This account of the Drake Battalion's involvement in the battle for the village appears in Army Book 152. Correspondence Book (Field Service.) It was hand written by W. Sterndale Bennett. Act. Commander Commanding Drake Bt. November 1917.
189th Inf Bde.
(63rd) R.N. Division.
27.4.17
NARRATIVE of OPERATIONS against GAVRELLE-OPPY line and GAVRELLE village.
23rd April. 1917.
11 pm. Patrols reported wire very thick.
1.45 am. B and D Coy's in position.
3 am. Whole Bn in position in eight waves on a two platoon frontage. This
formation was adopted, under instructions from 189th Bde, in order that the
frontage might be reduced to make a way through the only gap reported by
aircraft. The night was light and the dawn arrived before zero. The men however
kept down and were not seen by the enemy. Enemy was shelling the GAVRELLE
ARRAS Rd fairly heavily, but we suffered no casualties forming up in the
assembly trenches. My H. Q. was then in the British front line.
ZERO. Barrage opened and men moved forward in fine style.
O hr 3 mins Enemy wire encountered, this wire was terrifically thick and
the leading waves became immediately disorganised in their endeavours to
find gaps. I then thought it essential to leave H.Q. and try and straighten
things out. We managed to get them all through the wire and at Ohr 8mins
we assaulted the German front line with great success. B. Coy (the 2nd Coy
in the original formation ) worked down to the right flank and got rid of
any Germans that were causing trouble. The leading Coy. (D Coy) suffered
very badly going through the wire from enemy rifle and M. G. fire and all
their officers, except the Coy Commander (Sub Lieut Wallis) became casualties.
Gave orders to C. Coy (3rd wave) to keep in touch with KRR's at all
costs, which they did very well. Mopping up continued until Ohr 12 mins
when we went for the German support line. We met with little opposition with
the exception of small enemy parties which were soon dispersed. The advance
continued under excellent leadership by the officers and N.C.O.'s and
the way that the men kept close to the barrage absolutely fearlessly was
truly magnificent. The YELLOW line was captured at about Ohr 40 mins. We had
an excellent view of the village now and our left flank was engaging
enemy M.G s and nifles which were firing from the southern outskirts of the
village. The Lewis Guns constantly came into action against enemy parties
that were making a stand and were very effective. During this wait on the
YELLOW LINE enemy snipers were quite active and Sub Lt. Wallis was hit through
the head.
The advance continued and wherever the enemy showed fight, our men made
immediate
dashes at him and put him out of action or (in a few cases ) sent him back
as prisoners. The men's blood was up and few prisoners were taken. Owing
to our having suffered pretty badly in the enemy's wire the men had
little mercy.
In the SUNKEN ROAD there was a considerable enemy garrison. They started
to bolt but about 400 of them were reorganised under an officer and at one
period it looked rather as if they were going to hold up the KR.R.'s
(who were not close enough to the barrage) Our advanced parties were ordered
to rush up to the SUNKEN ROAD and attack the garrison on their right flank.
They did this in excellent style bringing up a Lewis gun and enfilading the
road. Those of the enemy that were left gave themselves up and had to run
the gauntlet through our men as they ran back to the rear. The same Lewis
gun took up a position on the eastern side of the road and played on the
remainder of the garrison which was doubling towards SQUARE WOOD. Word was
sent to the KR.R.'s that their position was taken and they could come
up when they thought fit.
When the remainder of the Bn came up we immediately pushed out our Lewis
guns on to the high ground to the east of the road and gave our men a short
rest. During this period many more of the enemy were cleared out of the small
shelters in the SUNKEN ROAD and enemy tools were being collected. I then
went out to site my trenches and suspected to see the Nelson Bn. coming out
of the village on my left but they did not show up. So I decided to dig my
line using an enemy communication trench for my general alignment. Keeping
the men as much as possible off the road, they started to dig in .
I saw a small party of the Nelson Bn digging in about C.25.a. 6. 1. So I
decided to make towards this on my left flank and the cross roads C.25 c.9.
1. I decided this was my right flank as I was here in touch with 2 Cmy's of the
K.R.R.'s.
