belgian authorities had met Mr. Winston Churchill and General Rawlinson to discuss the future. The arrival of General Rawlinson's force had been delayed owing to naval difficulties, and it was not to be concentrated now till the Sth at the earliest. There was also no news of the expected French force. All this meant, in effect, that the Belgians were free to decide whether to continue the defence, or to revert to their original plan of withdrawing the Field Army. Eventually a compromise was arrived at. The Army, less the 2nd Division, would at once withdraw across the Scheldt, and ultimately, if necessary, fall back in the direction of Ostend; but it would defend the crossings of the Scheldt as long as possible, while General Deguise, with the help of the 2nd Division of the Field Army and of General Paris's force (now increased to three brigades), would continue to man the eastern defences of the fortress. Under this arrangement, General Paris, who had now been promoted Major-General, was left in independent command of the British troops in the fortress.* The scheme for relieving the fortress was not definitely abandoned, but the loss of the line of the Nethe, and the withdrawal of the Field army, made it virtually certain that the defence could not be prolonged sufficiently to make the scheme practicable.
During the afternoon of October 6th, the rumour of the im pending departure of the Belgian Army began to circulate, and the effect on the moral of the remaining Belgian troops was deplorable. In these circumstances, General Paris had to consider whether it would not be wise to withdraw his force that night to the inner defences. As the afternoon drew on, the reports regarding the Belgian troops became more md more alarming, and, by the time the final decision regarding the future defence of the fortress was arrived at, the general's mind was made up, and orders were issued to Brigade Commanders for a further withdrawal to take place at 2 a.m.
While these orders were being written, Mr. Winston Churchill and General Rawlinson were with General Paris, and, after the decision had been taken, both expressed their agreement with the latter's view of the situation.
The front to which General Paris had decided to withdraw was the line of the inner forts, a very strong prepared position, consisting of eight forts covering Antwerp from the east and north-east. The right of the line was protected by the Scheldt, and the left by inundations. Between the forts were trenches, well wired and solidly constructed, with a perfect field of fire of five hundred yards. On the other hand, the trenches were old-fashioned and quite useless against modern artillery; there were no communication trenches, and the forts could not be relied on, either as to the quality of their armament or the resolu tion of the garrisons. The line, however, was the best there was; the trenches could be deepened; and, above all, the position could, at least, not be carried by infantry assault. To hold it meant, at any rate, to impose on the enemy the delay necessary for him to bring up his guns; or, alternatively, to force the line of the Scheldt and cut off the retreat of the garrison.
* His improvised Divisional Staff now consisted of Colonel Ollivant and Major Sketchley, General Staff Officers, and Major Richardson as A.A. & Q.M.G. Colonel Seely and Major Bridges were also lent to General Paris temporarily for staff duties. Beyond these officers there was no divisional organization.
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To rest the Marine Brigade, General Paris put the two Naval brigades into the trenches, the 1st R.N. Brigade on the left (Forts 2 to 5), and the 2nd R.N. Brigade on the right (Forts 5 to 8). Between Fort 8 and the Scheldt were Belgian fortress troops, relieved later by the Chatham Battalion.
The night of October 6th-7th passed off quietly, there being very little shelling, and that directed mainly against the houses behind the line. The only "incident" was on the Anson front, where two guns in the fort on their left flank burst, causing an ominous and significant panic among the Belgian garrison. The remaining guns in the fort were then manned by naval gun crews, picked from the ranks of the battalion.
Still the Germans hesitated to follow up the retirement, and, on the morning of the 7th, the staff were able to send up rations to the men in motor-buses, which drew up in front of our lines. So quiet, indeed, was the situation that many officers drove back into Antwerp on derelict carts, which were to be found behind the lines, to buy food and drink for their company messes. Meanwhile, officers of greater seniority unburdened their minds by writing field messages with ceaseless activity. Throughout the day, men were kept busily engaged, under the superintendence of the engineers, in digging shrapnel trenches in the rear of the main position, though the shortage of tools prevented any great progress being made except on the right. Only an occasional shell passing overhead into Antwerp reminded the troops of the stern realities of their situation. Remote, however, as its dangers still appeared at the time, the position of the Brigades was far from comfortable. They had no suitable cooking arrangements; the men had nowhere to sleep, the trenches themselves were overcrowded; there was no support line, and meals were irregular and scanty. Moreover, the entire ignorance of active service conditions on land, which was common to all ranks of the Brigades, made the situation, which to trained troops would have appeared comparatively peaceful, unnecessarily trying. The men in some battalions were being worked too hard, having regard to what they might be called on to face; and the golden rule that a soldier, on front-line duty, when he is not working should be sleeping, was not being, and had not been, observed. Particularly was this true of the officers, many of whom, for absolutely no reason, came back to England, after the Antwerp expedition, without a single proper eight hours' rest to their credit.
The first half of the night of October 7th-8th brought no change in the local situation. The front was still clear, and here was no suspicion of any attack. Towards 2 a.m., however, a German patrol was seen in front of our wire on the Drake Battalion front, and the firing from the Drake trenches led to an outburst of rapid fire along the front of several battalions to the right and left. This incident, reported to have led to he death of one cow, did little credit, no doubt, to the measure of control exercised by some of the officers; but many parallels could be found for it in early experiences of most formations, and it certainly cannot be regarded as a conclusive proof that few of the men in the Division knew how to load or fire a rifle.
Order had barely been restored after this incident, when desultory bombardment was opened on our trenches, which ontinued for some hours. The shelling was mostly by six and eight inch howitzers, but was neither heavy nor well directed; on the 2nd Brigade front, in fact, the casualties were extremely light - only some half-dozen men being wounded. The 1st Brigade lost rather more, one officer, Lt.-Colonel Max well (commanding the Collingwood Battalion) and three men being killed, and some twenty men wounded; but, thanks largely to the progress made in improving the trench system on this front, the damage was less than might have been expected. The bombardment, however, finally shattered the moral of the remaining fortress troops in this part of the line, and Forts 2, 3 and 4 had to be taken over, wholly or in part, by officers and men from the Naval Brigades.
* The medical arrangements were in the skilled hands of Fleet-Surgeon Finch, R.N., and, when tested on this occasion, provcd excellent.
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Nevertheless, there was nothing in what had occurred on this front to make our position untenable. The serious hap enings were those on the Scheldt at Schoonaerde, where the Germans, after severe fighting, had secured a footing across the river on the evening of the 7th, and, during the night, had thrown across more than a brigade. It was this that made it clear to General Paris that the Belgian Field Army was nearing the limits of its powers of resistance, and that the time when it would be necessary to withdraw was therefore approaching. Accordingly, at 7 a.m. on the morning of the 8th, he informed General Rawlinson by telephone that he would probably be forced to withdraw that night. Already, the previous day, the Brigade staffs had been warned to recon noitre the routes to the lower (pontoon) bridge at Burght, and Colonel Bridges had, in conjunction with Major Richardson, made certain preliminary arrangements, and had secured boats to take the Division across, in the event of the bridges being destroyed. The only thing that remained was to secure, if possible, trains to meet the Division outside Antwerp, and this was put in hand by General Rawlinson, who sent Colonel Fairholme to the Belgian (Field Army) Headquarters at Sel- zaete to make the best possible arrangements.
It was not, however, necessary as yet for General Paris to make an irrevocable decision. Belgian rearguards were still covering the approaches to the main roads and rail- ways leading from Antwerp to the coast, and the longer his force could stay the better. The only immediate danger, indeed, seemed to be from the north, where, according to the Belgian reports which reached General Deguise, the Germans had got round the flank of our line and captured Forts l and 2. Colonel Seely and Major Bridges found, however, on going personally to the 1st Brigade line, that no Germans had been seen, and that the forts, though abandoned by the Belgians, had been taken over by Naval gunners from the ranks of the Brigade. In the circumstances, there still seemed a hope of prolonging the defence for a little time; and it was agreed that, so long as the flanks were safe, and the bombardment along the line not sufficiently serious to necessitate withdrawal on that ground alone, the Division would remain. Only in the event of any change for the worse in the situation on the northern bank of the Scheldt, or on the left of the Ist Brigade, would the Division withdraw.
There was indeed every reason for remaining to the last possible moment. The popular idea that the position was untenable, and that it was on]y by good fortune that anyone escaped, has no shadow of foundation in fact. The lines of the inner forts, and the Belgian positions across the Scheldt, could be held for a good many hours (if not for two or three days) longer, if only the Belgians were ready to remain in their trenches, to man their forts, and to fire their guns. More- over, though nothing could have saved the city from ultimate destruction except a further intervention, such intervention was still possible. General Paris was, in the circumstances, bound to remain as long as the Belgians stood to their remaining positions, and so safeguarded for him a line of retreat.