I had a splendid view of the valley ahead to FRESNES les MONTAUBAN and I
felt that, as my flanks were doubtful, I could not do better than dig in
where I was. The enemy M. G's from about C. 19 D 3.3 and C. 19 D 9.4.
were giving us a lively time but we managed to rush out to shell holes on
our right flank to the east of the road and the consolidation went on very
successfully.
The enemy then started to shell the road with 5.9's and I sent back
for retaliation on FRESNES les MONTALTBAN on the OPPY gun line.
The enemy during our consolidation was coming back in small parties and
occupying
trenches in the valley and some small areas of dead ground about 300 yards
from our position. I received no fire except for occasional sniping owing
to the lack of SAA. During the afternoon a very formidable body of the enemy
started to advance towards us in waves on a line stretching from about C.20
central to SQUARE WOOD. The number must have amounted to two brigades. I
sent back immediately for the barrage to reopen. This was done and the enemy
became thoroughly disorganised and on the left flank they started to retire
along the road. However small parties kept advancing and occupying the trenches
to the NE of the village and also the dead ground 300 yards in front of my
position. They were evidently determined to drive us out if possible and
I kept up my consolidation at top pressure. I sent back for information
regarding
my flanks and for SAA and bombs.
I kept my H.Q. in the firing line because from there I could see the
enemy's movements. As soon as SAA arrived we kept up a steady fire at
the enemy as he approached us in small parties, I got news of my flanks from
the Brigade and felt more confident of my position. My right flank however
was still doubtful as we only had two Coy's of the K.R.R.'s between
us and an enemy strong point. This strong point was causing considerable
trouble to the K.R.R.'s by enfilade fire along the SUNKEN ROAD. I got
into communication with the K.R.R.'s and was informed that this gap
was going to be made good by the 13th R. Fusiliers during the night.
The enemy kept coming on in driblets all afternoon and I expected a
counter-attack during the night. I sent my Lewis gun officer to select good
sites for my Lewis guns keeping two guns on each flank. My two Stoke guns
were dug in just behind the SUNKEN ROAD also protecting my flanks. During
the Stand to at night I reinforced my posts in flank by sending out five
Lewis Guns about 100 yards in front of my position. Early morning "minnies
" started to shell the village with great vigour from the enemy trenches
to the N.E, The Nelson Battalion sent up an S.O.S. signal and I sent back
to get the heavies - giving the co-ordinates. The heavies opened up another
barrage. This quietened down the "minnies" but the 5.9's were very active.
These 5.9's during the whole time we were up in the line caused
considerable
annoyance and 1 constantly sent back for retaliation. In some cases this
retaliation had a good effect.
During the morning of the 24th still more parties of the enemy were constantly
pushing forward opposite my front and we fired on them continually when we
could afford the ammunition. They brought up M.G's and started to sweep
our parapets Our M. G. took up a position about 1. 1.b. 6.9. and played along
the road, making communication between ourselves and the K.R.R.'s extremely
difficult.
During the afternoon of 20 the enemy again appeared on the ridge to the N.E.
of the village about 1000 yards away. I estimated his strength at about four
battalions and, as he was shelling the village with heavies for about six
hours and was putting up an intensive barrage he evidently meant to attack
the N.E. corner of the village - the most vulnerable place. The corner
(MAYOR's HOUSE) was held by a platoon of Nelsons and 1 Lewis Gun. I
saw the house hit by one or two 5-9's and I saw the garrison retire.
When the enemy barrage lifted I sent down to the Howe Company Commander,
who was holding a line along the western edge of the cemetery to occupy the
Mayor's House at once, and sweep the ridge with a Lewis Gun in order
to keep down enemy M. G.'s that were enfilading our trench. 1 sent back
a message to my liaison officer to get the artillery on to the enemy on the
Ridge. Just as the last wave was appearing over the ridge the artillery crashed
amongst them in great style. It was a glorious sight. The enemy however were
fine troops - much finer than those of the previous day - and they kept coming
on by occupying shell holes and small trenches. Our Lewis Guns and rifles
on the left flank played havoc with these parties and were keeping up a steady
well controlled fire which mowed down the enemy. I thought that probably
the enemy troops who were just in front were waiting for those on my left
flank to get up into line before advancing. Just as the enemy was getting
up into line I sent up my S. 0. S. and the barrage came down on those in
front of my position. They held on and suffered badly from this barrage.