During the afternoon of the 8th, however, General Paris, who had moved his headquarters so as to be in the closest touch with General Deguise, saw reports coming in of con- tinual defections of the Belgian fortress troops, which made it clear that the conditions, on which alone he could remain, were no longer being fulfilled. His written instructions (which he had received from Mr. Winston Churchill) were imperative. "He will exert his utmost efforts to secure the prolongation of this de- fence. ..and, secondly, he will insist on being excluded from any capitulation or surrender, and will in all circum- stances keep and consider himself and his force free to make their way to the left bank of the Scheldt in order to rejoin Sir Henry Rawlinson's command or any other British force, naval or military." If the retreat of the Division were further postponed, the freedom to withdraw across the Scheldt would be lost, and the exclusion of the force from the now inevitable surrender would become impossible.
At 5 p.m. on the 8th, therefore, the final decision was taken, and reported to Mr. Winston Churchill by telephone, as the decision of the Commander on the spot, and accepted as such by him without question.
The order for retirement was issued between 5.30 and 6 p.m. The original of the order cannot be traced, though it was sent to the Admiralty by General Paris. The tenour of the instructions is, however, known. The 1st Brigade was to go by the Malines Gate to the city pontoon bridge, and thence to the rendezvous - Zwyndrecht; the 2nd and Marine Brigades were to go their direct routes to the pontoon bridge at Burght, and then to Zwyndrecht. The Portsmouth Battalion of Marines was to act as a rearguard, moving off in rear of all details. All Brigades were to leave on receipt of the order .
The order for retirement had not been unexpected. The different commanding officers had already been warned on the 6th and 7th to reconnoitre the road to the pontoon bridge, and the new route now assigned to the 1st Brigade, being through the town, was easy to find. Unfortunately, the staff officer, charged with the duty of delivering this order to Commo- dore Henderson, delivered it instead to Commander Campbell, of the Drake Battalion; and intimated to him, at the same time, that his brigade had already been notified and were on the point of departure. The result was that, whereas the 2nd Brigade, the Marine Brigade and the Drake Battalion left as soon as possible, Commodore Henderson and the Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood Battalions only learnt of the order to retreat, as the result of a visit from Colonel Ollivant* at about 7.15, and were, even then, not informed as to the vital point that the retirement was to take effect on its receipt.
The result of these mistakes was that, while the 2nd and Marine Brigades were able to reach the bridge at Burght at about 9.30 p.m. in good order, and, while the Drake Battalion reached the lower bridge as early as 9 o'clock, Commodore Henderson did not arrange to retire till 9.30, and, for various reasons, did not start till even later. The Portsmouth Marines, detailed as rearguard to the division, were, of course, longer delayed, and did not leave till some short time after 10.30 p.m.
The order had been for all three brigades to rendezvous at Zwyndrecht, a western suburb of Antwerp, about 14 miles from the centre of the line of the forts. From there, General Paris had intended to march to Beveren-Waes, not more than seven miles ahead, in the hope of getting a train, and, failing that, to continue his march westwards, through Stekene and Moerbeke. This plan was based on incorrect information regarding trains, for a message sent by Colonel Dallas from Selzaete (telling General Paris that the line from St. Nicholas was not safe because of the presence of Germans at Lokeren, and that he must therefore go to St. Gillaes-Waes), had un- fortunately miscarried. The true situation became known to General Paris only during the course of the retreat.
*Colonel Ollivant was the staff officer detailed to take the order to the Marine Brigade. It was after doing this that he had called at the 1st Brigade H.Q.
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The march of the two brigades and of the Drake Battalion to the river, a distance of some seven or eight miles, had been accomplished without much difficulty. and there was no interference whatever by the enemy. This was perhaps because a detachment, which had approached our lines just before the retreat, had been fired on, anq had retired, with the conviction that the defence of the fortress was being continued. Yet the occasional shells falling in Antwerp, the theatrical reflec tion of great fires, and the noise of continuous explosions, seemed to cast over the deserted streets an atmosphere of calamity, and gave to the weary battalions some faint warning of what they might have to face across the river.
Here, on the roads to Zwyndrecht, was a scene not indeed unparalleled in the annals of modern savagery but never surpassed in the pity it inspired. It seemed as if the whole population of Antwerp, women and children, priests and nuns, the sick, the aged and the infirm, had fled from their homes, and yet, momentarily indifferent to the consequences, they must halt ever and again to look back at the burning ruin of their hopes and their aspirations. To the other sorrows of exile, was added the threat of an armed and hostile pursuit. Mixed up with the procession of fugitives, were men driving cattle, and mules and peasants' carts, fleeing in an interminable procession along the same road; and each man, in his haste, impeding the progress of the others.
Amid these scenes it was impossible, from the start, to maintain any military formation. Battalions got separated from each other, and, as the hours passed, companies and even platoons had to fight their way along for themselves. Officers and men had been exhausted (to some extent needlessly, it is true, but the fault was not theirs) before they started. By the time they reached Zwyndrecht, about 11.30 p.m., they had marched, under the most impossible conditions, for nearly six hours. Some of the men had no water-bottles, and all carried ammunition in their pockets, which chafed unbearably as time went on. Acting on very correct instructions, many started the retreat carrying also boxes of ammunition, trench stores not lightly to be abandoned to the enemy, and these boxes were carried many miles, with a remarkable fidelity.
Yet, by the time the rendezvous was reached (the Drake Battalion arrived first. but was closely followed by the other brigades), the limit of endurance seemed near.
After a halt (during which time General Paris received reports from his staff officers that all three brigades were present), the column marched on along the St. Nicholas Road; and it was not till two hours' later, when they got past Beveren-Waes, that they learnt that they could only get trains from St. Gillaes-Waes.
Now the worst of the journey began. The new line of march was off the main road along narrow lanes, and the press and confusion was redoubled. As buses and motors made futile endeavours to pass along the line of march, and only succeeded in driving the men off the road, and then coming to a standstill themselves, the confusion soon bordered on chaos. To understand the scene in these last hours, we must see through the enveloping darkness not battalions of trained men, used to the unceasing fatigues of war, marching along recognizable roads; but, rather, groups Qf tired and hungry men, painfully cutting out a path for themselves along narrow lanes, through the throng of refugees, to which every hour and every path opening into the line of march added its tale of panic and confusion.
Inevitable that, in scenes such as this, stories should spread of men throwing away their equipment, of officers losing their men, of men refusing to acknowledge constituted authority. Almost all such stories were false. The battalions that started the march finished it, and finished it without loss. The head of the columns reached St. Gillaes-Waes at 7 a.m., and the last had entrained by nine o'clock. Having regard to the incalculable circumstances, the lack of adequate equipment and food, the raw condition of the men, and the utter inexperience of many of the senior and junior officers, there was much that was creditable in this achievement. Save for the mistake already explained, which lost the best part of four battalions, but was due in no way either to any defect in General Paris's plans for the retreat, or to the admitted fact that the battalions themselves were untrained, the dispatch of the Naval Brigades to Antwerp would not have excited popular criticism. What is still more important, it would not have obscured so fatally the true history of the Antwerp operations, in which the Naval brigades played only a small part, and that not a part which depended for its execution on any military qualities. They were sent by request to fulfil a promise, and they fulfilled it.
The less equable fortunes of the Hawke, Collingwood. Benbow and Portsmouth Marine Battalions must now be told. As we have said, Commodore Henderson, after Colonel Ollivant's visit, had ordered the 1st R.N. Brigade to retire at 9.30 p.m. Some delay occurred in arranging for the Ports- mouth Marines to cover this retirement, but eventually a start was made, at about 10.15 p.m. The Hawke Battalion got away first and crossed the river (though by the upper bridge at Burght and not as intended by the city bridge) at about midnight. The departure of the Benbow and Colling- wood Battalions was, however, delayed still further, and by the time Commodore Henderson and his staff, who were with these battalions, reached the river, the bridge had been de- stroyed. Colonel Bridges' foresight in providing boats for an emergency saved the situation, and it was in these that the party crossed, followed shortly afterwards by Colonel Luard's battalion.
The road from Burght to Zwyndrecht, where Commodore Henderson still hoped to find the rest of the Division, was by now comparatively clear; and all might yet have been well, if the three Naval battalions had not halted at Zwyndrecht for more than two hours, while Commodore Henderson, whose car had been commandeered by a staff officer, and who was thus without any means of getting into personal touch with General Paris, tried to get news. When, at last, the three bat- talions started for St. Gillaes-Waes, it was nearly 5 a.m. From the available records it appears that partly as the result of the confusion on the roads, partly, perhaps, owing to the variable quality of the staff work, carried on under almost impossible conditions, mainly owing to the extreme physical exhaustion of the men,* these battalions lost all cohesion. This must certainly have been the case, if we are right in stating that details of the 1st Brigade reached St. Gillaes as early as 11.30 a.m. on the 9th, while others did not reach till 3.45 p.m. This may have been unavoidable; but it is, nevertheless, certain that had the 1st Brigade - only some 1,500 men in all - maintained as much cohesion as did the 2nd and Marine Brigades, they might have begun to entrain at St. Gillaes-Waes at 2 p.m. and have got away before the enemy threat to the railway had developed sufficiently to be regarded as a menace to their line of retreat. As it was, a report (not, as it turned out, a correct one) reached St. Gillaes just as the 1st Brigade had entrained, that the enemy had crossed the southern railway at Lokeren, and had already cut the line at Moerbeke, a station a little way down the line.