Any that moved were mowed down by my men.
The landscape now was fairly clear except for stretcher parties. The sniping
however went on until dark and the constant rifle and Lewis Gun firing accounted
for considerable quantities of the enemy. They were congregated in the trenches
to the N.E. of the village and I warned the brigade to keep up a steady fire
with the heavies round this corner. I thought that if they rushed this corner
the positions of both brigades would be seriously imperilled.
During the night I heard very heavy rifle fire going on on my left near the
Ridge and also had a report from the K.R.R.'s that the enemy was moving
forward in front of them. I had previously agreed with the C.O. of the
K.R.R.'s that I would support him with the artillery in front of me,
so I did not hesitate. I sent up my last S. 0 S and the barrage opened on
the enemy immediately in front of my position. I thought perhaps the rifle
fire on my left was the enemy advancing firing from the hip and as the enemy
garrison in front of me was strong, I felt justified in asking for one more
barrage. They could have rushed us with comparative case as the men had little
or no sleep since the 21st and were thoroughly exhausted with the constant
vigil and consolidation.
During the massing I asked for a few reinforcements but the artillery being
so effective - when the reinforcements arrived they were not needed. When
the final counter attack was broken I asked for shelling along the ARRAS
GAVRELLE-FRESNES ROAD if the shells could be spared. This arrived and caught
many large parties of the enemy along this road. I feel that I am not
exaggerating when I estimate the enemy's casualties at two thousand.
We were firing at them continually all the time we were up there - the fire
was well controlled and splendid effects were seen - The artillery was
magnificent. The enemy was thoroughly butchered and we enjoyed every moment
of it all.
W. Sterndale Bennet. Act. Commander
Commanding Drake Bt. November 1917
Commander Sterndale Bennett met me as I was going to take up position in
front of Paschendaele Ridge. He shook hands with me and wished me good luck
but stated he thought there was little chance of anyone coming through. After
the attack to my surprise he came to my dugout and told me that his Battalion
were to relieve mine. I having lost fully 75% of my officers and men. When
at rest a few days later the General sent round to know if I would attend
Commander Sterndale Bennett's funeral which I did with great sorrow.
Although death was treated very lightly at that period I was greatly surprised
and shocked as, when he took over, the line was quiet except for casual
shelling.
On making enquiries I was informed at Headquarters that a shell had struck
hirn in the legs, severing one between the knee and ankle and I believe
shattering the other foot Although he received prompt treatment he sank very
rapidly. He was interred in a very large burial ground in rear of Ypres.
He was a fine officer and greatly respected by all.
Chas Hayfair . Lieut Commander.
Many years later Frank Andrews of the Drake Battalion was to write : -
Commander Bennett was badly wounded at about 4:30 p.m. on November 4th 1917.
I was attached to H.Q. at the time and we were caught right in the middle
of very fierce bombardment which the enemy had a nasty habit of putting over
every evening at the same time. He was carried away and it was with great
regret that we heard he passed away. I was about fifty yards away when that
particular shell dropped but was fortunately not hit myself although several
of my mates were killed. (10)
On the 7th November Sterndale Bennett's replacement Battalion Commander
was writing to Walter's mother:-
I cannot tell you how shocked and grieved we all were when your son was wounded
on the evening of the 4th. This is the first opportunity I have had of writing
and offering you our heartfelt sympathy as I had taken over command at once
and we are only just out of the line.
I am afraid his wound is very severe but we sincerely trust that be may be
spared to you and all those who have learnt to know his worth, though I am
afraid he will never be fit for active service again.
I cannot tell you how much he was looked up to and liked by the men and officers
of the Battalion, and indeed all who came in contact with him, and I do not
think I am saying more than the accurate facts when I say that he was
universally
recognised as the best Commanding Officer in the Division.
We shall miss him more than I can say, but his example and training will
- I am certain - live in the Battalion for a long time.
He was always cheerful and optimistic and absolutely fearless. His men would
have gone anywhere and done anything he asked them with the most complete
confidence.