* This brigade had throughout been subjected to more severe exertions than the 2nd Brigade, and the reckless way in which the strength of the men had been used was now a fatal element in the situation.
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Meanwhile the rearguard (Portsmouth) battalion, which had taken a different route, had arrived at St. Nicholas, only to learn, as General Paris had learnt some ten hours before, that the Germans were at Lokeren. Colonel Luard decided to march to Kemseke, i.e., one station further than St. Gillaes, acting on information, received from Belgian sources, that no trains were running from any nearer station. His battalion, curiously enough, had picked up some six hundred stragglers from the Naval battalions, under Lieut. Crossman, R.N., but the column, though naturally exhausted by their experience, managed to reach Kemseke some time after 8 p.m.
Almost at this hour, the 1st Brigade, which had undertaken the shorter march to St. Gillaes, crossed the Dutch frontier, with the result that the Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood battalions, with the Brigade Staff, were interned. Acting on information, misleading, as it turned out, as to the strength of the threat to his line of retreat, Commodore Henderson had felt it his duty to save his command from useless casualties and apparently inevitable surrender. His decision was subsequently upheld by the Admiralty and the Government.
It would, indeed, have been one of the ironies of war had the stragglers from his command, who were at almost the same hour entraining at Kemseke, made good their escape. But this was not to be. The train from Kemseke had only got as far as Moerbeke (reached about 10 p.m. ) when it was derailed. The Marines, who formed no more than half the complement of the train, at once got out, and rallied round their officers. The R.N.V.R. details, without officers, and, for the reasons already described, in a hopeless state of physical exhaustion, mostly remained asleep in the train. A few, however, under Lieut. Crossman, R.N., got out, and joined a party of Marines under Major French and Captain (then Lieut.) Gowney, who had opened fire on the German detachment. Under cover of the fire, Colonel Luard and a number of his men marched forward along the railway, and many more could have escaped. Unfortunately, however, the majority had got out on the far side of the train, and, hurrying in the wrong direction, were surrounded and captured. In the circumstances, Major French and the covering party were compelled to retire, leaving behind some wounded, including Lieut. Crossman, and the R.N.V.R. details, who, to the number of 7 officers and 950 men, were captured by a hardly superior German force, which immediately retreated with its prisoners.
The train itself, with the refugees, was taken on later into safety by a Belgian officer, and many Belgian troops passed down the line as late as the morning of October lOth. Colonel Luard, Major French (who was awarded the D.S.O. for his services on this occasion), Captain Gowney (who was awarded the D.S.C.), and approximately half the other officers and men of the Portsmouth Battalion made good their escape by road to Selzaete, a fact which shows that the German threat to the line of retreat was even now, on the night of October 9th-lOth, not very serious. Further evidence of this is to be found in the success with which Lieut. Grant, R.N.V.R.,* and forty men of the Benbow Battalion made their way along the frontier, and also reached Selzaete on the l0th.
As regards the general conduct of the operations, Sir John French's dispatch says the final word. "From a comprehensive review of all the circumstances," he gave it as his opinion that "the force of Marines and Naval Brigades which assisted in the defence of Antwerp was handled by General Paris with great skill and boldness."**
And, after all, what was the cost of these operations in comparison with their results? Antwerp did not fall, thanks to British intervention, till October lOth; by that time Sir Henry Rawlinson was in position at Ghent with a substantial force, the Belgian Field Army had retreated and rested, and the left wing of our Expeditionary Force was at Bailleul. The result was that the three forces could stand on the line of the Yser, and bar for ever the road to Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk. For this decisive success had been sacrificed the lives of 7 officers and 58 men; 8 officers and 185 men had been wounded; 87 officers and 1,442 men had been interned, and 5 officers and 981 men had fallen into the hands of the enemy. It is impossible to speak lightly of such losses, but the sacrifice, less than was exacted in many minor and fruitless engagements, was certainly not in vain.
* This officer was awarded the D.S.C. for a fine exploit in bringing these men
through. Sub-Lieut. Modin, of the same battalion (who also came through on the
lOth), was awarded the same distinction for displaying a similar resolution.
** The question of the Naval Division is, of course, quite independent
of the merits or demerits of the plan for relieving Antwerp. If the scheme
advocated by the Earl of Ypres in his book "1914" had been adopted, it would
still have been essential to prolong the defence of Antwerp in order to give
the scheme a chance of success.
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